Substance in the Kantian Philosophy (Based on and adapted from the author's doctoral dissertation on substance in the philosophy of west)

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ABSTRACT
In every historical period of philosophy, the important concept of substance has always been a significant philosophical discussion. In the zeta book of metaphysics, Aristotle says, "In fact, what has always been asked, which is a cause of confusion, is the question of substance, that is, what is being?" From the Homeric age to the pre-Socratic philosophers, controversy over the concept of substance was very serious. Plato raised it in his theory of Ideas, and Aristotle discussed it in details in his Metaphysics. After the renaissance, Descartes revived the discussion of substance and presented his explanation and interpretation of types of substance. Unlike Descartes, Spinoza believed in a single substance. That single substance was considered by him to be God. Unlike Descartes and Spinoza, Leibniz believed that the theory of substance should prove the unity of substance despite its plurality. He presented his viewpoints through the theory of Monads. After Descartes, some English experimental philosophers rejected the existence of substance, and some of them said that it was not necessary to assume the existence of substance, Locke, for example, said that substance is an unclear thing and that we do not know what it really is and that we have got not a clear representation of it. At any rate, we consider it as the fundamental basis for every issue because it is familiar to us. Barkley rejected the material substance, that is, the thinking substance on which attributes and qualities depend. Hume denied, and rejected, both the unknown material substance and Barkley's spiritual substance. According to Kant, substance does not refer to the characteristics of the objective world since it is a category to the faculty of understanding.

KEYWORDS: Substance; Category; Knowledge; Understanding; Reason

INTRODUCTION
Development of Problem
The concept of substance is common to logics, philosophy, and theology, and a very important discussion in the knowledge of reasoning and in the physical sciences. Aristotle, who established the first western systematic philosophy, has written comments on the substance more than any other subject, and his metaphysics begins with a discussion on the topic of substance. Every philosophical system has to discuss two important concepts: substance and causality.

A philosopher's attitude to these two concepts determines his philosophical position.
If he rejects or denies substance and causality, his philosophy approaches skepticism. If he accepts them, he may be prepared to accept metaphysical notions. Kant, who claimed he had affected a Copernican revolution in philosophy, revolutionized the concept of substance. He reduced it from a fundamental characteristic of the objective world to an aspect of the faculty of understanding, without which it is not possible to understand the external reality. In order to fully understand Kant's philosophy, it seems necessary to pay attention to the intellectual and philosophical movements prior to him, specifically in terms of substance. Many philosophical schools and movements influenced Kant's critical philosophy, for instance, Rationalism, Empiricism, Enlightenment, Romanticism, and viewpoints of Wolf and Rousseau. Given that the present essay focuses on the concept of substance, it is worth examining, very briefly, the viewpoints of Rationalists and Empiricists on substance.

Although there is no consensus among Rationalists on the whiteness of substance, they agree about the existence of substance. For example, Plato believed that substance is the same as Idea, and that the soul is closely related to it.

Aristotle believed that the true substance is the individual. Descartes believed in three substances: God, soul, and body. Spinoza believed in one substance, and Leibniz believed in the substantiality of monads.

Apart from their differences over the theory of nativism or innateness, the Rationalists consider the substance to be native or innate.
“Rationalism discusses the concept of substance both in terms of ontology and in terms of epistemology. In terms of ontology, the discussions include such comments as, "on the soul", "on the body" (Wahl, 1991, pp.83-84) on Reason", and 'on the substantiality of God "

One of the discussions concerning the substance and the attribute is the concept of movement. In terms of epistemology, one thing has to be known: What is the origin of substance?

Empiricists believe that every human knowledge, including every conception and confirmation, originates in experience, both sensory and conscious, and that man's mind is a tabula rasa before experience.

“Empiricists do not believe in any rational preceding principle. They do not agree that substance is innate” (Routlege, 2000).

Here. It is worth considering the viewpoints of pre-kantian empiricist philosophers concerning substance, since it will enhance our knowledge of substance in Kant's philosophy.

Locke believes that the representation we term as substance is nothing but the unknown assumed carrier of some qualities that we understand they exist and we imagine that the qualities cannot be without the thing they carry and we call the thing, "Substance"; that is, the thing which is the basis, and which is the carrier. We should bear in mind that the general notion or the composite conception of substance or substances we have is something vague, which seems to be lying as the foundation for all the simple representations (or qualities).

Locke's belief in the existence of material substance, despite his roots in empiricism, stems from the fact that he accepts the reality of concrete things independent of perception.

