

Rational Admiration and Condemnation in Terms of Mohaghegh Esfahani's View

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to discuss one of the major ethical and verbal issues namely admiration and condemnation in terms of Mohaghegh Esfahani's view and attitudes in the fields of sciences of meaning, epistemology and ontology will scrutinize, and in it will be finally indicated that admiration and condemnation are among the well-known issues that are based on scholar's consensus. In the continuity, concerning the difficulties and criticism of this view, it can be said that: firstly accepting this issue have many negative consequences including non-realism value, relativism, pluralism and the lack of ability to rationally defend the moral judgments.

KEY WORDS: Admiration , Condemnation , Inherent , Famous Cases.

INTRODUCTION

Admiration and Condemnation

The rational admiration and condemnation is one of the significant and invaluable issues which is based upon dialectics, ethics and principles of science. In other words, the above-mentioned issue is one of the significant ones in dialectics which is the fundamental tenet of most other issues and it can be benefitted from in some fields of sciences and it is used as a subject issue and fixed rule in dialectics, such as ethics and science of principle.

Ethics is concerned with high human values and demonstrating the generality and the continuity of its principles is one of the branches of rational admiration and condemnation.

The generality and continuity of the principles which are affected by no change in environmental differences, civilization's evolutions, and the diversity of habits and imitations and its stability and durability have been increased, is originated from this issue. That is to say, if a moral principle is beautiful, it will be always beautiful and if it is ugly, it will be always ugly. Without belief to inherent admiration and condemnation, moral values will be relative and it will not be continued and stable.

One of the key principles of the science of jurisprudence, which talks about the reasons and arguments that can be deduced by knowing the commandments of God, is the chapter of intellectual presuppositions and implications which all are derived from intellectual admiration and condemnation. If this chapter is taken away from the science of principles, the methods of deduction will be changed and the rules will be manifested in some other ways.

Sheikh Muhammad Taghi Najafi, the author of the valuable book "Hedayat Al-Mostarshedin", confined the reasons of religious precepts to four ones namely The Book, tradition, consensus and intellect and he had a comprehensive speech in each field. It is mentioned that the debate on intellect will be focused on two points:

1. Minor proof: that is one certain action is beautiful or not beautiful in terms of intellect.
2. Major proof: that is if a certain action is intellectually admirable or condemnable, the rule of judiciary will be naturally will be attending to its rule and the admiration of an issue in judiciary will be manifested as something which is invented and its condemnation will be manifested as its inhibition and the first discussion is the basic principles of the second one and indicates its subject (Najafi, 431).

An example is given concerning the issue of necessities: the cases in which persons are not aware of divine rules and think that it is possible that a certain action will be necessary and essential, and at the same time they find no reason in the assumption of expressing assignments such as The Book, tradition and consensus, it is intellectually possible that the action will be obligatory, and if it is in fact obligatory, it will be condemned to be leave aside by punishment, because such a punishment is the one in leaving aside an obligatory thing which is not expressed on the owner of the assignment and such a punishment is intellectually obscene and objectionable. The one who deduces this issue is come to this result in this condition that there is no duty on this person and he can assuredly leave aside the thing that is probably obligatory.

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1. Expressing the Problem

The significance of this argument and the valuable results are taken are not hidden to scholars. From the time when dialects are devised by scholars, the issue of intellectual admiration and condemnation become so important and there are few books in dialectics which do not regard it and or considers it as indifferent.

The point that raised expressing this issue is matter noted below:

1. The issues of condemnation and admiration are fundamental compared to many other dialectical issues.
 2. The doubt expressed by some intellectualists concerning the immorality of Islamic laws, especially in the realm of ethics, and it has been thought that many ethical principles and Islamic jurisprudence rules are related to specific circumstances and their development will naturally be stopped when those conditions are changed.
 3. The issue of continuity of ethical principles have been considered by scholars in the west and some of them attempt not to recognize the ethical principles as a general and stable principle to justify the corruption exists in the west in this way and consider it as a kind of morality. Russell, the English mathematician, is insisted in this regard than most others.
4. Expressing the relationship between ethics and science and that how much understanding the universe can be effective in human's morality and decision making, because some people take the way of indulgence and some the way of wastage. In this article, we are going to prove this essential fact that whether admiration and condemnation are inherent reality which has a tangible reality beyond human mind. In other words, the issue of admiration and condemnation are inherent facts or the famous cases that which are based on scholar's consensus, that is whether is a reality out of intellectualist's authenticity.

This impetus and the ones similar to it made us express the issue of admiration and condemnation away from complex and ambiguous terms.

