

The Cuban Missile Turmoil in the Caribbean during the Cold War Era: A Historical Analysis of USA's Proxy Confrontation in Opposition to USSR

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ABSTRACT

The Cuban Missile Crisis is by and large memorized as lasting for just thirteen days (from October 16, 1962-October 28, 1962), beginning with the point at which Washington discovered that dynamic edifice was scheduled in Cuba to inaugurate launched conveniences for Soviet medium-range missiles, to the calendar day the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Khrushchev, overtly and officially agreed to remove missiles from Cuba. As part of the concluding pacification and accession that was got in touch, President Kennedy assured that the United States would not invade and enter by force in Cuba. All-inclusive balance sheets of the crisis lengthen beyond these instantaneous 13 days to take account of the period from October 28, 1962 to November 20, 1962 as well, when resulted negotiations were carried out that more fully set forth and codified the agreements had been accomplished, the period when the U.S. naval line of defense was lifted, and the special ready to act status of the military forces of both of the countries had ended. The research gives the reader an inspiration regarding when the U.S. unclothed the erection of missile unveiling locations, President John F. Kennedy candidly deprecated the Soviet measures, challenging that they confiscate the nuclear missiles from Cuba. The paper makes accessible a comprehensive general idea of this tiff and squabble.

KEY WORDS: Cold-War, Caribbean, Crisis-1962, U.S.A., U.S.S.R., Kennedy, Fidel-Castro.

INTRODUCTION

If the world ever drew closer close to a nuclear world war then that would have to be the time of the Cuban missile calamity. On one side the United States was standing by to pounce on Cuban land and on the other the Soviet Union was enthusiastic to go nuclear in protection of the atoll. However as the course of events opened the globe was past the worst from witnessing an additional blood-spattered encounter which would have been much worse than the conflicts wrestled sooner than it. The two men that can be said to have been accountable pro forestalling the hostilities are President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev. The sum total panorama started when the Soviet Union envisaged the scheme of installing intermediary range missiles in Cuba. The USSR PM Nikita Khrushchev considered this to subsist an apposite scheme of thought with the intent that they could have the United States within their assortment and therefore trim down the menace of a prospected attack on the part of the American administration. This was if not impracticable because the USSR was deficient in such long range missiles that could target the United States from their land of birth.

Sensing the unvarying peril of an additional armed attack on the miniature islet Fidel Castro more than received the sketch of the Soviet prime minister with armaments wide unlock. That's why the work initiated in 1962 as soon as the Soviet Union progressed to fabricate their missile fittings in Cuba in a very mysterious mode and at great velocity. Conversely, they got trapped red handed when the explorational snaps took into custody the under construction sites in Cuba. On hearing the informations the American president set up the EX-COMM who arrived at a compromising point to install a naval quarantine on all sides of the waters of Cuba. Subsequently the news was made to all and sundry with the understanding that any beginning from Cuba would painstaking be well thought-out as a war on USA. By way of the fleet putting a stop to supplementary Soviet approach President John F. Kennedy insisted on them to back out of the map.

CHRONOLOGICAL INSIGHT

Cuban Missile catastrophe, of 1962, foremost cold war fender-bender stuck between the United States and the Soviet Union. Later than the Bay of Pigs raid, the USSR amplified her support of Fidel Castro's Cuban rule, and in the summer of 1962, Nikita Khrushchev covertly determined to fix ballistic armaments in Cuba. When United State scouting flights unclothed the underground edifice of missile launching positions, President Kennedy in public condemned the Soviet measures. He compulsory imposed a naval obstruction on Cuba and acknowledged that whichever missile got underway from Cuba would necessitate an all-out corrective assault by the United States beside the Soviet Union. On Oct. 24, 1962, Soviet missiles carrying vessels to Cuba turned reverse, and when Khrushchev agreed Oct. 28, 1962 to take out the missiles and take to pieces the missile sites, the mess ended as out of the blue as it had started. The United States ended her barricade on Nov. 20, 1962 and by the end of the year the

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armaments and bombers were detached from Cuba. The United States, in response, promised not to attack Cuba, and afterward secretly detached ballistic missiles she had sited in Turkey.