Barkley does not accept the material substance, i.e., the non-thinking substance on which attributes and qualities depend. He even rejects its existence as it is absurd and contradictory to assume the existence of a material, or non-thinking, substance. He says that there are two types of existents: the perceptive, and the perceived. In Treatise 18, Barkley says:

“However, even if substances with body, shape, and movement, actually exist outside the mind, and in accordance with our mental apprehensions, how can we obtain knowledge of their existence?

But how can reason make us believe in the existence of objects outside the mind on the basis of our perceptions? Therefore, if we have a representation of substance in the general sense of it, i.e., as the carrier of attributes and as self-existent, we might have taken the representation from the spiritual substance.

Aye, the origin of representation of substance is the perception we have of our soul as a perceptive existent" (Hakak, 2001, p.126).

Hume rejected both Locke's unknown material substance and Barkley's spiritual substance. He did not accept the objective reality of substance.

Given what was said above, Hume believes that we have got no representation of the corporeal substance and that we cannot say that it is perceived through one of the senses and since the representation of substance does not precede any impression, substance is nothing but a collection of simple representations composed and unified by the faculty of imagination, and consequently, it is an imaginary representation. Concerning the soul, he says we have nothing other than the perception, and that the substance is other than perception. Therefore, we connect multiple disconnected perceptions. In this way, we come to believe in the existence of a single continuous connected concept in the course of time, and we call it the soul.

“It is acceptable to maintain the general assumption that there were many things about which Hume was skeptical or absurdist. However, his legacy is based more on reductionism than on skepticism or absurdism. The general assumption can be explained by considering his viewpoint about substance.

According to Hume's viewpoints in the Treatise, our belief of the substance results from a mistake or a fancy” (Kant, 1963).

Types of Knowledge According to Kant

Kant believed that types of knowledge, in the first instance, fall into two groups;

Analytical and Composite. Judging, and thinking are quite contrary to perception, and none of them can refer to the other. Prior cognition, which is the same as judging, is either analytical or composite, and on the other hand, each type is either a priori or a posteriori. Therefore, it seems that Kant's classification allows for four possibilities of judgments, or sentences, namely, a posteriori composite, a priori composite, a posteriori analytical, a priori analytical. However, the fourth possibility does not exist. As for a compiled [that is, composite] sentence, or a judgment proposition, the predicate should contain information not included in the subject. The analytical proposition does not just pertain to the meanings of words, and therefore, it does not give any new information.

In contrast, the a posteriori proposition gives such information since it depends on experience. Metaphysics always deals with pure intellectual concepts in an a priori way. It can be said, therefore, that the future of metaphysics depends on the materialization of a priori propositions.

A priori composite propositions in any discipline are our presuppositions or subject matters for thinking, and they may be difficult to decipher.

It is possible to explicate them only if we search in our thinking peculiarities. The critical philosophy is primarily an inquiry into the essence and the action of preceding composite judgments. Preceding [or a priori]
concepts may be the descriptions of details whose ways of perception are different from a posteriori concepts. Kant argues that place and time are such details. They are a priori details or the pure forms of perceptions abstracted from the perceived. In the critical period, Kant wrote three critiques: the first critique is the famous 'Critique of Pure Reason', which assumes that there are three stages in the movement of reasoning, each stage having a distinct faculty. In the first critique, Kant deals with the senses of reasoning, the concept analysis, and the analysis of principles and dialectics. Kant's method is transcendental, rather than psychological.

In other words, the faculties of understanding are examined in the pre-experimental cognitions affected by the faculties, and not within themselves. Sensibility is never the cognition of sensible things, as understanding is not the rational cognition of representations. Sensibility is a faculty which gives the scattered unrelated multiplicity in place and time. Understanding is a faculty which connects and unites these multiplicities together. Therefore, the book divides into the transcendental senses and the transcendental analysis. One deals with the pre-experimental and the general in the multiplicity and the other deals with the action of understanding in its purest and most abstract form, giving unity to the variety. Knowledge of rules of understanding is the very transcendental logic.

“The transcendental logic includes a priori knowledge of noumena. As long as this knowledge is the action of understanding, the transcendental senses [that were considered above] will examine the forms of feeling as a priori necessary conditions so that the noumena may develop in the feeling” (Coplestone, 1981, p.89).