2. Significance and Position

The issue of value has been the focus of analysis in various sciences and in different ways. Epistemology, the philosophers of ethics, the scholars in aesthetics, theologians, scientists in principles, scholars of different social and human sciences such as sociologists, economists, lawyers and scholars in political sciences have explored this issue based on their specific views. The extensiveness the discussion related to value has been to the extent that a field named "Axiology" has been formed to study the various aspects of this issue. In this study, the nature of value and issues related to it are the focus of study and research.

The discussion in the field of value is an interdisciplinary subject (HUsseini Kfavi, 402) and it has been studies in different sciences. In one hand, it is a dialectical debate and it has been firstly proposed by theologians in the Islamic world to resolve the issues raised regarding divine justice and God's actions. It is later on discussed by the scholars and jurists . however, it seems that the main place of this debate is ethics and moral philosophy and the philosophy of values in general. If it has been considered in dialectics, it is because of the fact that the relationship between servant's morality and that of Gods is to be recognized and to know whether God's actions are issued based on the moral principles and criteria governing on human relations or God has a special moral and no considering the ethical principles governing human relationships are expected from God. Firstly, it may be assumed that the divine essence or admiration and condemnation have not significant scientific and practical effect. However, the significance and special position of this debate can be gathered with a little thought: the one who believes that admiration and condemnation is inherent, he believes that optional actions of an autonomous being, regardless of absence or presence and awareness or unawareness of the one who has authority, and also regardless of the wishes, desires and willingness of people are admirable or condemnable, in fact it is going to say that moral rules and values are rooted in reality and it can defend moral absolutism and deny moral relativism and pluralism. Moreover, such a person believe that the relationship between values and beings is a rational and unbroken relationship. On the other hand, the one who believe that admiration and condemnation is a religious act thinks that God's forbiddance and allowance are the only factor in good actins and bad ones and considers the value of actions as an agreed and unrealistic issue.

Another practical outcomes of this issue is manifested in the role of intellect in Islamic rules and educations.

The one who defends the theory of admiration and condemnation believes that it is a religious and divine argument where there is a rational reason for a subject and behaves based on that rule, although there was not a clear instructions from the judge. However, according to divine admiration and condemnation, never is it benefitted from intellect as a guide to deduce religious rules and orders (Motahari, Vol. 955, 4-956), for intellect

is not merely an understandable and discoverable force, and if it is accepted that the value of actions are inherently based, there will be no place for intellect to have a role.

The late Mollahadi Sabzevari maintained, concerning the significance of this issue, that the issue of admiration and condemnation is a significant one and there have been many attitudes expressed and many principal and dialectical issues are based upon it. The base and direction of many doctrinal discussions is this issue (Sabzevari, 108-109).

3. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Talking about value has a long history. Written history of human kind shows that this issue has been seriously considered from various aspects by ancient Greece philosophers and thinkers. On the one hand, the sophists such as Socrates and Aristotle, and on the other hand, extensive research are performed and various ideas are expressed in different types of value, including ethical values, aesthetics, epistemology and political and religious dimensions. Their discussions in this regard are still the focus of serious attention of philosophers and theologians. A cursory look at the dialogue between Socrates and Asyfron indicates the in-depth discussions expressed in this regard. In this dialogue, Asyfron claims that act of God is a good cause of an action. Then Socrates asked him, “whether God orders something is reward and because that thing is a reward God orders it? ASyfron says in response that it is a kind of reward because God orders it, and they continue their dialogue in this way. This is exactly the issue that was raised later on in Islamic thought and Muslim’s theologians and philosophers discussed in this regard comprehensively and beneficially. Also, addressing this debate by some great scholars in recent years causes re-developing and resolving some of the problems and ambiguities in this regard. Although this issue is required to be more scholarly and seriously considered.

The origin of this problem being raised in Islamic dialectics are the issues expressed concerning divine actions and characteristics among the theologians, for when they talked about God’s characteristics, especially his justice, they in fact want to confirm the inappropriateness and abomination of unfair practices, as well as to show that God does not do ugly actions. For this reason, they should firstly indicate that whether human’s intellect can recognize their work’s beauty or ugliness and can judge about their goodness or badness.