When Castro assumed control of Cuba in January 1959, he enjoyed the enthusiastic support of the great majority of the Cuban people. He invited anti-Batista moderates and liberals to organize a provisional government under his leadership as prime minister. The new government soon increased the wage levels of workers and lower-middle class employees. In May an agricultural-reform act limited the size of holdings to a maximum of 966 acres, with sugar, rice, and cattle-raising enterprises allowed to be as large as 3,300 acres.[1] This measure destroyed the very large landholdings (*latifundio*), including U.S.-owned sugar properties, several of which exceeded 400,000 acres. Land was distributed to tens of thousands of rural workers, and support for the revolution increased throughout the countryside. A literacy campaign sent thousands of young volunteers to rural areas. The government also began building hundreds of new schools and training thousands of additional teachers. Similarly, new clinics and hospitals were constructed, many in rural areas where such facilities had been almost nonexistent. Private and racially segregated beaches and resorts were opened to the entire public. All these changes were immensely popular with most Cubans.

Szulc claimed that Castro decided to attempt developing Cuba into a Marxist-Leninist one-party state during 1959 or even earlier. Castro's reasons apparently included the belief that a centrally controlled government was necessary to counter anticipated U.S. opposition to his planned socioeconomic changes.[2] Castro viewed the U.S. government as capitalist dominated and was sure that it would not easily accept the establishment of a socialist economic system in Cuba, not only because of the negative impact on U.S. investments there, but also out of fear that other Latin American countries might follow Cuba's example.[3] Castro's experience with self-seeking and corrupt political figures in Cuba and the country's cycle of shifts between elective politics and pro-U.S. military dictatorships probably convinced him that a multiparty democratic system would be too vulnerable to economic and military pressures from the United States or to covert actions by the CIA, such as the bribery, intimidation, or assassination of key leaders.[4] A second factor influencing Castro's decision was his belief that Marxist-Leninist-style socialism could solve Cuba's socioeconomic problems, such as its high levels of inequality, unemployment, crime, and corruption.[5] Control of Cuba's government by a revolutionary party would enable major structural social change to be carried out quickly.

Castro and many of his associates felt that past revolutions had bitterly disappointed the economic and nationalist aspirations of most Cubans. In contrast, the new revolutionary government's rapid redistribution of wealth rallied enthusiastic support for the revolution among the majority of Cuba's rural and urban populations. Revolutionary leaders concluded that a nationally owned (rather than foreign-dominated) economic infrastructure would give Cuba the ability to resist economic control from other countries more effectively. The possibility that Cuba, having alienated the United States, might become economically dependent on the USSR seemed less onerous because the Soviet Union was very distant and presumably could not exercise the same level of control over Cuba¹ as the military and economic giant only ninety miles away.

By the end of 1959, the more radical elements from Castro's M-26-7 movement had consolidated control over the Cuban army. This accomplishment involved the removal of conservative officers and soldiers and the trials and executions of about 550 Batista military and police personnel accused of murder and torture. The firing squads offended some North Americans but won the strong approval of the thousands of Cubans whose family members or friends had suffered Batista's repression.[6] Members of M-26-7 also assumed positions in the government bureaucracy. During 1959 Castro held negotiations with leaders of the Communist party; his goal was to fuse his M-26-7 movement and their organization to create a new Communist party under his leadership.