Kant terms the pure or a priori concepts of understanding the categories, and the categories of understanding are a priori conditions or the logical actions of affirmations. Before the presentation of Kant's table of categories, it is necessary to point out that the Aristotelian categories are the division of actuals and possibles, but the Kantian categories are a priori categories of the faculty of understanding. However, it is necessary to explain why the spontaneity of understanding connects the multiplicity of sensiveness, and how the multiplicity of intuition falls into the pre-experimental concept. It is because the transcendental judgment results indeed from our discretion that an intuitive thing is a partial state of a general concept. Kant's solution is the transcendental schematization. 'Schema' refers to a rule by means of which mental images can be created in accordance with a specific concept. Schema is neither the concept of sensiveness nor the mental image of sensiveness. It is, rather, something between the two and it is created by the imagination.

The question of categories will not be solved unless we find a mediator between the pure understanding and the pure intuition, and it is the pure transcendental schema. Schematization reveals the possibility of pure understanding noumena in the sensible intuition. Therefore, the attribution of categories means materialization through the unification of the multiplicity of pure perception.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, (B.105), Kant says:

“This function gives unity in a judgment to different representations, and also gives unity to the pure [i.e.bare] synthesis of different representations in an intuition. This unity, generally speaking, is called the concept of pure understanding. Exactly in the same way, there develop concepts of pure understanding. We like to call these concepts categories as Aristotle did, since our intention is indeed the same as his at first, although it will be different from his intention during the performance” (Kant, 1983, pp. 158-159).

**Kant's Categories**

If we abstract the contents of a general judgment and pay attention to it just as a pure form of understanding, we will learn that function of thinking in the judgment can fall into four headings, each heading having three factors within it. They have been listed in the following table;

1. **General (the unity)**

2. **Particular (the multiplicity or plurality)**
   1. Quantity
   2. Quality

3. **Personal (the totality)**
   1. Affirmative (the existence)
   2. Negative (the negation)

4. **Infinite (the infinity)**
1. Attributive (the essence or substance)

2. Conditional (Accidental)

3. Relation

4. Disjunctive (Association)

1. Possibility (Impossibility)

2. Existence (Being–Non Being)

4. Direction

3. Necessity

In the fourth category, of course, the possibility can be termed as the conjectural possibility and non-being, and the existence can be termed as predicative or definite, and the necessity can be termed as certain.

According to Kant, each category of the third categories is obtained from the combination of the first and second categories.

In the category of relation (attributive and conditional), there are the substance, the attribute (or accident), and the causality. Now we learn that the position of substance in the categories is in the category of relation (the attributive). The concept of substance is the thing that Kant terms the schema of the category of substance.

For the concept of substance, there is no place other than the concept of substance defined in the schemata. Kant tries in the beginning to prove that the validity of the category of substance is for the understanding of phenomena. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant says:

The Principle of Permanence

“All the phenomena incorporate in themselves the substance as the object itself within themselves, and the changing as the pure determination, that is, in a way as the fixed exists” (First Edition).

“In all the variations of appearance, the substance remains unchanged, and its quantity in the nature neither increases not decreases” (Second Edition).

Whatever belongs to the existence of thing is the substance, and whatever belongs to the permanent Being is able to become, like the determination of thinking substance. Kant tries to demonstrate that what he terms a priori representations including the representation of substance are the necessary representations, and as such, they are objective, and that the experience depends on them as a requirement, and experience, in the sense Kant uses, is not possible without such representations.

Human mind must find a fixed permanent thing as the basis of every change in the course of events: That fixed thing is the substance, which is not perceived through experience. According to Kant, the substance is essentially a rule or law the substance is essentially the law in that it explains the order in which phenomena occur one after the other, while it is fixed itself and not changing in the course of events and happenings, and in that it helps us to easily understand the changes. Kant believes that the substance cannot exist save in the world of phenomena.

“Kant believes that the principle of substance is at work only within the circle of attributes and phenomena, and that it doesn't go beyond that. Substance, according to Kant's description, is something between the substance and the phenomenon, both this and that, in some respects, (Wahl, 1991, p.85) and neither this nor that, in every respect”.

The phenomena are not substances, but they necessitate the substantial existence in the phenomenal world of noumena. Kant considers the being of phenomena and the obvious matters as subsidiary to the being of noumena. In other words, he accepts the existence of phenomena because he believes in the existence of noumena. The main meanings of substance for Kant are as follows:

1. The logical subject in which the predicates are inherent and the predicate itself is nothing else. In this meaning, "I" is a substance.
2. Something relatively independent, which remains permanent throughout the changes of attributes. In this meaning, "I" or the subject is not a substance.
3. That which is permanent throughout the changes of appearance, and whose quantity neither increases nor decreases in the nature. In this meaning, there is one substance, that is, matter.
4. "The schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time, that is, the representation of the real as such a substratum of the empirical determination of time in general, viz., the substratum which is constant when everything else is changing what is corresponding to time, which is itself constant and unalterable, is the non-
transitory in existence, that is, the substance, and only in substance can the succession and coexistence of phenomena is determined in time” (Kant, 1983, pp. 247-248).