From the beginning, Muslim theologians have been divided into two categories concerning this question: Shiites, Mutazals, Karamies and also some Hanafies believed that the value of actions are lies in the essence of things, and human intellect is not able solely able to understand the value of some works without the guide of divine revelation. God’s forbiddance and allowance are also help people to discover the reality of some other works. Based on this issue, the goodness of a good work lies in its essence and hence it is ordered by God and the ugliness of an ugly work lies in its essence and hence it has been forbidden by God. On the other hand, Ashaaries insist that God’s forbiddance and allowance is the positive aspect of action’s goodness and badness, that is God’s forbiddance and allowance is worthwhile and it is not true that goodness and badness lies in the essence of works and revelation merely uncovers the realities. As it is commonly and prevalently indicated by the poets, “a good work is the one that is considered as good by God and the bad work is the one that is considered by God as bad work”. So if God gives a command to lying, lying will be considered as a good thing and if truth is prohibited by God, it will be inappropriate and obscene.

4. The attitude of Muhaghegh Esfahani concerning admiration and condemnation

It has been aimed in this article to show what the attitude of Muhaghegh Esfahani is concerning the concepts of admiration and condemnation. Whether the concepts are objective or subjective? Whether they are real, authentic or arbitrary? Whether they are essential concepts or philosophical ones?

It has been deduced by the words of Muhaghegh Esfahani that by admiration and condemnation, it means the merit of praising and the merit of condemning.

Regarding the issue that whether admiration and condemnation is inherent, Muhaghegh Esfahani said that by the intrinsic nature of good and evil thing, it means that these two things are the “intrinsic width” for their subjects, that is justice has worth to be praised as a justice and without giving it another title, and oppression has worth to be condemned as an oppression without giving it another title. But the other ethical titles are not the same as this. For example, truth is sometimes condemned to be considered as an objectionable thing and it is where it causes the murder of a faithful person (Esfahani, Vol. 44, 2).

Moreover, Mihahegh Esfahani indicated in the issue of obstruction that by admiration and condemnation, it means that the subject admires a good thing by the virtue of his intellect and condemns a bad thing by the virtue of his intellect (ibid, Vol. 287, 3).

In another place of the book “*Nahayet al-Derayat*”, Mohaghegh Esfahani indicated that by admiration, it means that the subject is merited to be praised and by condemnation, it means that the subject is merited to be condemned (ibid).

Another instance in the dialectics of Mohaghegh Esfahani which can be adhered to is to prove this issue that by admiration, it means the merit to be praised and by condemnation, it means the merit to be condemned. It is said that, the origin of this rule, as it is mentioned in its place, is not but the subject is rationally entitled to be praised and injustice is subject to be scorned, because there is the public interest in the former and there is the public scorn in the latter one, for in scorning the intellectuals, because the intellectuals are rational and seek to attract the public interest and preventing the public detriments in order the human society to be remained and injustices are put away from the human society.

Mohaghegh indicated concerning the issue of novelty and conduction (Isfahani, Vol. 376, 1).

Therefore, this concept of Mohaghegh indicating that he considers the nature of reward as something admirable and the nature of condemnation is to be scorned, in other words, what causes rewards is admirable for it can be adopted to the action and what causes punishment is condemnable, for it can be well- adopted to it.

Some researchers have claimed that by reflecting on the concepts of Esfahani's words, five definitions can be proved concerning admiration and condemnation: firstly, we seek to express the nature and meaning of this definition and secondly, the original meaning that is argued to be proved, and finally express the idea of the late Esfahani.

He defined these two concepts as follows:

1. He sometimes defined admiration and condemnation as admiration and scorn.
2. It is sometimes meant as an order to praise and condemnation.
3. It is sometimes deserved to be praised and condemned.
4. The nature of praise and scorn are defined based on admiration and condemnation.
5. Based on what intellectuals mentioned, he defined praise and scorn according to admiration and condemnation.

4.1: The analysis and study of the definitions of admiration and condemnation made by Mohaghegh Esfahani

These definitions are apparently different, therefore, it should be seen whether there is a unit root or not, therefore, these definitions are separately considered:

Definition one (the validity of admiration and condemnation): what is the meaning of this definition? it firstly may seem that its meaning is the same as the goodness of admiration and condemnation, if this is the case, especially in the position of definition, it is required to, for in this regard, admiration and condemnation means approving condemnation, that is admiration and condemnation, moreover, if this is not the case to be defined, this issue that admiration and condemnation of actions is in fact the same as praising goodness and condemning the bad things is not a useful concept. However, the first definition of admiration and condemnation is not correct, for the ones which can be intellectually understood is not the same as the dignity of the accuracy of admiration and condemnation. However, it is accepted that admiration and condemnation are achieved based on the intellectual consensus and they are not the issue related to accuracy of praise and scorn. Moreover, no words of what Mohaghegh Esfahani expressed indicates this meaning.

