

# The Nature of the Theorem of Admiration and Condemnation in Terms of Mohaghegh Isfahani's Perspective

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## ABSTRACT

Mohaghegh Isfahani believes that theorems such as justice are good and injustice is condemned, and these objective issues have not external reality or it is not a real fact that is outside rational validity, but the rational opinion is that justice is good and injustice is bad. He maintained in the field of epistemology of admiration and condemnation that human's intellect is able to understand the object's admiration and condemnation and the topic of the discussion is focused on some points: firstly, justice is as a safeguard of a discipline and injustice causes disturbance in a discipline. Secondly, the conscience of love of nature. Thirdly, adopting with disadvantages and conflicting with interests, and that he indicated his arguments on the famous aspect of admiration and condemnation. And finally, it has been proved that his claims are not comprehensive and the fame of an issue is not compatible with its reality.

**KEY WORDS:** Admiration, Condemnation, Famous, Nature.

## INTRODUCTION

Mohaghegh Isfahani claimed that "admiration of justice" and "condemnation of injustice" are the famous theorems which are rationally agreed upon issues, for there is no order to determine the compatibility or non-compatibility of this issue. Therefore, the accuracy of the "admiration of justice" theorem is that it is rationally agreed upon and all have this consensus that the subject praise justice. He takes two ways to prove this issue that the theorems like "justice are admirable" are the famous theorem and the criterion to prove it is rationally agreed upon.

A. Quoting the words and opinions of the experts.

Avicenna says in the references that the admiration of justice and condemnation of injustice are not the theorems to be understood by human's intellect or sensation and to acknowledge it, unless some issues are occurred:

1. Human is seeking the induction of such an order.
2. It is acknowledged by training and suggestions
3. it is believed by human interactions.

In fact, Avicenna's words is indicated due to the fact that the admiration of justice and condemnation of injustice are not the essential theorems, otherwise, it would be gathered by human's intellect.

Isfahani maintains that these are the reformatory disciplines which are of two kinds:

1. those which are achieved by human interactions and temperaments, such as kindness, benignity and protecting privacy.
2. Those which are rationally agreed based on religious rules .

Mohaghegh Tousi indicated in explaining the latter words of Isfahani that:

Religion comprises written and non-written ones: non-written religion is the one agreed upon by the scholars for some sciences may be agreed on scholars contrary religion. In this interpretation, Mohaghegh Tousi considered admiration of justice and condemnation of injustice as the evidence of rationally agreed upon and famous theorems.

What is meant by famous theorems?

The famous theorems are the ones that are acceptable to the public and because there is a logic for a theorem being famous, the logicians divided the famous theorems into some subdivisions based on means of fame:

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1. Those obligatory things that are acceptable and it means initial certain theorems, such as “ the whole is greater than its parts”.
2. Scammony theorems, that is the ones agreed on by all human beings, such as “ admiration of justice” and “ condemnation of injustice”.

Sheikh Alrais believes that “ admiration of justice” and “ condemnation of injustice”, such as the latter one is not certain.

Mohaghegh Isfahani says, concerning the issue that “ admiration of justice” is not proof to issues such as intrinsic subjects, that : “ the inherent aspect of proof is that studying the subject by itself is sufficient to its abstractness, such as the comparison between human and its location, while taking another one’s property ( grabbing another one’s property), which is one of the aspects of inner title, is not enough to abstraction of condemnation, but other titles such as abomination and dissatisfaction, which are both outside the nature of subject, should be annexed to, and the action must be considered as a usurped thing for being called as condemnation, and how is it possible in this case that describing condemnation – which is the same as deserving scorn and its position in the nature of action ( grabbing another one’s property) is latter- is abstracted from the action itself. (ibid, 8).

The real contents of Isfahani’s words is concerned with the fact that the seizure in other’s property is the category of the verbs and one’s dissatisfaction and it is a kind of human pleasure, and an object cannot be categorized under two supreme objects. Therefore, the seizure cannot be considered as one real thing for it is related to two separate things, because it is a prerequisite for an external developmental thing to be composed of two heterogeneous materials. Therefore, it should be said that seizure is an abstract title which is abstracted from seizing another one’s property while the owner is dissatisfied , and the prerequisite of an abstract thing ) seizure) cannot be inherent to proof.

What is meant by inherence?