Revolutionary Instruction Schools were established not only to train young recruits in how to run revolutionary institutions but also to teach Marxist-Leninist concepts and interpretations of Cuban history.[7] Castro concealed his plans to transform Cuba into a Communist party-dominated state in an attempt to delay the expected furious opposition from the United States and to provide time to strengthen the revolutionaries' control over the army and prepare the Cuban people psychologically to accept the new system. Later Castro cited Marti's advice to revolutionaries that to achieve desired goals, deception must sometimes be used because to state those goals openly might provoke powerful opposition that revolutionaries might not yet be able to overcome. When in April 1961 Castro revealed to the Cuban people that the revolution was going to result in socialism, he used Marti's demands for social justice and the elimination of poverty and racism as the basis for the proclamation.

When moderates in the provisional government, M-26-7, and the rebel army realized that the revolution was moving toward a socialist economy and a political system dominated by a rejuvenated Communist party, they began to resign in protest. Castro condemned such resignations as counterrevolutionary and called upon supporters to stage mass demonstrations. Some opposed to Castro's plans launched a new guerrilla war in the Escambray Mountains in central Cuba. The counterrevolutionary guerrillas included former Batista soldiers, some landowners opposed to the agrarian reform, a number of individuals with rightist political views, and even some disillusioned former rebel army members, all loosely bound together under the banner of anticommunism. [8] They numbered as many as 5,000 in the early 1960s, but the revolutionary government was able to mobilize many

times more men and women. Castro sent tens of thousands of revolutionary militia into the mountains, positioning 1 person every few hundred yards along trails and roads. This made movement of opposition forces extremely difficult, except in small groups, and most of the weapons and supplies the CIA airdropped to them fell into the hands of Castro's people. In a few years, the counterrevolutionary guerrilla threat was eliminated.

In the cities, hundreds of thousands joined neighborhood Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) to carry on organized surveillance, which brought an end to violent attacks on the government in urban areas. In the 1980s, an estimated 66 percent of the total population and over 80 percent of adults belonged to CDRs.[9] The efforts of the revolutionary armed forces and the CDRs were aided by Castro's intelligence service, which had agents placed in virtually every counterrevolutionary group. Several hundred thousand discontented Cubans, mostly urban upper- and middle-class individuals and families, left Cuba in the early 1960s. Castro's program of "exporting dissent" reduced security problems but also hurt the economy because many of those who departed possessed important skills.

UNITED STATE'S RESPONSES TO THE REVOLUTION

In April 1959, Fidel Castro visited the United States and expressed a desire for friendship and continued trade. But by late 1959, the CIA began sending weapons to anti-Castro guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains. And by mid-1960, the Eisenhower administration had decided to organize and arm an exile military force to overthrow Castro's government [10] In September 1960, the CIA recruited several U.S. Italian-American organized-crime figures, formerly involved in Havana casinos, to assassinate Castro. It is very possible that Eisenhower and later presidents were not specifically informed of plans to kill Castro: The CIA often neglected to inform a president about a controversial operation in order to give him "plausible deniability" if the matter ever came to light [11] During 1959, the revolutionary government began buying arms for its new army, purchasing 25,000 rifles, 50 million rounds of ammunition, and 100,000 grenades from Belgium, and mortars, cannons, and heavy machine guns from Italy. The United States would not sell Cuba weapons and soon pressured Western European countries into refusing arms sales. Revolutionary Cuba could then only obtain military equipment from the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies. According to Szulc (1986), the first weapons from Czechoslovakia and the USSR began reaching Cuba in late 1960, several months after President Eisenhower had severed economic relations. Deliveries of jet military aircraft began in mid-1961, after the U.S.-organized "Bay of Pigs" invasion of Cuba had failed.

When the revolution succeeded in January 1959, the Soviet Union was at first not very enthusiastic about Castro's government because for years Cuba's Communist party had portrayed Castro as an irresponsible adventurer precipitating pointless bloodshed before objective conditions were right for revolution. But certain events during the year 1960 greatly increased Soviet interest in aiding Cuba.[12] First, relations with the United States worsened markedly following the downing of a U.S.U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union. As tensions increased, the Soviets quickly recognized that given their significant inferiority to the U.S. in nuclear weapons and delivery systems, Cuba could be a valuable strategic asset. Furthermore, in 1960 the ideological conflict between the USSR and the People's Republic of China became public knowledge. The Soviets and the Chinese were thereafter in competition for influence among less-developed countries. Cuba provided the USSR an opportunity to demonstrate its concern with aiding a developing nation attempting to free itself from what its revolutionary leaders viewed as imperial domination.

