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# **Effects of Dividend Policy on Investment Decisions**

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## ABSTRACT

Dividend Policy is one of the key factors influence many investment decisions. This paper examine whether the dividend has a any effect on investors decision making? We construct a random sample of 152 firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange, betweem 2009 and 2014. This correlational research is applied in terms of objective. To test the hypotheses, the combined linear and multiple regression model was used. **KEY WORDS:** Dividends Policy; Investment Decisions; Financial Reporting Quality,

### INTRODUCTION

Investment decisions are considered as one of the crucial decisions on the survival and growth of firms. However, investment in firms can be influenced by several factors including dividend policy, firm size and financial leverage. According to Brav &et al. 2005, dividend policy has a negative effect on investment decisions due to the distribution of the firm's internal resources among shareholders and reduced liquidity.

In the research by Brav et al. (2005), evidence showed that firms that mitigated their dividend are under more financial pressure and have to provide opportunities for investment. Therefore, it is expected that the distribution of cash dividend has a more negative effect on the firms that reduced their dividend.

#### LITERATURE REVIEW

Studies of Miller and Modigliani (1961), showed that in a capital market, dividend policy is irrelevant to firm value. According to this hypothesis, dividend changes play an important role in information collection and affect cash flows. Dividend changes lead to changes in prices and provide information about future income and investment but dividend changes have no effect on firm value. This description only uses investment policy counts' principle and explains market reaction in reflecting information on investment policy. The basic explanation of the other theory is free cash flows based on the interaction between managers and investors. This hypothesis suggests that dividend mitigates managers' investment problem by reducing free cash flows available to managers. Therefore, the free cash flow hypothesis suggests that dividend policy has a real effect on the firm's investments and cash flows, which would be inconsistent with the dividend irrelevance theorem. Unfortunately, dividend changes almost always change investors' information set about future earnings, and the earnings information itself is an integral part of the firm's underlying operations and hence should affect firm value. In the research by Miller and Rock (1985), attempt to provide evidence on the dividend irrelevance theorem by examining the stock price reaction to dividend announcements. It is well documented that stock prices tend to react positively (negatively) to announcements of dividend increases (decreases). However, the literature has reached little consensus on what causes the price reaction. Knowledge of the cause of the price reaction is critical to determining whether the observed price reactions to dividend announcements are consistent or inconsistent with the dividend irrelevance theorem. One primary explanation for the price reaction to dividend announcement is the signaling hypothesis based on information asymmetry between managers and investors. This explanation holds that managers use dividends as a costly signal to communicate to the market their private information about the firm's future earnings prospects.

Brav et al. (2005), studied 3,840 firms and found that dividend decisions can have a negative effect on investment decisions. Unlike Lintner, they found that managers are reluctant to cut dividend and consider reaching to dividend as an unreachable goal. Managers stated that they tend to provide investment opportunities in order to reach to dividend. Daniel et al. (2010), found evidence on the results of the research by Brav et al. (2005) and tested that whether dividend cut, reduced investment or increased external investment can provide the expected level of dividend and investment. They found that a small number of firms cut their dividend, while the majority of firms mitigate investment with the expected level. In addition,

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the recent study and obtained evidence suggest that dividend has a negative effect on investment and will lead to investment problems.

David Han-Min Wang (2010), to explores the causal structure of corporate financial strategies for the high-tech firms in Taiwan and China. By employing path analysis and directed graphs model, explores the causal relationships among investment, financing, dividend policies, and corporate performance. The results show that the investment expenditures by Taiwan's firms positively affect financial performance and the increased borrowings jeopardize company's profits. However, the financing decisions of China's firms have a positively effect on their capital expenditures. The findings suggest that firms across the Strait adopt different strategies in financial decision environments.

Santhosh Ramalingegowda, Chuan-San Wang, and Yong Yu (2013), investigated the role of financial reporting quality on mitigating the effect of dividend policy on investment decisions and found that high-quality financial reporting significantly mitigates the effect of dividend on investment. In addition, this mitigating effect is stronger in the R&D investment than major investment and also stronger for firms with growth value.

