

## Regional Security after the US/NATO Drawdown from Afghanistan (2014)

Dr. Jehangir Khan<sup>1</sup>, Professor Dr. Jehanzeb Khan<sup>2</sup> & Dr. Manzoor Ahmad<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1,3</sup>Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan

<sup>2</sup>Professor and Dean Faculty of Arts, Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan

*Received: September 1, 2014*

*Accepted: November 13, 2014*

### ABSTRACT

There is an apprehension that the US/ NATO drawdown from Afghanistan till the end of 2014 will create a power vacuum in Afghanistan and it will, in turn, give rise to a strategic shift in the region. There is a possibility of the emergence of different scenarios in Afghanistan and the region that depends upon the cooperation and non-cooperation of the stakeholders. Different state and non-state actors with divergent perspectives and conflicting strategies will try to achieve their strategic, political and economic objectives. This interplay will lead to a new Great Game in the region that may pose serious threats to regional and global security. Stability and security are common objectives of all stakeholders in Afghanistan but they have divergent and incompatible strategies. Just like partners of the Prisoner's Dilemma in the game theory they may have a non-zero-sum situation if they cooperate but in case of defection the game will result in zero-sum outcome. This study is aimed at exploring the causes of misperception among all the stakeholders. It would highlight the perceptions of US policymakers regarding other players. It will take into account the consequences of cooperation and defection among the stakeholders by applying game theory. It will recommend ways and means to evolve a broader pattern of cooperation among local, regional and global players of the game.

**KEYWORDS:** US/NATO; Drawdown; Afghanistan; ANSF; Pakistan; China; India; Iran

### INTRODUCTION

The expected drawdown of US/NATO forces from Afghanistan would definitely create a power vacuum which is not likely to be filled by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) (Nopens, March 2014). Thus, regional players would rush to fill the gap through their surrogates from inside Afghanistan and a tug of war will be launched which will serve no one's interest. The inclusion of non-state actors, especially the militants, in this struggle may hamper the regional security. No doubt, NATO forces have succeeded in disrupting the network of *Al-Qaeda* in Afghanistan but the remnants of that outfit and the Taliban are still posing a serious challenge to the security forces. NATO has failed in arresting the Taliban insurgencies and if the collective efforts of 49 countries have failed to stop resurgence of these militants then, definitely, the Kabul regime can neither deter them from reemergence through ANSF nor can bring them into the mainstream through half-heartedly started dialogue process. The ANSF lacks the capability to cope with the threat emanating from these elements due to the poor training and non-availability of the required equipment on the part of their personnel (Olsson, Holmquist, Bergenwall, & Lackenbauer, 2012). After the NATO withdrawal, the morale of the militants will go up as it happened in 1989 after the rollback of Soviet red army from Afghanistan. It is feared that in the wake of NATO drawdown the US supported Kabul government may face the same fate as did the Soviet supported Najib government met with in 1989 (Huasheng & Kuchins, March 2012). Though it is a very pessimist approach but supported by fact-based analogy drawn between the two situations arising after withdrawal of foreign troops. The meager position of Afghan government is also ineffective in reaping benefit from table-talks with the Taliban. The state of cooperation among different stakeholders and crisis of confidence in each other due to conflicting interests is leading towards turmoil in this war-torn country. Ethnic divide is also contributing to political uncertainty (Olsson, Holmquist, Bergenwall, & Lackenbauer, 2012). The Afghan society is divided along ethnic lines. Control of the central government is minimal while the role of warlords and local commanders is still very crucial. Central authorities have to depend upon them to extend the writ of the government. The presidential campaign 2014 clearly reflected the ethnic conflict. In the wake of the presidential election, this rift and tension is likely to increase which would hinder political stability. Political instability will undermine the whole process of democratization which will encourage the non-democratic forces who believe in violence. The reflection of ethnic divide in political process will also be detrimental to peace and stability in Afghanistan.

\* **Corresponding Author:** Dr. Jehangir Khan, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan

Despite signing the “Enduring Bilateral Strategic Agreement” between Kabul and Washington there is no guarantee that Afghanistan will continue to be a recipient of exceptional levels of US aid. The US would honor the pledges it made in Chicago and Tokyo for military and civilian support respectively till 2016 (Dormandy & Keating, 2014). Sooner or later, the growing fiscal constraints will definitely force US Senate to put downward pressure on nearly all US administration to cut down defense expenditures abroad. Consequently, Afghanistan that is greatly dependent on US aid would face difficulties in keeping ANSF intact. Payment of remunerations to the ANSF personnel will become impossible. Training and funding to ANSAF will choke altogether (all salaries of the ANSF members are paid by the US). Most of the ANSF forces will be prone to defect at the hand of militants which will be a very negative posture.