As ties between Cuba and the USSR were developing, Cuban relations with the United States rapidly worsened. In June 1960, oil refineries owned by U.S. and British companies, under pressure from the U.S. government, refused to refine crude oil delivered to Cuba from the Soviet Union. In addition the United States cut its purchase of Cuban sugar by 95 percent. Cuba, in turn, nationalized the refineries and all remaining US. Properties. The United States soon imposed a virtually complete economic embargo and for years convinced all Latin American countries except Mexico to refuse trade with Cuba. Cuba responded to scarcities with a rationing system intended to ensure that basic commodities were directed toward families with the greatest need, generally those with the most children.

The Bay of Pigs invasion, a major attempt to overthrow the revolutionary government, was initiated by the Eisenhower administration. By the latter half of 1960 the CIA had recruited hundreds of anti-Castro Cuban exiles and established bases for them in Guatemala. The plan, in fact, was modeled on the CIA's successful 1954 overthrow of the elected reform government in Guatemala. Some CIA instructors evidently promised many of the exiles direct U.S. military intervention, apparently assuming that Nixon, a strongly anti-Communist conservative and Eisenhower's vice president, would be elected president instead of Kennedy in fall 1960.[13]

After Kennedy was elected, the CIA informed the new president of the invasion plan and attempted to convince him to approve it.[14] The agency suggested that if Kennedy refused to let the invasion go forward, he would be seen as a weakling unwilling to confront a Communist threat, perhaps encouraging more revolutions in Latin America. Furthermore, the CIA misinformed the president, evidently through mistaken intelligence, that Castro was no longer popular and that an invasion would spark mass uprisings against him. This erroneous view may have resulted from the agency's relying too heavily on the opinions of middle-and upper-class exiles, among whom Castro was certainly unpopular. The revolution, however, had won immense support from other sectors of the population, and Castro was

apparently strongly supported by a large majority.[15] Besides 25,000 in the regular army, 200,000 had volunteered to join militia forces all over the island and trained day and night to learn how to use newly arrived Soviet weapons. When the invasion, preceded by the detentions of several thousand Cubans suspected of counterrevolutionary activity, occurred, no uprisings materialized. Kennedy, also incorrectly informed that the Cuban air force would be destroyed before the assault gave the go ahead, but on the condition that once the landing force was deposited on Cuban soil, there would be no direct U.S. military involvement.

The CIA signed up Cuban-American-owned ships to transport the invasion force and assembled a secret air force composed of a number of B-26 World War-II era twin-engine bombers, with Cuban-exile air crews, along with several pilots on loan from the Alabama Air National Guard (four Alabamans were shot down and killed in the assault). Cuban air force markings were put on the CIA planes so that it would appear during the invasion that the country's own pilots had mutinied and joined the counterrevolutionary attack. The function of the CIA air force was both to provide air support for the invasion and to destroy the small Cuban air force on the ground through bombing attacks. Two days before the invasion, eight CIA B-26s left Central America for a raid on Cuban airfields. After the attack, the CIA attempted to stage a false defection by having an anti-Castro Cuban impersonate a Cuban air force pilot. Wearing a Cuban uniform, he landed his B-26 in south Florida and announced that he had defected and bombed his own air base on the way out. The purpose of the charade was probably to persuade the U.S. public that Castro was so unpopular that the loyalty of his armed forces was disintegrating, and perhaps to confuse or demoralize the Cubans. But the revolutionary government quickly pointed out that the front ends of its few B-26s were Plexiglas, whereas that on the falsely defecting plane was metal, a detail the CIA had overlooked.[16]