The phenomena are not substances; they necessitate the substance in the world of noumenon. Here, it is necessary to distinguish the transcendental essence from the (non-permanent) concept of noumenon. The transcendental essence means the completely undetermined understanding of something universally, but this transcendental essence is not yet the concept of noumenon. In order to turn the transcendental essence into the noumenon, we should assume an intellectual intuition in which the essence is given and the noumenon (the non-appearance) has two meanings: Negative, and affirmative.

In the negative meaning, it is a thing that does not belong to the sensible intuition. However, if by non-appearance, we mean a thing belonging to the non-sensible, and then, we assume a specific kind of intuition, it will be the affirmative meaning of noumenon (the non-appearance). Now, let us deal with the attribute.

Kant says that the separation of substance and attribute leads to many misunderstandings, but, given the circumstances, the application of our understanding is unavoidable, and in his opinion, we should not take Lockes assumption of substratum. Kant says that the attribute of a substance is just the specific mode of the existence of substance.

"Determinations of a substance, which are but the particular modes of that substance for existing, are called attributes. Attributes are always real since they are related to the being of substance” (Kant, 1983, B230).

In other words, a thing is not the substance and its attributes, in a manner as though, they were its separate components, but it is a substance which exists in a specific way. The substance and attributes are not different elements in a thing, but a single thing is viewed from different perspectives.

**Demonstration of Substance**

The reasoning for the demonstration of substance in the second edition [of the Critique of Pure Reason] can be summarized as follows:

1. Any coexistence and succession or sequence in time which serves as the substratum is our form of inner intuition.
2. Time does not change in itself, but it is constantly fixed. Otherwise, we would need another time so that the first time could change within it. Therefore, there is an unchangeable thing in our experience. Only through awareness of this unchangeable thing can we have knowledge of the change.
3. The existence of a constant fixed element in our experience was demonstrated. It cannot be found only in time, and therefore, it must be sought in the sensible impressions, as a substratum that represents the time, and a condition through which only can the change and coexistence be apprehended and distinguished, in other words, the theorem that any change and/or coexistence depends on the existence of a fixed substratum.
4. Such a fixed and constant substratum is the thing which usually is referred to as the substance. The reasoning in this way is an argument for the existence of substance” (Kant, 1983).

**Is Soul (or Spirit) a Substance?**

In the second book of 'The Transcendental Dialectics', Chapter One, the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, Kant deals with the fallacies of pure reason. He defines the logical fallacy as the erroneous reasoning or deductions obtained from erroneous forms, apart from the contents of reasoning. However, a transcendental fallacy has a transcendental basis which leads us to obtain an erroneous conclusion due to the forms. The theoretical (rational) psychology claims the demonstration of the existence of soul as a self-existent substance, and given the principle of cogito [that is, I think], it claims, it has shown that Soul is simple, personal, eternal, and self-preserving. Kant addresses those under four questions, and therefore, he develops four modes of inference for them. These inferences, or analogies, are indeed the fallacies Kant refers to as the fallacies of pure reason. Now, the four questions are: 1. the substantiality of soul 2. The simplicity of soul 3. The character [or personality] of soul 4. The self – existence of soul.

What concerns us here is the first question, that is, the substantiality of soul- The metaphysical argument for the question has been presented in the form of the following paralogism:

'That which whose representation is the absolute subject of our judgments and, therefore, cannot be used as the determination of another thing, is the substance.

I, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my possible judgments, and this representation of me, cannot be used as the predicate of a kind of another thing.

Therefore, I, as the thinking being (soul), am the substance” (Kant, 2011, p.399).

This analogy is a paralogism, that is, an erroneous inference, in that it has four parts.

Technically, the medium can be thought of only as the subject.

In the minor premiss, it has a meaning which is different from its meaning in the major premiss. In the major premiss, it refers to the representations of thought in general, including the images and, to be sure, the category of substance refers to the essence given to the intuition, or the essence that might be given to it, and it may be considered as the subject, that is, as the form of thinking rather than essence of intuition. Substance is
never used to refer to something in this meaning since the pure self-consciousness has not been given to the intuition, and therefore, this category is not applicable to it. The permanent soul has not been given to the intuition, and, therefore, the category of substance cannot apply to it. As it was said above, there are three main concepts of pure reason.