#### METHODOLOGY

This descriptive accounting study is correlational and applied in terms of objective. It is also classified in the quasi-experimental research category. Epistemologically, it is empiricist, its reasoning system is deductive and it is an ex-post desk study using historical information. Information about the subject literature, theoretical foundations and history was collected from library resources and also through the study of books, publications articles and theses, both internal and external sources. Information and data required to check and test the research hypotheses was derived from the financial statements and reports submitted to the firms listed in the Stock Exchange from the Tadbir Pardaz software package and the financial information CD of firms. The research information is combinational. After data preparation, the analysis and estimation of models and hypotheses were done using Eviews7.

#### **Statistical Population**

The statistical population includes 468 firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange which have been active up to 2014. After applying restrictions and deducting 171 firms which changed their fiscal year or modified their activities and 52 financial institutions and banks and 65 firms whose fiscal year did not lead to March 19, and 28 firms with the lack of access to information or over six months of trade gap, the statistical population includes 152 firms (912 year-firms) listed in Tehran Stock Exchange which have been active from the beginning of 2009 to March 2014.

### **Research variables**

#### **Dependent variable**

Investment (Investment<sub>it</sub>): It is obtained from dividing the sum of acquisition or construction of fixed or intangible assets or other long-term assets to total assets.

### Independent variable

Dividend per share (Dividend<sub>jt</sub>): It is obtained from dividing the total ordinary dividend paid by the number of shares.

Dividend per share -	Total dividend pay out
Dividend per share -	number of comon shares

(1)

(5)

### **Control variables**

SIZE<sub>j</sub>, t: Firm size in year t in firm j is the natural logarithm of total assets.

SD cfo j,t: Fluctuations in cash flows in year t and firm j is the difference of the cash from operating activities in the current and previous years divided by the previous year.

SD sale j, t: Fluctuations in the firm sales in year t and firm is the difference of sales in the current and previous years divided by the previous year.

SD investment jt: Investment fluctuations in year t of firm j is the difference of investment in the current and previous years divided by the previous year.

Bankrupcy risk j,t: To predict bankruptcy risk in year t in firm j, the Z' model adjusted by Altman (1983, p.122) based on model (5) was used (Altman, 2000; Altman, 2006, 246; Altman, 2013).

 $Z'=0.717x_1+0.847x_2+3.107x_3+0.420x_4+0.998x_5$ 

X<sub>1</sub>: The working capital to total assets ratio X<sub>2</sub>: The retained earnings to total assets ratio

 $X_3$ : The earnings before interest and tax to total assets ratio

 $X_4$ : The book value of equity to book value of debt ratio

X<sub>5</sub>: The sales to total assets ratio

In model (5), firms are considered bankrupt for values less than 1.23 for Z', non-bankrupt for values greater than 2.99 and within financial distress (gray) area for values of Z' between 1.23 and 2.99.

Fluctuations in the gross value of property, plant and equipment (sdppe j,t): This variable in year t in firm j is obtained by dividing the gross value of property, plant and equipment of the current and previous years by the previous year.

Leverage j): Financial leverage in year t in firm j is obtained by dividing total liabilities to total assets.

The cash flow ratio (cfop jt): The cash flow ratio in year t in firm j is obtained by dividing cash flows from operating activities to total sales.

Age index (agejt): Age index in year t in firm j is obtained from the difference between the desired year and the firm establishment year.

Operational cycle (cycle jt): Operational cycle is obtained from the long-term receivables to sales ratio plus the inventory to sales ratio multiplied by 360 in year t in firm j.

Cash holdings ratio (cashhold jt): Cash holdings ratio in year t in firm j is obtained from the cash flows to total assets ratio.

(ROA j,t): Return on assets in year t in firm j is obtained from the net income to total assets ratio.

Dividends per share changes (Dividend per share j,t): Dividends per share changes in year t in firm j is obtained from the difference between the dividends per share of the current and previous years divided by the previous year.

Pre-tax profit index variable (loos j,t): This variable in year t in firm j is obtained using a dummy variable; if the firm reports a loss, it is 1, otherwise zero.