By inherence, it does neither mean the category of Eisa Ghouji, nor the inherence of the category of proof, but it means rational aspect. That is, to have the intelligence in understanding the admiration and condemnation without any recourse to external realities and to comprehend the admiration and condemnation of actions, and by using the terms such as inherent and rational objects, it means to reject the theory of poets which intellect by itself is not self-sufficient to recognize good and bad things and the things that deserves to be praised and the ones condemned.

Therefore, those who justify the object’s admiration and condemnation based on public interests and disadvantages, it cannot be categorized in the field of inherent admiration and condemnation, for intellect is unable to understand the two features and recourse to another one namely social outcomes. It is better to name this group as those believed in non-inherent rational admiration and condemnation.

In other words, inherent admiration and condemnation have two features:

1. Wisdom is independent and so called “ self-sufficient” in its order.
2. Wisdom has no need in its order in analyzing the aspects of the case and only understanding the subject (justice), praise ( admiration) and predicate ( which its comparison is originated from the self) are sufficient in acknowledgment to predicate and the station of these theorems is in practical intellect, dignity of the basic theorems and theoretical reason.

### **Evaluation and Criticism**

According to our opinion, an important problem which can be indicated in the words of Mohaghegh Isfahani is the issue of relativity in ethics. Because knowing the well-known theorems about value judgments has outcomes and instruments that no Shiite philosophers and thinkers can accessed to; the instruments such as non-realistic value, relativism and pluralism and that they cannot rationally be defended. While one the characteristics of clear thoughts of Shiite thoughts against the non-Shiite thoughts is related to moral realism and defending from inherence of values. Another thing is that ethical theorems in our opinions indicates objective realities in external world and it is not merely a rational validity.

### **The Epistemological Perspective of Mohaghegh Isfahani concerning admiration and condemnation**

In the first two parts of this article in the field of epistemology of admiration and condemnation, the theorems including admiration and condemnation has been discussed and now another issue concerning the way they are recognized are discussed below:

Is human's intellect able to understand the goodness and badness of the works regardless of lawyer's allowance and forbiddance? If human's intellect is not able to understand the action's goodness and badness, what are the ways to recognize it? Do they can be determined through social axioms? What about religious orders? If human's intellect is able to understand work's goodness and badness, is it able to understand all the work's goodness and badness or it merely has such power about some of them? However, is understanding of the works which can be understood by human intellect are axiomatic or theoretical? If it is axiomatic, what kind of axioms is it related? In other words, are the value judgments the types of certain theorems or they are the famous things? Mohaghegh Isfahani was the first one who attempted to prove that the theorems admiration and condemnation are the famous ones with making some claims. He explained this perspective in his well-known books "Nahat Al-Deeyat Fi Sharh Alkefayat". He claims that the explanations he mentioned are in fact the arguments to prove that these theorems are famous value judgments. Now it is going to the words of this principled thinker be expressed briefly for the explication of this perspective. Firstly, Mohaghegh Isfahani says that there are some incontrovertible facts that are the requirements to be understood and comprehended by intellect and it has no relationship to fame and rational consensus.

### **The principle of the topic of discussion**

Justice causes the maintenance of discipline and injustice causes the disturbance in the discipline.

Undoubtedly, everyone easily understands the fact that justice and charity are led to public interest which cause the social system's maintenance, and on the contrary, oppression and abuse comprises public disadvantages which are led to social system's disturbance. There is none who do not accept this idea or is in doubt within. It is due to this fact that all people accept the principle of these rules despite being different in the realities such as justice, injustice, goodness and badness. That is to say, all people accept that "justice and goodness are good" and "injustice is bad".

### **Conscientiousness of the love of nature**

The second fact is that every man is able to find, by referring within himself and his conscience, that he loves himself and the matters related to him. Love of nature, or so-called "psychological self-love", is of conscience and innate matters.

Human's destiny has been designed in such a way that not only he loves himself and always seeking to gain more advantage and utility for himself, but also he loves the matters related to him and loves them and seeks to acquire them and suffers from not having them.

### **Self-compatibility with the interests and non-compatibility with disadvantages**

And finally, the third fact is that every human knows the fact, as a consciousness issue and in facing with interests and disadvantages related to him, that his self is compatible with interests and is not compatible with disadvantages and hates them. Therefore, he is inevitably loves justice and goodness, because he considers justice as an adoptable and related to his essence and his interests, and he hates injustice and badness, because he reckons that injustice and oppression cannot be compatible with his advantages and interests related to his essence.