**Table. 1 US Aid to Afghanistan**

(appropriations/allocations in \$ millions)

Fiscal Year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2002-13	2014	2015 (req)
ESF	117	239	894	1280	473	1211	1400	2088	3346	2168	1837	1850	16903	1123	1225
DA	18.3	42.5	153	170	185	167	149	.4	.3	0	0	0	884		
GHCS	7.5	49.7	33.4	38	41.5	101	63	58.	92	70	0	0	554		
Refugee Accounts	160	61	63	47	42	54	44	77	82	65	99	13	807		
Food Aid	206	74	99	97	108	70	231	82	32	19	0.6	0	1017		
IDA	197	86	11	4	0	0	17	27	30	66	61	14	514		
INCLE	60	0	220	709	216	252	308	484	589	400	324	6.1	3567	(ESF)	325
NADR	44	34.7	67	38.	18.2	37	27	49	58	69	65	54	506	(ESF)	43.5
IMET	0.2	0.4	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.7	1.4	1.8	1.6	2	0.8	14	(ESF)	1.4
FMF	57	191	414	397	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,059		
Other	33	23	36	18	0.2	0.1	21	5	5.8	7.4	8	0	158		
DOD—ASSF	0	0	0	995	1908	7406	2750	5607	9167	10619	9200	5124	52777	4727	4109
DOD—CERP	0	0	40	136	215	209	488	551	1000	400	400	200	3639	30	15
Infrastructure Fund	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	299	400	325	1024	199	0
Business Task Force	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	59	239	242	179	733	64	5
DOD—CN	0	0	72	225	108	291	193	230	392	376	421	372	2679		
DOD—Other	7.5	165	285	540	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	998		
DEA Counternarc	0.6	2.9	3.7	17	23.7	20	41	19	0	0	0	0	128		
Total U.S. Assistance	909	970	2392	4712	3339	9818	5732	9292	14854	14800	13058	8084	87963	6143	5725

**Sources and Notes:** Prepared by Curt Tarnoff, Specialist in Foreign Assistance. P.L. 113-76 (FY2014 omnibus appropriation). Department of State budget; SIGAR reports, and CRS calculations. Does not include USG operational expenses (over \$5 billion since 2002). Food aid includes P.L.480 Title II and other programs. “Other” = Office of Transition Initiatives, Treasury Assistance, and Peacekeeping. ESF = Economic Support Funds; DA = Development Assistance; GHCS = Global Health/Child Survival; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining, and Related; IMET = International Military Education and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; ASSF = Afghan Security Forces Funding; IDA = International Disaster Assistance.

Afghan government will lose ground to the non-state actors and foreign influence will intensify the civil strife (Barno, Irvine, & Matthew, June 2011). Consequently, weak economic situation will weaken the government and strengthen the non-state actors. Security environment in Afghanistan may deteriorate which in turn may adversely affect the whole region. The prevalence of chaos in Afghanistan would spill over to the countries of the region and thus pose a grave threat to regional security in terms of all national, human and economic securities. Thus, the border area of Pakistan will again turn into a sanctuary and safe haven for terrorists. (Felbab-Brown, 2013). The fragile government in Kabul, loose network of security forces and economic disorder after NATO drawdown would pave way for foreign actors to fill the gap and grab the opportunity to advance their agenda of interests. The United States, China, Pakistan, India, Russia, Iran, Turkey and other neighboring states will continue to compete for influence in the region – peacefully or otherwise. Besides major and regional powers, some non-state actors, especially the militant outfits, from neighboring countries are also ready to get their loin share. But, ironically, all the players whether local, regional or international are still unclear about their future strategy. They are in a state of uncertainty as the players of the Game theory in the prisoners’ dilemma or drivers in the chicken game theory. This uncertainty may result in a number of scenarios with different cost and benefit ratios but most of them contribute to the regional security issues. All expected future scenarios greatly depend upon the pattern of interaction among different stakeholders, especially among the Taliban, the Kabul government, the US, Pakistan and all neighboring states (Olsson, Holmquist, Bergenwall, & Lackenbauer, 2012).