 $\beta_0$ : Intercept (c is constant)

 $\beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3, \beta_4, \beta_5..., \beta_{17}$ : Variable coefficients are independent.

ε : Error term

#### **RESULTS/ANALYSIS**

The descriptive statistics of variables are shown in Table (1).

Observations	Mean	Median	Maximum	Minimum	Std. Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis
912	0.150	0.118	1.710	-0.707	0.214	0.292	7.263
912	0.102	0.068	0.910	0.000	0.118	2.357	11.558
912	13.422	13.328	18.521	0.000	1.710	-2.168	22.758
912	0.388	0.000	9.171	-6.618	5.078	9.270	149.523
912	0.227	0.160	5.190	-0.738	0.611	10.569	165.76
912	0.232	0.022	6.131	-1.000	1.401	15.785	311.639
912	1.381	1.199	12.043	0.000	0.756	5.698	63.062
912	0.258	0.212	0.892	0.000	0.184	1.076	3.849
912	0.633	0.636	0.960	0.096	0.234	3.463	32.777
912	0.188	0.147	2.338	-0.775	0.220	1.841	15.811
912	3.445	3.610	4.094	1.609	0.462	-1.127	3.767
912	5.173	5.274	7.707	-1.135	0.896	-1.883	17.615
912	0.039	0.029	0.261	0.000	0.036	2.186	9.691
912	0.125	0.104	0.745	-1.451	0.190	4.781	64.047
912	0.099	0.000	2.000	-1.000	0.903	3.955	29.239
	Observations         912         913	Observations         Mean 912           912         0.150           912         0.102           912         13.422           912         0.388           912         0.388           912         0.227           912         0.232           912         0.232           912         0.238           912         0.238           912         0.258           912         0.633           912         0.188           912         3.445           912         5.173           912         0.039           912         0.125           912         0.125           912         0.099	Observations         Mean         Median           912         0.150         0.118           912         0.150         0.118           912         0.150         0.118           912         0.102         0.068           912         13.422         13.328           912         0.388         0.000           912         0.227         0.160           912         0.232         0.022           912         0.232         0.022           912         0.233         0.636           912         0.258         0.212           912         0.633         0.636           912         0.188         0.147           912         3.445         3.610           912         5.173         5.274           912         0.039         0.029           912         0.125         0.104           912         0.125         0.104	Observations         Mean         Median         Maximum           912         0.150         0.118         1.710           912         0.150         0.118         1.710           912         0.102         0.068         0.910           912         13.422         13.328         18.521           912         0.388         0.000         9.171           912         0.227         0.160         5.190           912         0.232         0.022         6.131           912         0.232         0.022         6.131           912         0.238         0.212         0.892           912         0.258         0.212         0.892           912         0.633         0.636         0.960           912         0.188         0.147         2.338           912         3.445         3.610         4.094           912         5.173         5.274         7.707           912         0.039         0.029         0.261           912         0.125         0.104         0.745           912         0.099         0.000         2.000	Observations         Mean         Median         Maximum         Minimum           912         0.150         0.118         1.710         -0.707           912         0.102         0.068         0.910         0.000           912         13.422         13.328         18.521         0.000           912         0.388         0.000         9.171         -6.618           912         0.227         0.160         5.190         -0.738           912         0.232         0.022         6.131         -1.000           912         0.232         0.022         6.131         -1.000           912         0.232         0.022         6.131         -1000           912         0.238         0.212         0.892         0.000           912         0.258         0.212         0.892         0.000           912         0.633         0.636         0.960         0.096           912         0.188         0.147         2.338         -0.775           912         3.445         3.610         4.094         1.609           912         5.173         5.274         