### **The reasons of value judgment's fame**

What is the reason of this claim? Why the goodness of justice and the badness of injustice are conventional issues and are related to intellectual consensus? Having investigated in all speeches of Mohaghegh Isfahani, it seems that he mentioned three reasons in response to this question:

1. Reason one: if every action is required to be praised or scorned, only one of the two methods below is possible (ibid, 312,314).

A: as a prerequisite of the cause compared to effect and something advisable compared to something being advised.

B: the prerequisite of a supreme being compared to lower levels

The first type of prerequisite is where one person has an oppression to someone else. By explanation, when injustice is made on an individual, an impetus to take revenge from the oppressor is formed within that person because of something that is incompatible with his self. In such cases, the cause of the condemned to scorn is a real cause. In other words, these cases can be considered as the real cause and

effect. However, the latter cause is the types which our aim to order to praise and censure is to maintain the social order and survival of human kind, due to the fact that justice and charity observe public interest and oppression and injustice observe public disadvantages. Therefore, it is required by the public interest to praise actions which are based on public interest and the public disadvantage also requires to blame and censure the works which are based on public disadvantage. Therefore, that public interest is required to praise doing something that is based on public interest, and that public disadvantage is required to blame and censure doing something that is based on public disadvantage. Therefore, this praise and condemnation cause maintaining social order and preventing from anarchy in social order. Then late Isfahani says that the meaning that can be adopted to rational order and can be attributed to a lawyer is the latter one, not the former definition which is neither the lawyer's stature and dignity neither rationally suitable, for they are rational. The latter branch is a rational rule which can be named as "discipline arrangements", for an order to the badness of justice and badness of injustice, or in other interpretation, an order to praising the justice and censuring injustice, cause doing something that comprises public interest. But the praise and censure that are related to animal motives on justice and injustice neither are never led to public interest nor it prevents from public disadvantage. Obviously, such contingency does not mean the first one. What was concerned with Ashaere and Adlieh is the latter contingency. And proving such contingency is the one repeatedly mentioned: maintain social order and survival of human kind that is common and popular among all people and its opposite is also inappropriate for everyone and this issue forces the intellectualists to praise performing something that is based on public interest and condemn doing something that is led to public disadvantage.

Based on what was mentioned, by expressing the fact that justice deserves to be praised and injustice deserves condemnation, it means that it is based on the intellectualists and their consensus that such is the case for justice and injustice rather than there are such contingencies in reality and by itself (ibid, 314).

2. Reason 2: Mohaghegh Isfahani also raised this issue in another discussion and he meant another reason to prove that the goodness of justice and badness of injustice is the famous issues. He says that the famous theorems are not considered as intended meaning, for this reason:

A: the materials of proof are limited to six essential ones, because the content of proof is either based on "proprieties", such as "the whole is greater than its parts", and the theorem of "two contradictory things cannot be associated with each other" or they are "admirable", including physical senses which are named as "observations", such as the theorem of "this material is white", or "this fruit is sweet", or inner senses, which are named as "conscientiousness", such as the theorem of "I have knowledge", or "I feel hungry", or it is of innate things such as the theorem of "number 4 is even", or it is of experiences, which is the product of repeating experiences, such as the case "Saghmounia is easy" or the case "there is a country named Siberia", for those who has not yet been gone there and did not see that place, and he merely heard of numerous people who do not probably agreed on lying. Or it is of "speculations", such as the case "moonlight is taken from sunlight".

It is clear that deserving praise and censure compared to justice and injustice is not among the priorities, that is, this is not the case to sentence an order merely because of speculating the subject (justice or injustice) and the effect (goodness or badness) for proving the relations among them. Who can they be regarded as priorities while the intellectualists have not consensus to it. In addition, the theorem of "justice is good" and "injustice is bad" is not among the sensory cases, that is, this sense neither can be understood by apparent senses nor by inherent senses, because it this is not deserves to be observed by sense to be considered as observations. It cannot also be considered as consciences, because there are natural theorems, because they are not the type of cases to be compared, and there is no need to explain why they cannot be categorized as successive, experimental and speculative theorems.