Pakistan and India are the two regional powers and archrivals who can never be on the same page Pakistan is longing for a secure western border and pro-Pakistani setup in Kabul. It has economic interests in Central Asian Republics (CARs) that can be achieved only if there is stability in Afghanistan. It also has serious reservations over the increasing Indian influence resulting from the Afghan-India close ties after 9/11. Pakistan alleges India for its involvement in uprising in one of its border province with Afghanistan – Baluchistan. Pakistani authorities blame Indian consulates in Afghanistan for involvement in supporting

secessionist movements in Baluchistan and turmoil in its federally administered tribal area (FATA) (Olsson, Holmquist, Bergenwall, & Lackenbauer, 2012). Energy deficient Pakistan is looking towards central Asian states for their hydrocarbon resources but only a peaceful Afghanistan could provide it with access to these resources. Thus, a peaceful Afghanistan with a pro-Pakistani government in Kabul which is free from Indian influence could promote Pakistan's strategic and economic interests (Narayanan, July 2010). India, on the other hand, has its own strategic objectives. Containment of Pakistani influence in Kabul, economic interest in Central Asian countries and saving Afghanistan from becoming an operational base for terrorists in Kashmir are the key policy goals of India. Pro-Pakistani setup in Kabul would be an antithesis to Indian interests. India is keen to play the role of a regional hegemon while Pakistan is not ready to accept that role of India. Their interests are incompatible but none of them can completely overlook the interests of the other. According to the game theory, they can maximize their relative benefits through cooperation while non-cooperation among them will be in no one's interest. Neo-liberalism is prevailing in most parts of the world and liberal institutionalisms seek to demonstrate that cooperation between states can be enhanced even without the presence of a hegemonic player which can enforce compliance with agreements. For them, anarchy is mitigated by regimes and institutional cooperation which brings higher levels of regularity and predictability to international relations (Burchill, et al., 2005). But, looking at the history of bilateral relation between these two South Asian powers, it is more than obvious that reconciliation in the contrasting interests of these two nuclear states of the region is impossible. Their rivalry in Afghanistan might adversely affect political stability in that war ravaged country. US, an ally of both these states, is also in a fix due to their ongoing conflict of interests and finds it hard to bring them to rapprochement. US policymakers also look at India as a regional hegemon but at the same time cannot neglect the vital role of Pakistan in resolving the Afghan issue and curbing terrorism in the region. In case of increasing militancy in Kashmir, Pak-India skirmishes would hamper the regional security and endanger the US strategic and economic interests in South Asia (Barno, Irvine, & Matthew, June 2011). Most of the scholars are of the opinion that the Taliban are pampered by Pakistan and controlled by military through its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency (Stefan Olsson, 2012). But it is half-truth. No doubt, the Taliban in Afghanistan would have been supported by ISI under strategic compulsion but no one can deny the fact that Pakistani army has lost thousands of its troops while fighting against these militant outfits. Economic losses are far more than the trajectory of foreign aid given to Pakistan in the name of coalition support fund against terrorism. Pakistan has still influence in the Taliban circles but they are not under the thumb of ISI. Recently they have gone against Islamabad interests on a number of occasions and in future they would also keep up to the same defiant posture where their interest is in contrast to Pakistan's interests.