7.707         -1.135           912 <td< td=""><td>Observations         Mean         Median         Maximum         Minimum         Sid. Dev.           912         0.150         0.118         1.710         -0.707         0.214           912         0.102         0.068         0.910         0.000         0.118           912         13.422         13.328         18.521         0.000         1.710           912         0.388         0.000         9.171         -6.618         5.078           912         0.227         0.160         5.190         -0.738         0.611           912         0.232         0.022         6.131         -1.000         1.401           912         0.232         0.022         6.131         -1.000         1.401           912         0.258         0.212         0.892         0.000         0.756           912         0.633         0.636         0.960         0.096         0.234           912         0.188         0.147         2.338         -0.775         0.220           912         0.188         0.147         2.338         -0.775         0.220           912         0.184         3.610         4.094         1.609         0.462</td><td>Observations         Mean         Median         Maximum         Minimum         Std. Dev.         Skewness           912         0.150         0.118         1.710         -0.707         0.214         0.292           912         0.102         0.068         0.910         0.000         0.118         2.357           912         13.422         13.328         18.521         0.000         1.710         -2.168           912         0.388         0.000         9.171         -6.618         5.078         9.270           912         0.227         0.160         5.190         -0.738         0.611         10.569           912         0.232         0.022         6.131         -1.000         1.401         15.785           912         0.232         0.022         6.131         -1.000         1.401         15.785           912         1.381         1.199         12.043         0.000         0.756         5.698           912         0.633         0.636         0.960         0.096         0.234         3.463           912         0.188         0.147         2.338         -0.775         0.220         1.841           912         0.184</td></td<>	Observations         Mean         Median         Maximum         Minimum         Sid. Dev.           912         0.150         0.118         1.710         -0.707         0.214           912         0.102         0.068         0.910         0.000         0.118           912         13.422         13.328         18.521         0.000         1.710           912         0.388         0.000         9.171         -6.618         5.078           912         0.227         0.160         5.190         -0.738         0.611           912         0.232         0.022         6.131         -1.000         1.401           912         0.232         0.022         6.131         -1.000         1.401           912         0.258         0.212         0.892         0.000         0.756           912         0.633         0.636         0.960         0.096         0.234           912         0.188         0.147         2.338         -0.775         0.220           912         0.188         0.147         2.338         -0.775         0.220           912         0.184         3.610         4.094         1.609         0.462	Observations         Mean         Median         Maximum         Minimum         Std. Dev.         Skewness           912         0.150         0.118         1.710         -0.707         0.214         0.292           912         0.102         0.068         0.910         0.000         0.118         2.357           912         13.422         13.328         18.521         0.000         1.710         -2.168           912         0.388         0.000         9.171         -6.618         5.078         9.270           912         0.227         0.160         5.190         -0.738         0.611         10.569           912         0.232         0.022         6.131         -1.000         1.401         15.785           912         0.232         0.022         6.131         -1.000         1.401         15.785           912         1.381         1.199         12.043         0.000         0.756         5.698           912         0.633         0.636         0.960         0.096         0.234         3.463           912         0.188         0.147         2.338         -0.775         0.220         1.841           912         0.184