But the second definition (an order to praise and scorn): this definition is by itself a synopsis, for admiration and condemnation are a type of action and cannot be described as objects such as admiration and condemnation; therefore, the order to these two actions must be one of the two meanings below:

1. Approving the admiration of justice and condemnation of oppression. If so, praise and concern should be considered as admiration and condemnation by itself. Then this meaning will be the same as the fourth definition of praise and concern.
2. An order to praise and scorn, if so, there is a problem as which meaning of the order is related to approve and which one indicates to give orders. In his case the person is characterized as approving or the one giving order, not describing its state, while admiration and condemnation are the features of an action.
3. Deserving praise and scorn: this meaning can be proved from Mohaghegh Esfahani's words (Isfahani, Vol. 2, 42).

4. The self of praise and scorn: praise and scorn, both are the doer of an action and the subject of being praise or scorned, and unlike admiration and condemnation, they are not the adjective of verb, therefore praise and scorn cannot be admiration and condemnation. Although this meaning cannot be proved by seeking in the words of Mohaghegh Isfahani.

5. Based on the intellectualist's consensus of praise and scorn: this is the most original definition and all other ones are developmentally oriented and are based on intellectualist's praise and scorn.

If the appearance of this definition is regarded, that problem is also existed on the previous definition: what is the relationship between the description of justice as praise and injustice and scorn? They are rational and are based on praise and scorn. In other words, the intellectualists are concerned with action and they cannot be the characteristics of objects, unless they are justified and says that: praise and scorn are the features that are abstracted from an action that was based on rational praise and scorn, not rational admiration and condemnation. However, the last definition was meant by Mohaghegh Isfahani (ibid, 369).

2.4: REVIEW AND CRITICISM

1.2.4: problem 1:

In Mohaghegh Isfahani's words, "praise and scorn" are sometimes equivalent to each other and are sometimes "the accuracy of praise and scorn" and sometimes "deserving praise and scorn", while these concepts do not seem to be equivalent. For "praise and scorn" are rational and therefore it is under their authority and volition.

However, "deserving praise and scorn" is another issue. As such, it is claimed that this deserve is an objective reality, therefore, such a deserve is existed, whether "praise and scorn" are actually realized in the outside world or does not realize, though this issue is not so easy as it appears. It had previously been noted that "deserve" needs analysis.

It may be referred as abstract things and or real and developmental talents. It seems that the latter is more correct. However, that Mohaghegh Isfahani firmly claims that praise and scorn are referred to rational objects and they are not naturally derived from these objects, it is correct based on the premise of "praise and scorn" not "the deserve of praise and scorn". And at least it is not clear based on the latter interpretation, and it should be observed what reasonable and justifiable meaning can be derived from "deserve".

4.2.2: Problem 2:

Most importantly, the fact that admiration and condemnation is the same as praise and scorn or deserving praise and scorn needs reflection and it is a concept that was not much agreed upon. Mohaghegh Isfahani claims based on the theories of many experiments in ethical issues that the conflict on the issue of rational praise and scorn about this meaning is the result of praise and scorn. It probably means an abstract object which was common among poets, Motazeleh and Imamieh. Perhaps the conflict was really for this issue.

Mr. Larijani believes that the issue of praise and scorn by itself should firstly be explored. It must be figured out that the phenomenon of praise and scorn has outside reality or it is an abstract object and what kinds of features it has and then ask what features praise and scorn have as the meaning of deserving praise and scorn. Is it real or rational? It seems that this a kind of deviation from the main point and discussion which instead of studying the real nature of admiration and condemnation, a meaning of is taken that (the accuracy of praise and concern) and discusses that this is real or abstract meaning. For it is possible that admiration and condemnation by itself are not analytically the same as praise and concern. If it is supposed that all the introduction of Mohaghegh Isfahani's logic came to an end, the achieved result is not other than some actions are rationally praised and some others are scorned and this is not prove that the admiration and condemnation affecting actions (maybe on objects) are in fact praises and scorns. Therefore, another analysis is needed to prove this point. It does not seem that such a point is existed.

4.3.2: Problem 3:

The introduction mentioned by Mohaghegh Isfahani, if supposed as correct, does not prove the point above-mentioned. However, according to the logic of Mohaghegh Isfahani:

1. Every man loves himself and his own perfection
2. Therefore, every action help his perfection is favorable.
3. The discipline in a society help people achieve optimal perfection.

4. Justice helps a society's discipline and injustice helps the lack of discipline.
5. Therefore, the wise men love justice and hate injustice.
6. The wise men suppose that justice should be praised and injustice should be condemned in order justice to be prevalent in society and injustice will be avoided.