Strained Pak-Iran relations in late 1990s were greatly due to the Taliban's fanatic action against *Shias* in Hazara – Northern part of Afghanistan. Pakistan disdained to this action and tried to prevent them but the Taliban leadership dissuaded from complying with Islamabad. Even now these two close neighbors and friendly countries have competing interests in Afghanistan. On the one hand, Iran is unhappy with the US presence in Afghanistan while, on the other hand, it is concerned with the resurgence of the extremist *Sunni* Taliban. If Pakistan comes to fill the power vacuum created after the NATO drawdown then Iran would definitely raise its stakes. Growing Pakistani influence in Kabul is harmful to Tehran's economic interest. Iran wants to tap the resources of CARs through its territory to enhance its political and economic influence in the region. Iran sees Afghanistan as a corridor to China and tries to reduce their dependence upon the choke point of the Strait of Hormuz. Development of the port of Chabahar is top priority of Tehran. This new port would not only provide Afghanistan with an alternative to the Pakistani port of Gwadar as a point of access to the sea but would also provide Iran with increasing political and economic influence in the region. India and Iran are working on a network of roads from Chabahar to the main cities of Afghanistan and to CARs to provide the former with safest and easiest routes to establish trade and commercial links with hydrocarbon rich Central Asian region which could also serve as a huge market for Indian and Iranian good. Similarly, to facilitate Indian companies' access to Afghanistan's estimated \$1 trillion in minerals and raw materials. Any pro-Pakistan set up in Kabul would not be acceptable for Iran, India and the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. This conflict of interest would foster a new proxy war in Afghanistan. Insurgency in Baluchistan has also alarmed Tehran of the spread of separatist movement into the *Baluch* community on its own side. This episode has also added to tension between Islamabad and Tehran. Iranian support to anti-US sentiments in *Hazara* community in Afghanistan would further escalate US-Iran tension. Both the US and Iran are not in favor of an extremist or pro-Pakistan setup in Kabul and to avert the possibility of such a development they can benefit from mutual cooperation. But anti-Iran US stance over nuclear program of Iran and Iranian leadership's anti US attitude in the region does not let the two countries to cooperate. This antagonistic approach on both sides would benefit other actors but hinder regional stability and put regional security at stake. Sunni-Shia divide in the Middle East has started resurfacing after the fall of Saddam government and spreading to the whole region. This rift has given rise to two camps; the Sunni camp led by Saudi Arabia and the Shia Camp under the banner of Iran. Afghanistan being a Sunni dominated state is

viewed by Saudi as its client state and, therefore, the latter is trying to have a Sunni setup there while Iran is trying to have a modern and liberal government in Kabul to check the Saudi influence. Iranian interest in Afghanistan is economic and political rather than ideological (Toscano, January 2012).

Russia and China, two major powers of the region, are also important competitors to have influence in the Central Asian Republics (CARs). Security and stability of the region is closely linked and dependent upon the stability in Afghanistan (Huasheng & Kuchins, March 2012).

China, an emerging economic giant, has its own strategic, political and economic interests in Afghanistan and the rest of Central Asia. China, on the one hand, is concerned about extremism and militancy in its backyard as it directly poses threat to its security due to its spillover into its Xinjiang province. Instability in Afghanistan will obviously encourage militancy in Xinjiang which will increase the security risks for Beijing (Huasheng & Kuchins, March 2012). On the other hand, physical presence of US/NATO forces is also a source of concern for Chinese leadership. US-India nexus to contain China and to arrest its influence in the region is also troubling this emerging economic power. These rivalries are also contributing to instability and security issue as explained by the game theory. To keep its economic boost intact, China needs smooth and uninterrupted supply of energy and this need can be fulfilled from the energy rich CARs. The energy deficient China badly needs access to the rest of world through its Mule National Companies (MNCs) like Union Oil Company of California (UNOCAL). To achieve this economic objective, the UNOCAL had provided some money to the Taliban movement in early 1990s. (Goodson, 2000). This shows the corporate interests of US companies in Afghanistan. Thus, China is not only competing with the US but also the Russian interest in the region. But the only hurdle in the smooth flow of energy and conduct of trade is the crisis-ridden Afghanistan which is the easiest corridor to CARs. Afghanistan has the world largest Lithium resources in the world while copper and some other rare metals are abundant there. In 2009, the Aynak, a Chinese firm leased the rights to copper deposit for 3.5 billion dollars which is the single largest foreign investment in mining sector in Afghanistan. China's total investment in Afghanistan reaches 10 billion dollars. By granting exploit rights of mineral reserves Afghanistan can earn 808 billion dollars and annually 60 million dollars from taxes over it for 30 years (Huasheng & Kuchins, March 2012).

#### Afghanistan Supply Routes: Northern Distribution Network and Pakistan Overland Routes



SOURCE: U.S. Transportation Command, 2011.

RAND OP387-5.1

China's trade with Central Asia has risen to \$26 billion per year – nearly fifty-fold. Moreover, China and Pakistan have closer economic ties and the former use this relationship as an important bellwether for its relations with the Muslim world. It also uses it as a hedge against the growing influence of India and Russia. (Barno, Irvine, & Matthew, June 2011).