After the CIA bombing raid, which destroyed five planes, the Cuban air force consisted of eight operational aircraft, including four British-made Sea Fury light attack bombers (propeller driven), one B-26, three T-33 jet trainers, and seven pilots. Unknown to the CIA, the Cubans had been able to equip the T-33 jets with two 50-caliber machine guns each and used them as fighter interceptors during the invasion to destroy or drive off the CIA's B-26s. The Sea Fury bombers were directed against the invasion transport ships, sinking two and forcing the others to flee, thereby isolating more than 1,300 counterrevolutionaries on the beach (more than 100 of these would be killed, along with several hundred defenders)

Following the raid on April 16, 1961. Castro publicly proclaimed for the first time that Cuba's revolution was a socialist one. He had planned to make the announcement in a speech on May 1, but realizing the invasion was about to occur, he made the statement just before the April 17 landing. Later Castro said that he felt those who were preparing to give their lives in defense of the revolution had the right to know what they were fighting for.[17] Immediately attacked by local militia forces and then surrounded by thousands of Cuban army and militia, cut off from resupply or evacuation and with its air force neutralized, the invasion brigade surrendered after about forty eight hours. Later, more than 1,000 members of the brigade were sent back to the United States in return for \$53 million worth of medicine and food. The successful defeat of the Bay of Pigs invasion further consolidated Castro's revolution by demonstrating that it had given Cuba the strength to defeat US intervention. Cuban nationalism soared and Castro's popularity was greater than ever. On December 1, 1961, Castro went beyond his April speech to announce that Cuba would proceed along a "Marxist-Leninist" course of development.[18]

The Soviet Union, taking advantage of Cuba's fear of another invasion, perhaps directly involving U.S. armed forces, offered to station nuclear missiles in Cuba, precipitating the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The Kennedy administration demanded that the missiles be removed and placed a naval blockade around the island. The USSR, at the time weaker than the United States in nuclear military capability and fearing world war, withdrew the missiles. The Kennedy administration, for its part, pledged that the United States would not invade Cuba. But the CIA recruited scores of brigade veterans and other Cuban exiles; they waged a secret war of infiltration and sabotage against Cuba through the early 1970s and continued efforts to assassinate Castro.[19] The Cuban missile crisis, as President Kennedy remarked to Premier Khrushchev, at one moment approached the point "where events could have become unmanageable." This confrontation rechanneled the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union, affecting many facets of world affairs.

The roots of the crisis ran back to Khrushchev's ICBM-oriented foreign policies after 1957 and his intense concern with removing NATO power from West Berlin. By 1962 these policies were related, for the Soviets needed credible strategic force if they hoped to neutralize Western power in Germany. By the spring of 1962, however, high American officials had publicly expressed their skepticism of Soviet missile credibility. President Kennedy further observed in a widely publicized interview that under some circumstances the United States would strike first. In June, Defense Secretary McNamara indicated that American missiles were so potent and precise that in a nuclear war they could spare cities and hit only military installations.[20]

Khrushchev and Marshal Rodion Malinovsky angrily responded that, contrary to McNamara's beliefs, cities would be the first victims in any nuclear war. The Soviet premier warned Kennedy against engaging "in sinister competition as to who will be the first to start a war." For the first time in five years, however, Khrushchev emphasized Soviet bomber strength instead of missiles. As for West Berlin, the building of the wall and Kennedy's quick military buildup in 1961 had quieted

Khrushchev's demands.

In the summer of 1962, Khrushchev moved to regain the initiative in the strategic realm. In late August an American U-2 reconnaissance plane flying fourteen miles above Cuba reported the first Soviet surface-to-air missile site. Forty-two Russian medium bombers were next observed on Castro's airstrips. On October 14 high administration officials expressed their disbelief that the Soviets and Cubans would try to install offensive, ground-to-ground missiles, particularly after President Kennedy had expressly warned against any such attempt in mid-September. This disbelief was also based on Khrushchev's repeated assurances that he would not jiggle East-West relations during the American congressional election campaign. On that same day, October 14, however, the first photographs appeared of a launch pad under construction that could fire ballistic missiles with a range of 1000 miles. Several days later a 2000-mile missile site was observed under construction.