Table (1): Descriptive statistics for variables in the sample firms

To test the research hypothesis, the panel data integration method is used, because the dependent variable is qualitative and normal, so we should use parametric statistical methods such as pooled or panel regression. The number of the year-firm observations was 912 based on balanced panel data. According to the descriptive statistic, high indicators can be divided into central, dispersion or other indexes. Central indexes

include mean and median, dispersion indexes include SD, and other indexes include minimum, maximum, skewness and kurtosis. The average index is briefly explained below. The average financial leverage shows that in most firms, the debt/assets ratio is over 50%, which suggests that the selected firms used debt more than equity in their capital structure. This can eventually lead to increased cost of debt in capital structure. **Normality test of data** 

The first step to start the hypothesis testing process is to check data normality. For this purpose, the Kolomogrov-Smirnov test was used. The results are presented in Table (2).

Table (2): Kolomogrov-Smirnov test results									
Variable	Kolmogorov-Smirnov j Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)								
Investment	1.174	0.125							

The Kolomogrov-Smirnov test results show that the dependend variable.

### **Correlation between variables**

To investigate the correlation between quantitative variables, Pearson's correlation coefficient is used. The test results are given in Table (3). Due to the large number of variables, this section only analyzes independent and control variables associated with the dependent variable as follows:

Table (3): Pearson's correlation matrix between independent and control variables and the investment

decisions variable

DIVIDE ND_PE R_SHA RE	ROA	CASHHOLD	CYCL E	AGE	CFOP	LEV	SDPPE	Q_TOBI N	SDIN VEST MENT	SDS ALE	SDCFO	SIZE	DIV	INVESTMEN T	Prob
														1.000000	INV
													1.0000	-0.047076**	
														0.0050	
												1.0000 00	0.0113	0.165804**	
													0.7325	0.0000	
											1.00000	0.0103 87	0.0237 78	0.029192	S
												0.7541	0.4733	0.3786	
										1.00 0000	0.05758	0.0529 67	0.0189	0.182183**	SI
											0.0822	0.1099	0.5679	0.0000	<u> </u>
									1.0000 00	0.03 5895	0.00697	0.0485 35	- 0.0459 48	0.133143**	SDI
										0.27 89	0.8334	0.1430	0.1656	0.0001	
								1.000000	0.0157	0.06 8054	0.02904	0.0273	0.5325	0.105332**	Q_
									0.6355	0.03 99	0.3810	0.4086	0.0000	0.0014	
							1.00000	0.036392	0.1830 09	0.10 3345	0.02542	0.0332	0.0053 98	-0.074193*	S
								0.2723	0.0000	0.00 18	0.4432	0.3159	0.8707	0.0251	
						1.0000	- 0.08688 0	-0.057955	0.0117 34	0.05	0.01033	0.0556	0.3602	-0.113957**	
							0.0087	0.0802	0.7234	0.10 88	0.7553	0.0931	0.0000	0.0006	
					1.0000 00	0.2537	0.31508	0.145443	0.2893 32	0.09 6615	0.11297 8	0.0922 81	0.2855 37	-0.028924	(
						0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.00 35	0.0006	0.0053	0.0000	0.3830	

				1.00	-	0.1196	-	0.001084	0.0150	-	-	-	-	-0.025125	
				0000	0.0736	23	0.05277		11	0.03	0.00454	0.0548	0.0582		
					20		4			0840	4	97	86		
					0.0262	0.0003	0.1112	0.9739	0.6507	0.35	0.8910	0.0976	0.0785	0.4485	
										22					
			1.0000	0.11	-	0.1926	-	-0.285766	0.0056	-	0.01508	0.0555	-	0.003827	C
			00	4147	0.0484	46	0.18990		03	0.16	1	17	0.2355		
					97		0			1116			83		
				0.00	0.1433	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.8658	0.00	0.6492	0.0938	0.0000	0.9081	
				06						00					
		1.000000	-	0.01	0.0865	-	-	0.182265	-	0.02	0.06909	-	0.1335	0.118573**	CAS
			0.1122	0972	73	0.1462	0.09096		0.0610	7006	2	0.0482	89		
			96			13	7		70			34			
			0.0007	0.74	0.0089	0.0000	0.0060	0.0000	0.0653	0.41	0.0370	0.1455	0.0001	0.0003	
				07						53					
	1.00	0.208301	-	-	0.1783	-	0.00962	0.597864	-	0.08	0.03780	-	0.6489	0.125706**	
	0000		0.3080	0.03	08	0.4807	6		0.0191	4953	0	0.0360	54		
			32	9791		93			73			39			
		0.0000	0.0000	0.22	0.0000	0.0000	0.7716	0.0000	0.5631	0.01	0.2541	0.2769	0.0000	0.0001	
				99						03					
1.00000	0.12	0.072754	-	-	0.0313	- I	-	-0.009479	-	0.11	0.02727	-	0.1353	0.110201**	DIV
0	3399		0.0889	0.00	73	0.1219	0.00165		0.0296	5863	1	0.0929	13	0.110201	PER
Ŭ			77	8696		11	2		87			48			
	0.00	0.0280	0.0072	0.79	0.3440	0.0002	0.9603	0.7750	0.3705	0.00	0.4107	0.0050	0.0000	0.0009	
	02			31						05					
	02			51						0.0					
							<u> </u>	1							
					<u> </u>	· · · ·	I	1	L		1	I		I	

\* and \*\* significant at the 95% and 99% confidence level, respectively.