The US and other members of NATO are not ready to wash hands of their long term interests in Afghanistan. Thus, the game is multi-dimensional and leading to a 'New Great game' with a number of international and regional players. But most crucial will be the role played by stakeholders from inside Afghanistan. Among them the Taliban, the warlords, local commanders and to a lesser extent the civil society (which is not yet so developed) are the key elements that can affect the future strategies of the actors from abroad. Their behavior will be greatly shaped by their economic needs.

Currently only 10 percent of Afghanistan's GDP comes from domestic revenue while 90 from foreign aid. If the foreign aid is choked or curtailed then economic disorder will further worsen. On the other hand, there is no denying to the fact that the sole industry in Afghanistan is war industry which got very much developed since 1979. The warlords depend for their revenue upon implicit and explicit supply of arms, ammunition and aid from foreign stakeholders, both regional and international, or they rely on poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. In both cases law and order is adversely affected. To get financial support, they promote foreign agenda which is never based on Afghan interest but foreign interest. The contrasting interests of the players may result in another civil war (Olsson, Holmquist, Bergenwall, & Lackenbauer, 2012). The civil war not only cause deterioration of law and order but gives rise to drug trafficking and illegal trade of weapons by warlords and their commanders. These two phenomena are vehicles for the spread of terrorism and lawlessness in the region and abroad.

The longest ever war fought by the American forces is the war-on-terror in Afghanistan and it will prove counterproductive if Afghanistan plunges again into another civil war and become sanctuary of terrorism. This new wave of terrorism would engulf the whole region and there might be a possibility that the nuclear arsenal fell into the hands of terrorists as they would not only operate in Afghanistan but would find their targets in Pakistan and India. They will penetrate into the political systems through one way or the other.

All these stakeholders are the Afghan government, the US, Pakistan, Russia, China, Iran and India have their own national interest in Afghanistan and, definitely, they have their own strategies to achieve their goals. But non-cooperation among them has resulted in no-sum game. The ultimate suffers are the Afghan people but their sufferings and agonies will cross the Afghan borders and affect the regional security of the three Asias; South, Central and West Asia. The new security paradigm of these regions will have serious repercussions for the world at large. But this study will focus on the regional security equation arising as a result of the said drawdown. An analysis of the interests of the stakeholder will be presented along with their strategies and possible outcomes of these courses of action shall be ascertained. The post drawdown situation in Afghanistan will also be taken into account and policy recommendation for peace shall be put forward.

If Pakistan and the US are in the prisoner's dilemma situation and hesitate to trust the strategies of each other, then no-win situation is more evident. The crises of confidence between these two key players will pave way for others. Thus, a new great game will take place among regional players and the involvement of so many actors would push Afghanistan into a severe chaotic situation. A new civil war will not only reverse the process of modernization and democratization in Afghanistan but would also make the Afghan soil a breeding zone for extremism again. New extremist doctrines would evolve which would be a direct challenge to the existing nation-state system of the region. The terrorists have a global agenda and know no geographical bounds. The first casualty of this new terrorist tide would be the nation-state system and this would lead to the gravest security issue; including human, national and economic security.

The decade long War on Terror on Afghan soil has been put to an end and the subsequent drawdown of NATO forces is expected to complete till the end of 2014 but, ironically, the future of this war ravaged country is still in doldrums. The Afghan nation is still uncertain about their destiny that is to be decided by others.

Many U.S. politicians, and even arguably many in the White House, increasingly regard Afghanistan as an unwise liability and of little strategic interest. (Felbab-Brown, 2013)

## **Conclusion**

The proposed drawdown of US/NATO will open a new chapter in the history of Afghanistan but the Afghan agonies would remain the same if not multiplied. The security of Afghanistan and the region as a whole would be at stake. A new shift in the strategic paradigm of the region is eminent. The three tiers of players; domestic, regional and international have their own objectives. But none of them can secure their interest in case of non-cooperation. The only way to get their way forward is their mutual cooperation to ensure peace, stability and prosperity in Afghanistan.

A stable Afghanistan also needs a regional peace agreement – on which the signature of Pakistan would be crucial. Pakistan wants a friendly government in Afghanistan and to reduce the perceived threat from India. Without a settlement regarding Afghanistan between India and Pakistan, Islamabad may act as a spoiler.