The President was in a delicate political situation. Some Republicans for weeks had warned of threatening Soviet moves in Cuba. These warnings, plus the frustrations which Castro was causing so many Americans, created in the early autumn what one acute observer called "a war party" which demanded military action against Cuba.[21] The elections were less than three weeks away. In this pressure tank, a special committee of top administration officials began virtual round-the-clock meetings to consider the response to the Soviets. The alternatives narrowed down to a blockade or an air strike against the missile sites. Dean Acheson, supported by General Maxwell Taylor and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued vigorously for the air strike, even though such an attack would probably kill Soviet technicians working on the sites. Other officials changed their minds several times in the course of five days, but Under Secretary of State George Ball slowly won support for a blockade. McNamara supported Ball with the argument that, if the blockade failed, the air strike option could still be used. Attorney General Robert Kennedy, pointedly alluding to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, endorsed Ball's position with the words, "My brother is not going to be the Togo of the 1960." Acheson so strongly opposed the final decision that he resigned from the committee.[22]

At 7 P.M. on October 22, the President broke the well-kept secret to the American people. Because the Soviets were building bases in Cuba "to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere," Kennedy announced, the United States was imposing "a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment" being shipped into Cuba. American military forces, he added, were on full alert, and the United States would "regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union." He appealed to Khrushchev to remove the offensive weapons under United Nations supervision.

The premier replied four days later in a long, rambling letter that apparently offered removal of the missiles in return for an American pledge not to invade Cuba. A second letter the next day raised the price to the dismantling of the American Jupiter missiles in Turkey. The special committee, worn down by ten days of the most intense pressures ("I saw first-hand," Theodore Sorensen later remarked, "how brutally physical and mental fatigue can numb the good sense as well as the senses of normally articulate men"),[23] now made the crucial decision to bypass the second letter and accept the first. On Sunday morning, October 28, as American military officials prepared an air strike on the missile sites for Tuesday morning, Khrushchev endorsed the American offer.[24] Sixteen Soviet ships sailing toward Cuba turned around in mid ocean to return to Russian ports. The crisis was over.

The effects, however, will ripple on at least through the lifetime of the generation that lived through those October days. In a speech of February 27, 1963, Khrushchev explained that in removing the missiles he had saved the world from a possible nuclear disaster. This step back from the brink set the tone for a Soviet policy which was epitomized in a June 1964 press announcement that in order to guarantee the final preponderance of the forces of socialism over the forces of capitalism, to win victory in peaceful competition, peace is essential." Even Soviet military support of "wars of liberation" became considerably more conditional.[25] In the summer of 1963 the United States and Russia negotiated and signed their first agreement to limit the arms race by prohibiting aboveground nuclear testing. These policies intensely angered the Chinese, widening the Sino-Russian split to the point of a complete break. The Chinese called Khrushchev foolish for putting the missiles into Cuba and cowardly for removing them. They feared the growing Russian-American cooperation and deprecated the less militant Soviet policy.

This crisis did not enhance Khrushchev's personal power within the Soviet bloc. His decline, combined with the Sino-Soviet breach and the warmer East-West relations, opened new opportunities for the satellites in Eastern Europe to regain more autonomy. Some competent observers believed that the fear of Germany, as much as Russian control, kept the Warsaw Pact nations together. Certainly no generalization could fit the spectrum of intellectual freedom which stretched from Poland's liberalism to Albania's Stalinism, the agricultural collectivization which was almost total in Russia but declining in Poland and Yugoslavia, the use of terror which was manifest in Czechoslovakia but little evidenced in Poland, or the ideological framework which was rigidly dogmatic in Albania but quite loose in Yugoslavia and Poland.[26] By 1963 anyone who talked about - monolithic communist threat was discussing a world that no longer existed.