### Hypothesis test results

Following Santhosh Ramalingegowda, Chuan-San Wang, and Yong Yu (2013), our hypothesis is test with the model below:

 $\begin{array}{l} \text{investment}_{jt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ Dividend}_{jt} + \beta_2 \text{ size}_{jt} + \beta_3 \text{ sdcfo}_{jt} + \beta_4 \text{ sdsale}_{jt} + \beta_5 \text{ sdinvestment}_{jt} + \beta_6 \text{ Qtobin}_{jt} + \beta_7 \\ \text{Bancrupcy risk}_{jt} + \beta_8 \text{ sdppe}_{jt} + \beta_9 \text{ lev}_{jt} + \beta_{10} \text{ cfop}_{jt} + \beta_{11} \text{ age}_{jt} + \beta_{12} \text{ cycle}_{jt} + \beta_{13} \text{ cashhold}_{jt} + \beta_{14} \text{ RoA}_{jt} + \beta_{15} \\ \text{loos}_{jt} + \epsilon_{jt} \end{array}$ 

Variable	Coefficient	t-Statistic	Prob.		
Dividend	-0.474	-4.203	0.000		
Size	0.023	4.988	0.000		
Sdcfo	0.0002	0.245	0.806		
Sdsale	0.048	2.300	0.021		
Sdinvestment	0.024	1.994	0.046		
Q_Tobin	0.058	3.085	0.002		
Bankruptrisk	-0.055	-3.670	0.000		
Sdppe	-0.075	-1.666	0.096		
Leverage	-0.134	-3.005	0.002		
Cfop	-0.086	-1.862	0.062		
Age	-0.008	-0.630	0.528		
Cycle	0.018	2.137	0.032		
Cashhold	0.460	2.170	0.030		
Roa	0.048	0.521	0.602		
Dividend Per Share	0.024	3.006	0.002		
Loss	-0.087	-3.919	0.003		
С	-0.164	-1.606	0.108		
R Squar		0.201			
Adjusted R Square		0.187			
Durbin-Watson		1.928			
F-Statistic	14.103		Prob. 0.000		
<i>F-White</i>	2.508		Prob. 0.000		
Godfrey	0.447		Prob. 0.639		
F-Limer	1.859		Prob. 0.241		

### Table (4): hypothesis test results

Given the hypothesis test results provided in Table 4, the significance level of the F-limer statistic (0.241) is larger than the acceptable level of error (5%), so the Poold data method is superior compared to the panel data method, so it is used for the regression model fitness. In addition, given that the significance level of the F-white statistic is 0.000, regression has heteroskedasticity. After fixing this problem, the Godfrey statistic was used whose significance level is 0.639, thus regression has not the serial autocorrelation problem. Next, given that the F statistic (0.000) has a significance level below 5%, regression has explanatory power. And since the significance level of dividend (independent variable) is lower than 5%, it can be said that dividend has a negative effect on investment. For one unit increase in dividend, investment decreases 0.474 units. Among control variables, firm size, fluctuations in sales, fluctuations in investment, Torbin's Q index, bankruptcy risk, financial leverage, operating cycle, liquidity ratio, changes in paid dividend and the gains and losses index have a significant effect on investment. The Durbin-Watson statistic is between 1.5 and 2.5, so we can conclude that there is no autocorrelation between variables. Finally, the coefficient of determination value shows that changes in the dependent and control variables reflect 20.1%

#### Conclusion

Empirically many studied in the field of capital market have addressed the usefulness of accounting information for investors. The usefulness of accounting information for investors have been empirically studied through examining the relationship (lack of relationship) of published accounting figures and changes in prices or other important components needed in society. Accordingly, this study aimed to investigate the role of financial reporting quality in reduction of the negative effect of dividend policy on investment decisions in the Tehran Stock Exchange. In addition to the above theoretical basis, the research findings show that dividend has a negative effect on investment. About the hypothesis, it can be said that dividend and investment are interdependent and that a stable dividend policy prevent the economic unit from investment by reducing domestic capital. Accordingly, an increase in dividend will mitigate investment in the economic unit.

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