Other spoilers of a settlement could be the warlords in Afghanistan or those Taliban factions in Pakistan and Afghanistan that do not accept a peace deal. Therefore, another peace treaty must be negotiated at domestic level where all stakeholders including the Taliban, warlords and civil society of Afghanistan will be the parties. Guarantors to this treaty be the remaining US troops and UN peace force after UN approval.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Remarks by the President on a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.* (2009, March 27). Retrieved October 27, 2014, from The White House: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-a-new-strategy-afghanistan-and-pakistan>
- President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries.* (2013, September 07). Retrieved November 28, 2014, from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (PRC): <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1076334.shtml>
- New Afghan president to head to China. (2014, October 27). Washington DC: The New York Times.
- Paying Afghanistan's Bills. (2014, October 01). Ney York: New York Times.
- Ali, I. (2012, May). *United States-Pakistan Relations: Facing a Critical Juncture*. Islamabad: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding.
- Annawitt, P. (2010). *Global Security and Regional Responses: Conflict Management in a Fractured World*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy.
- Armitage, R. L., Berger, S. R., & Markey, D. S. (2010). *U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
- Barno, D. W., Exum, A., & Irvine, M. ( June 2011). *Beyond Afghanistan A Regional Security Strategy for South and Central Asia*. Center for a New American Security, Washington, DC.
- Barno, D. W., Irvine, A. E., & Matthew. (June 2011). *Beyond Afghanistan A Regional Security Strategy for South and Central Asia*. David W. Barno, Andrew Exum and Matthew Irvine. Beyond Afghanistan A ReCenter for a New American Security, Washington D.C.
- Belasco, A. (2011). *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
- Brandt, J., & Siegel, H. (2013, May). After the Drawdown: The United States, India, and the Challenge of Afghanistan. Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
- Brooke, J. (2013, September 29). China's Central Asia Bazaar. Moscow: The Moscow Times.
- Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Devetak, R., Donnelly, J., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, C., et al. (2005). *Scott Burchill; Andrew Linklater; Richard Devetak; Jack Donnelly; Matthew Paterson; Christian ReuTheories of International Relations* (3rd ed.). New York, USA: Scott Burchill; Andrew Linklater; Richard Devetak; Jack Donnelly; Matthew Paterson; ChrPalgrave Macmillan.
- Byrd, W. (2012). *Lessons from Afghanistan's History for the Current Transition and beyond*. Washington, DC.: United States Institute of Peace.
- Dale, C. (2011). *War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress* . Washington, DC.: Congressional Research Service.
- Dasgupta, S. (2013). *Regional Politics and the Prospects for Stability in Afghanistan*. Washington, DC.: United States Institute for Peace.
- Dormandy, X., & Keating, M. (2014). The United States and Afghanistan:A Diminishing Transactional Relationship. (pp. 6-12). Washington, DC.: The National Bureau of Asian Research.
- Fair, C. C. (2012, May 17). The US–Pakistan Relations after a Decade of the War on Terror. *Contemporary South Asia*, 20(2), 243-253.