In contrast to Khrushchev's decline, President Kennedy emerged from the missile crisis with new support and political charisma. His own conception of this power was exemplified at American University in Washington, D.C., on June 10,

1963. There Kennedy spoke of peace "as the necessary rational end of rational men" and dramatically appealed to the Soviets to seek a relaxation of tensions. This speech sped the negotiations of the nuclear test ban treaty, a pact that Kennedy then drove through the Senate over the strong opposition of American military officials and a few scientists led by Edward Teller of the University of California.[27]

The new warmth toward Russia did not improve the NATO alliance. De Gaulle and Adenauer had been angered when Kennedy offered to negotiate bilaterally with the Soviets over Berlin in August 1961, and when the United States twice rejected (in August 1961 and January 1962) de Gaulle's pleas for establishing a joint directorate for military strategy. These rejections reaffirmed the French determination to build an independent nuclear power. De Gaulle viewed the British application for admission to the Common Market in 1961-1962 as the stalking horse of American economic and political power. The French pondered Kennedy's July 4, 1962, speech, which urged Europe to join in a "declaration of interdependence," but which pointedly omitted any mention of possible nuclear sharing." This speech, together with American trade legislation that allowed large reciprocal cuts in tariffs, indicated that the United States sought increased economic leverage in Europe. De Gaulle's mistrust intensified during the missile crisis; when Atchison flew to Paris to "inform," not "consult" (the words were de Gaulle's) the French on the confrontation. The French president fully supported Kennedy, but the episode convinced Paris officials that the United States would involve them in a nuclear war without consulting them beforehand.[28]

De Gaulle's views were confirmed at the conference between Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan at Nassau in December. The United States unilaterally cancelled its development of the Sky bolt missile on which the British had hoped to base their nuclear striking force. Instead, Kennedy offered nuclear submarine and warhead information to Macmillan. The President pointedly did not make a similar offer to France. In January de Gaulle dramatically announced that he would veto the British entry into the Common Market. He explained that Great Britain had nitpicked for sixteen months of negotiations in an effort to bend the Common Market to British interests but had surrendered control of its own defense to the United States in a mere forty-eight hours at Nassau. De Gaulle, however, had made this decision for a more fundamental reason. He feared that if Great Britain entered the European Economic Community, "the end would be a colossal Atlantic Community dependent on America and directed by America, which would not take long to absorb this European Community." Shortly afterward, a Franco-German friendship treaty was signed, which de Gaulle hoped would be the axis for an independent European diplomacy.

De Gaulle correctly believed that in the wake of the missile crisis East-West tensions would ease; in the long run, a united Europe led by France would be able to influence international diplomacy if that Europe was free of both Russian and American control and if France had its own nuclear power. He also feared unchecked American military and economic power, believing that, because the United States would use the power unilaterally and irresponsibly, the French could suffer annihilation without representation.

The missile crisis did not advance Kennedy's "Grand Design" for Europe, but it tragically accelerated the American rush into Vietnam. Key Washington policy makers assumed that the one result of the October confrontation was a nuclear standoff between the two superpowers. Both had clearly indicated their reluctance to use nuclear force. The United States had won primarily because Khrushchev unwisely challenged Kennedy in the Caribbean, where American conventional naval power was decisive. Within months, both sides were discussing the easing of Cold War tensions. If the assumption was correct that the two great powers mutually feared each other's nuclear arms, then, the Kennedy administration concluded, the leaders of the emerging nations might feel that they had considerable opportunity to play West versus East, or, as in Southeast Asia and Africa, to undertake revolutionary changes without fear that either the United States or Russia would be able to shape these changes. If nationalist leaders acted on these beliefs, the newly emerging world could become increasingly unmanageable, perhaps dangerously radical from Washington's point of view.[29] Such a view meshed perfectly with the other American fear that the communist policy line of support for (but not direct involvement in) "wars of liberation" had been established in 1960-1961 precisely to exploit the emerging nationalisms. The New Frontiersmen dedicated themselves to shattering "wars of liberation" within such nationalist movements. Vietnam would be used as example.