As a result, value judgments, or theorems based on goodness or badness, are not essential and obvious cases, but such cases are famous ones (ibid, Vol. 42, 2-43).

### 6.2.3: Reason 3

Moreover, Isfahani mentioned in another place that: logical theorems are the ones based on realities and the self; however, the famous theorems and deserved opinions are the ones can be proved based on the intellectualists' consensus, not according to realities, for the reality is not beyond the public consensus.

What is valid among the dialecticians regarding early cases of proof, which is limited to six-type-necessities, is their compatibility with reality and facts. However, what is valid in famous theorems and

deserving opinions is their compatibility with the opinions of the intellectualists, because there is no reality other than intellectualist's consensus

## REVIEW AND CRITICIZM

### 1. Non-compatibility with value realism

The reality is that the contingency of the actions should be considered as the accuracy of admiration and condemnation or deserving them and or admiration and condemnation ( three different interpretations applied in the words of Mohaghegh Isfahani), such as the contingency of “ cause” for “ effect” and or the cases such as the contingency of “ supreme being” and its “ lower levels” is not only compatible with value realism, and as a result, their rationality, but also it fully confirms the value realism. Value and ethical realism means that there is a cause and effect and real relationships between action and purpose. If the desired action is to establish social order, it will be clear that this goal cannot be achieved with any action, and it cannot be obtained by praise, admiration, treachery and oppression, but the actions commensurate with it should be praised. Therefore, the intellectualist's admiration and condemnation is under the real cause and effect and the actions over them, not creating goodness and badness for actions.

Even it is accepted that admiration and condemnation are deserved for its lower levels in value judgments such as the contingency of the finalities, it does not contradict with the rationality and reality of value judgments. Because, when it is said that justice is good, it means that doing a justifiable action is contingent to be praised and fairness, that is, we are achieved to that fact through the action. Even if the result is considered as public interest, it means that a justifiable work is really caused to meet public interests, not conventionally this is occurred! This fact can be expressed by the statements such as “ justice is good” and “ justice must be applied”. Therefore, goodness and badness means expressing the relationship between cause (human's optional actions are the ones derived from optional actions) and effect (a desired result).

### 2. Being not evident is different from being not rational

The second proof Mohaghegh Isfahani mentioned to prove that value theorems are famous is not clear, for if a theorem is not considered as axioms, it will be required to be proved. There are many theorems that cannot be doubted, but they cannot be claimed that they are not axioms. For example, the theorems such as “ there is resurrection day”, “ sending prophets is necessary”, “ God is all knowing, all sage” and “ human's soul is perpetual”..., are all theorems. However, it cannot be claimed that there are axioms. None of the theorems are supreme, sensory, perpetual, natural, experimental and continues. However, it can be concluded from this fact that these are famous theorems and they have no fact and reality beyond fame and public interest.

There is a clear and obvious fact indicating that logical and intellectual theorems are divided in a general taxonomy into two categories namely axioms and theories. Theoretical theorems are also logical and intellectual, though they cannot be categorized as six-type-axiom.

### 3. Truth and falsehood in value theorems

The last point is that value theorems are according to realities and the self. However, it must be paid considered that the reality of something is based on its features. The reality of something is sometimes outside world, but some theorems outside our mind and some others are philosophical and subjective which are achieved from comparing two subjective and objective reality. The reality of value theorems are the same as this type. The truth of a theorem means that the reality be the same as what that theorem indicates. Therefore, the reality of a theorem may be different from the type of what it is narrated. In fact, in the theorem “ truth is good” wants to say that there is a causality relationship between truth and being achieved to desired aim. The truth of this theorem is that it must be really in a way that this claim be proved, that is, “ truth” be the human's cause of being achieved to desired perfection in the real world.

## Conclusion

The attitude of Mohaghegh Isfahani is based on the relationship between admiration and condemnation which the goodness of justice and badness of injustice means that justice deserves to be praised and injustice deserves to be censured and it is based on the intellectualist's consensus and the action itself is not bound to real interest and disadvantage. Therefore, the admiration of justice and condemnation

of injustice are the famous theorems and hence outside the logic and is not effected to logic. The criterion for truth and falsehood of these theorems is compatibility and non-compatibility of the intellectualist's opinions, not the outside world, because the reality of these theorems is in such a way that depends on compatibility and non-compatibility of the intellectualist's opinions.

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