- Felbab-Brown, V. (2013, November 17). The Stakes, Politics, and Implications of the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement. USA: Brookings Institute.
- Foust, J. (2010). *Post-Soviet Central Asian National Interests in Afghanistan*. Washington, DC.: The Century Foundation.
- Gartenstein-Ross, D., Trombly, D., & Barr, N. (October 2014). *China's Post-2014 Role in Afghanistan*. Foundation for Defense of Democracies Washington, DC.
- Ghani, A. (April 2009). *A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan*. Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council of the United States.
- Goodson, L. (2000). Foreign Policy Gone Awry: The Kalashnikovization and Talibanization of. In C. Baxter, & C. H. Kennedy (Eds.), *Pakistan 2000* (p. 168). Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press.
- Hanauer, L., & Chalk, P. (2012). India's and Pakistan's Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region. Larry Hanauer Peter Chalk India's and Pakistan's straRAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy.
- Huasheng, Z., & Kuchins, A. C. (March 2012). *China and Afghanistan: China's Interests, Stances, and Perspectives*. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
- Katz, M. N. (2014). Putin's Predicament: Russia and Afghanistan after 2014. *Asia Policy*.17, pp. 1-65. Washington, DC.: The National Bureau of Asian Research.
- Katzman, K. (2014). *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*. Washington, DC.: Congressional Research Service.
- Khan, K. N. (1990, December). Soviet Interests in Afghanistan and Implications upon Withdrawal . Kansas: Fort Leavenworth.
- Khan, M. N., & Rehman, S. (2013). Afghanistan Drawdown and Regional Security. *IPRI Journal*, XIII(02), 131-139.
- Krishnamurthy, R. (Ed.). (2014). *Afghanistan 2014: BSA, Internal Security, Taliban & Indian Strategy*. New Delhi, India: Institution of Peace and Conflict Studies.
- Kronstadt, K. A. (2008). *Terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for U.S. Interests*. Washington, DC.: Congressional Research Service.
- Kronstadt, K. A. (2011). *Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
- Lamb, R. D., Hameed, S., & Mixon, K. (2014, January). South Asia: Regional Dynamics and Strategic Concerns: A Framework for U.S. Policy and Strategy in South Asia (2014-2026). Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies.
- Lang, J. (2014). *Afghanistan: The view from Russia*. European Union Institute for Security Studies.
- Londoño, E., DeYoung, K., & Miller, G. (2013, December 28). Afghanistan gains will be lost quickly after drawdown, U.S. intelligence estimate warns. Washington, DC.: The Washington Post.
- Malik, M. (2012, July/August). China and India Today: Diplomats Jostle, Militaries Prepare. *World Affairs*, 75.
- Markey, D. S. (2014). *Reorienting U.S. Pakistan Strategy: From Af-Pak to Asia*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
- Menkiszak, M. (2011). *Russia's Afghan Problem the Russian Federation and the Afghanistan Problem since 2001*. Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies.
- Narayanan, S. (2010). *Pakistan & Afghanistan Understanding Islamabad's Policies and Strategies*. New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.
- Narayanan, S. (July 2010). *Pakistan & Afghanistan: Understanding Islamabad's Objectives and Strategies*. New Delhi: Sripathi Narayanan. Pakistan & Afghanistan: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.
- Nazir, T. (2014, October 28). Cost of the Afghan conflict. *Daily Times*. Islamabad, Pakistan.



- Nopens, P. (March 2014). *The Impact of the Withdrawal from Afghanistan on Russia's Security*. Brussels: EGMONT –Royal Institute for International Relations.
- Ogden, C. (2013, February 27). Tracing the Pakistan–Terrorism Nexus in Indian Security Perspectives: From 1947 to 26/11. *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* , 69(1), 35 - 50.
- Olsson, S., Holmquist, E., Bergenwall, S., & Lackenbauer, H. (2012). *Afghanistan After 2014: Five Scenarios*. Stakholm: Sweedish Defence Research Agency.
- Price, G. (2013, August). *India's Policy towards Afghanistan*. London: Chatham House.
- Riede, B. (2008, July). Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm. *Pakistan and Terror:The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 31 - 46.
- Sarkees, M., Frank, W. W., & Singer, J. D. (2003). Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars. A Comprehensive Look at their Distribution over Time. *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(1), 49-70.
- Shah, S. (2013, September 19). US wars in Afghanistan, Iraq to cost \$6 trillion. Islamabad, Pakistan: The News.
- Stefan Olsson, E. H. (2012). *Afghanistan After 2014: Five Scenarios*. Stakholm: Sweedish Defence Research Agency.
- (2011). Challenges and Opportunities: Russia and the Rise of China and India. In A. J. Tellis, T. Tanner, J. Keough, A. J. Tellis, T. Tanner, & J. Keough (Eds.).
- (2011). Challenges and Opportunities: Russia and the Rise of China and India. In A. J. Tellis, T. Tanner, J. Keough, A. J. Tellis, T. Tanner, & J. Keough (Eds.), *Asia Responds to its Rising Powers: China and India*.
- Toscano, R. (January 2012). *Iran's Role in Afghanistan*. NOREF, Norwegian Peace Building Resource Centre. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Trenin, D. (2011). Challenges and Opportunities: Russia and the Rise of China and India. In A. J. Tellis, T. Tanner, & J. Keough, *Asia Responds to its Rising Powers: China and India*. Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research.
- Wall, G. P. (2014, February 04). Taliban could retake key territory, says Army head. (ConCoughlin, Interviewer) The Telegrapgh.
- Ying, D. (2013, September 19). *Silk Road Revival*. Retrieved from [http://www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2013-09/16/content\\_568045\\_3.htm](http://www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2013-09/16/content_568045_3.htm).
- Yusuf, M., Yusuf, H., & Zaidi, S. (2011). *The United States and the End Game in Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan's Foreign Policy Elite*. Islamabad: Jinnah Institute.