Now the problem is that according to the above-mentioned points, what is firstly and naturally popular and must be praised, it is "making the ideal perfection", and consequently the discipline and justice which is led to be popular and it is based on praise.

It seems that the latter problem is not related to the meaning of admiration and condemnation, for this part should be consecrated to the application of the terms admiration and condemnation in the Arabic language. Another point is that this discussion is related to ontology of this issue. Therefore, Mohaghegh Isfahani is right here.

6. Ontology in terms of the researcher's view

6.1. The criteria of goodness and badness

In this part of the article, it is going to say that what the criteria of goodness and badness is according to Mohaghegh Isfahani's view.

In other words, the ontology of words and the valuable issues are going to be studied. The main issue is to prove whether "admiration and condemnation" are the kinds of statements from the point of the researcher? That is, whether it can be proved or realized by themselves? Or is these kinds of words are statements and cannot be realized or proved? In other words, is value judgments as experimental and mathematical ones are predicative of objective and external facts or no external facts are indicated or it merely indicates personal feelings and emotions or group inclinations and the like? Or finally, or value judgments are the kind of fictitious and authentic rules or discovery and real ones.

The ontology of admiration and condemnation has long been the focus of different thinkers. This issue was one of the sectarian issues in the history of Muslims. In fact, the real conflict between poets and jurists was in the field of rational admiration and condemnation, that goodness or badness, regardless of lawyer's allowance or forbiddance, is an objective and external reality or the reality beyond the lawyer's allowance and forbiddance. In other words, whether these actions are related to admiration and condemnation or not before a verdict is proposed by the lawyer concerning this issue.

After Mohaghegh Isfahani denies that admiration and condemnation are inherent in the field of Isaghouchi and intrinsic to proof, he expressed his intention as :

It is not hidden that the titles of admiration and condemnation are two parts: some are inherently admirable and some are inherently condemnable, such the titles of justice and charity in the former one (inherent admiration) and as oppression and injustice in the latter one (something that is inherently condemnable), and there are some titles that are not inherently admiration and condemnation, but they are not inherently so, as apart from the titles mentioned, and by intrinsic nature of goodness and badness, it means that these two (intrinsic width), are related to their issues, that is to say, justice deserves to be praised without recourse to other titles. And injustice is deserved to be condemned without recourse to other titles. But other ethical titles are not so. For example, truth is sometimes is subjected to be condemned and deserved to be scorned, and that this where it causes a faithful man's death or lying are sometimes subjected to praise and admiration and that is where it causes a faithful man's liberation (Isfahani, Vol. 144, 2).

Isfahani mentioned in another part of his book "Nagayat Alderayat" concerning admiration and condemnation that by inherent and non-inherent, it means that if a title is inherently subjected to praise of the doer of an action, regardless recourse to other titles, is affected to be rationally praised or scorned to the subject. That is why, it is comprised public interest and disadvantage. Therefore, the action is either inherently admirable or inherently condemnable.

If an action is not inherently subjected to admiration or condemnation, but because it is under the provision of admiration or condemnation, therefore, that action is objectively admirable or condemnable.

Finally, some actions are often objective and some are inherently entitles, such as true and false. In his case, it is said that if true and false are assumed as inherent (without external side effects), then it will inherently be described as admiration and or inherently described as false. Mohaghegh Isfahani maintained in continuous that the case of admiration and condemnation of injustice are the famous cases that is rationally agreed upon to maintain the discipline and its survival (ibid, Vol. 369, 1).

Concerning the nature and reality of admiration and condemnation, he maintains that such issues are the ones agreed on by scholars, for public interest and maintaining the discipline and its survival is bound to (ibid, Vol. 42, 46-2).

Therefore, if a lawyer considers the rational admiration and condemnation, he means that they are the adorable and famous theorems that are considered as advisable disciplines, and these are the cases that are agreed upon by scholars in the way that they are rational and no external reality are rationally beyond credibility.

Conclusion

In the science of meaning of admiration and condemnation, Mohaghegh Isfahani maintains that from the different meanings can be raised for admiration and condemnation, it means admiration as the meaning of deserving praise and injustice as the meaning of deserving condemnation. He means that if a lawyer considers the rational admiration and condemnation, he means that they are the adorable and famous theorems that are considered as advisable disciplines, and these are the cases that are agreed upon by scholars in the way that they are rational and no external reality are rationally beyond credibility.

Therefore, if admiration and condemnation of objects depends of a lawyer's verdict, never can intellect be used as a guide to deduce religious rules and orders and that proving positivism is not possible in ethics.

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