"Soul as a permanent substantial factor, Universe as the collection of phenomena which have the relation of causality, and God as Absolute Perfection, and as the unity of the conditions belonging to the thinking in general. These concepts are not innate, but they are not obtained by means of experience either" (Coplestone, 1981, p. 132).

Therefore, the title of the category of substance does not apply to them, given that the spirit provides the substantial meaning only in terms of ideals, and not in terms of reality. 'I' is a subject which represents itself as the final substance, and this approach becomes the cause of the illusion of substantiality of soul (or 'I').

Is God a Substance?

In the division of mental faculties, Kant considered the third faculty to be the reason, and that the reason has three categories or a priori essences, and that the third category is God. Kant accepts the definition of God as the Perfect Existent since he believes that the representation of God is within the original reason. The theoretical theology claims that it has demonstrated the existence of the Necessary Being, and it raises some proofs. These proofs are classified in three forms:

1. The existential proof
2. The natural existence
3. The natural proof. Kant’s criticism concerning these proofs sums up in the voiding of the existential proof. He then declares that the other two arguments are based on the existential proof, and therefore, the other two proofs are void like them, and he finally concludes that it is impossible to produce a rational proof of the existence of God” (Karam, no date, p. 79).

Kant’s comments in the Critique of Pure Reason on the existential proof are as follows: 'If something exists, then an absolutely necessary being must also exist. Now, at least I myself exist. Therefore, there is an absolutely necessary being. The major premise contains the analogical inference of the existence of the necessary from an experience in general. Now, the argumentation goes further and draws a conclusion: The necessary being can only be determined in a unique manner" (Kant, 1983, A605).

He presents the following critique of the above argument:

"Of course, it can be well permissible that the existence of a being which has the highest adequacy, such as the cause of all the possible effects, be assumed in order to facilitate for the reason the unity of grounds of explanations which it seeks.

However, if we go on too far, and declare that such a being necessarily exists, it will not be the modest announcement of a permissible assumption. It will be, rather, an impudent assertion in the manner of an apodictic certainty" (Kant, 1983, A 612, B640).

Now, we accept that the above argument cannot prove the existence of the self-existent God. The concept of God is the intellectual perception of a noumenal thing which has been presented in experience. God is thought of as an essence, namely, the essence dependent on thinking.

However, He is not presented as the essence; the concept is, rather, the thinking of the pure reason. God is not a substance outside my intellection; God is, rather, a thinking by means of which we can create a combination of dependent essence for ourselves through a priori knowledge. Kant draws a distinction between the concept of God and the existence of God. God is conceived as the highest cause of the thing in universe, and He is an existent of high distinction. God is the Highest Good, Reason, and Being. The concept of God is a man-made Ideal. In other words, He is the creation of mind, and there is no Divine entity outside the mind, conforming to this concept [contrary to the viewpoints of Descartes], God is a transcendental idea whose existence cannot be inferred. Although we think of God as an infinite substance, He is not a substance, and He cannot be, since He is higher than the human understanding. It is not possible to prove the existence of God as a specific substance by means of the theoretical reason. Free will, eternity of soul, and God are the concepts that can be demonstrated by the practical reason. While the theoretical reason is unable to produce arguments for them, the practical reason takes them for granted. These concepts are not subjective or personal, but they are objective and universal since the reason it assumes them as obvious concepts, and this is an acknowledgement that the practical reason has priority over the theoretical reason. Our only access to God is across the ethical consciousness. No theoretical proof for the existence of God is possible. There is a correlation between faith in God and commitment in the pure principles of practical reason. Kant says: "The representation of God depends on faith in Him and in His identity” (Coplestone, 1981, p. 272).

Kant also says:
The very concept of God presupposes faith in Him. Reflections on God and faith in Him are two questions on an equal footing (Coplestone, 1981, p. 272).
Conclusion and / or Summary

In short, the substance and the attribute are the first categories of the relational categories [or the categories of relation] in the categories of the faculty of understanding. The substance is a thing which ought to be the last subject of any other determinations with respect to intuition. Unity and constancy are the substances of characteristics which apply to the world of appearances (i.e. the phenomena) by means of man's understanding, and the determinations of a substance or the manner of the existence of a substance are termed the attributes. In the critique of theoretical reason, Kant knows no existence for the substance except in the world of appearances (i.e. the phenomena), and Soul and God that are not categories are not considered as substances. In the critique of practical reason, the substance finds a location and / or status, and our soul is considered to be substantial when it has free will and when it is connected to God.

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