The President also focused on Southeast Asia because he hoped to discipline what he believed to be the expansiveness of Communist China. In 1949-1950 Kennedy, then a member of the House of Representatives, had joined Republicans in denouncing the Truman administration for supposedly "losing" China. He softened these views during the 1950s, but in preparing to run for the presidency in 1960 he was reluctant to consider disavowing the use of nuclear weapons:" I wonder if we could expect to check the sweep south of the Chinese with their end less armies with conventional forces?"[30] After the missile crisis, Kennedy summarized his position in a conversation with Andre Meraux, French culture affairs minister. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler has described this talk:

Kennedy wanted to get a message to de Gaulle through Meraux that really there was no reason why there should be differences between us and France in Europe, or between us and our European Allies, because there was no longer a likely

Soviet military threat against Europe since the Cuban missile crisis. But the area where we would have problems in the future...was China. He said it was so important that he and de Gaulle and other European leaders should think together about what they will do, what the situation will be when China becomes a nuclear power, what will happen then...This was the great menace in the future to humanity, the free world, and freedom on earth. Relations with the Soviet Union could be contained within the framework of mutual awareness of the impossibility of achieving any gains through war. But in the case of China, this restraint would not be effective because the Chinese would be perfectly prepared, because of the lower value they attach to human life, to sacrifice hundreds of millions of their own lives, if this were necessary in order to carry out their militant and aggressive policies. [31]

The missile crisis and the Berlin confrontation in 1961 also reinforced the administration's belief that it knew how to threaten to apply or, if necessary, actually apply conventional military power to obtain maximum results. White House officials joked that poor John Foster Dulles had never been able to find a suitable war for his "massive retaliation"; these pragmatic Kennedyites, however, had apparently solved the great riddle by perfectly matching power to crisis. One false premise ultimately wrecked this self-satisfaction: in Berlin and Cuba the Russians had backed down Castro, noticeably, had been willing to fight to keep the missiles in Vietnam the USA dealt with by continuing to fight against apparently overwhelming American firepower. [32]

CONCLUSION

I am sure, the Cuban missile crisis situates by itself as a pivotal and crucial dot where the world came across nuclear war in the face. At no other point before or since as a nuclear exchange gave the impression so likely. The costs and consequences of the crisis were extensive. Besides, the calamity over Cuba showed the way to bigger appreciative between the two giant powers. Although the Cold War continued, the year of 1963 saw the first two-pronged accord on Nuclear Testing. This was gone after the coming years by further intercontinental concords to truss the spreading out of both conservative and nuclear weapons; a typical weather of relative indulgent that was to stay integral until the decade of eighty. The significance of the crisis has a cycle of poles apart viewpoints. On the one hand, it symbolized an ordeal pro the permanence of the bipolar system. The truth that the two most imperative powers on the earth, having nuclear potential, administered to arrive at a peaceful resolution of the catastrophe provided evidence the constancy of the organism and the fact that, undeniably, from the standpoint of intercontinental relations hypothesis, a bipolar structure is the least defenseless. On the other, the chapter attested to be crucial for reorienting the track of far-off policy all through the Cold War. Subsequent to the jam, the Hot Line was documented amid the White House and Kremlin, to make possible a nonstop and unconstrained communiqué between the two creams of the crop of the planet. That's why, an assured wakefulness of the global jeopardy faced in 1962 escorted the opinionated figures to review their stubborn site and be more unfasten to collaboration in terms of worldwide agreements and political consultations. Conversely, the shifting of the headship in Washington and the Vietnam Conflict slowed down the road to teamwork and cooperation. Anyway, this research makes accessible a comprehensive general idea of this tiff and squabble.

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