

The Influence of Sunni Political Fiqh on the Recent Egyptian Developments

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ABSTRACT

The Sunni political fiqh with a history of deep theoretical debate on politics and government always has been an influential agent in Islamic countries' developments. Using a critical analysis of discourse and examining the history of Sunni political fiqh, the present paper tries to demonstrate the discursive relation of Sunni political fiqh with the recent Egyptian revolution and developments which led to Hosni Mubarak overturn. This study shows that how Sunni political fiqh could present a rival and dominant political discourse as parties and political and social active groups and through social networking and organizational activities in Egypt which prepared the needed conditions for government change.

KEYWORDS: Sunni Political Fiqh, Egypt, Critical Discourse Analysis, Muslim Brotherhood.

INTRODUCTION

The Islamic teachings-based political thought is an integrated part of Islam's thought field from its beginning and first Islamic government formation. Among Islamic traditions, the Sunni political fiqh –according to an extensive domain of researches about it, its wide fiqh debates, its history of assimilation and analysis and updating in itself, its presence in the realm of politics and government for a long time and its ability to adapt to everyday issues and events- was specially influential in political analyses and developments and in political and independence movements in Islamic countries; and the present paper precisely according to this history examined the effect of Sunni political fiqh on the recent developments in Egypt by a critical discourse analysis and on a discursive context.

The recent developments in Egypt which led to overturn of Hosni Mubarak –though not a full scale and classic revolution- are among such kind of developments that formed in a short time without a single and universal leader and even sometimes by some tools that are the symbol of modern world (Hoveydi, 2011), the communication age and the global village, and led to a government establishment.

The approach of the present paper toward Sunni political fiqh as a discourse will be according to critical analysis of discourse which itself has various aspects. The Sunni political fiqh, like other discourses which are sensitive to “power issue” and social and political developments, has a prominent role in the recent Egyptian social and political developments. Intending this, the present study wants to know how this effect will happen so that be able in the shadow of knowing the limits of this effect on a political revolution, to examine the effect's intellectual position according to historical background of mentioned political thought.

The Levels of Analysis

From the viewpoint of critical analysis of discourse to the way that Sunni political fiqh influences on Egyptian political developments, we can examine its discursive possibilities and tools, which it used for its discursive domination. This discursive domination, as mentioned in the second section, has various aspects in regard with dominance and power.

The historical and extensive role of Sunni fiqh's political thought in Islamic countries especially Egypt is one of important point that must be considered for investigating the role of Sunni political thought in the formation of recent revolution in Egypt. In this regard, we start our debate as two viewpoint and analysis level. Firstly, what is the extent of political fiqh's influence on politics, government and society in Egyptian society especially and in Muslim Societies generally, and also how is effect of politics, government and society on political fiqh. These items are shown in table 1 as following:

Table 1

Analysis Levels	Linguistic and Conceptual Level	Political and Social Level
The effect of political fiqh on politics, government, and society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Islamic wakefulness concept - Forbidding the evil and excommunication of oppressive ruler - Introduction of religious concepts in economic, political and social legislation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Religious fundamentalism - Determination of form and method of non-religious affairs in the field of economy, politics, and society according to scientific developments and time conditions - Formation of young dissident and change-seeking groups
The effect of politics, government and society on political fiqh	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ijtihad reinitiating - History reassessment - Foundations of legitimacy and non-legitimacy of rulers - Fiqh Judicial rules 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Caliphate abolishment - Emergence of government-related religious ideology - Battle against western and foreign colonization in its general concept - Formation of political branches and political in religious groups

The items mentioned in above table are described as follows:

- Religious Fundamentalism: it is the most political manifestation of religious thought that began from the middle of 1920s and is originated in the attempts by Muslim combatants to introduce Islamic values against western interferences (Enayat, 2001, 128).
- Emergence of government-related religious ideology: governments urged religious scholars so to justify and to confirm the reformations that governments accomplished in the name of nationalism or socialism, for example rejection of traditional holiness of ownership, exclusion of women, and religious courts' qualification by their Ijtihad instruments and possibilities (Enayat, 2001, 91). According to Nasr Hamed Abo-Zeid, Al-Azhar is an official and governmental religious entity, and cited one of its statements against Egyptian dissidents as an example as follows: "those sabotage acts described in newspapers making dangers against the society ... the honorable Al-Azhar invites everybody to caution and prudence and justice against a disturbance which is occurred in the name of religion. Islam is beyond such persons and disturbances. The big fire flames through such small sparks. Our society must be aware, and mosques and other centers must wipe themselves from such ranters and big-mouthed persons and also decadence makers and rebels against government" (Abo-Zeid, 2004, 67).
- History reassessment: with attention to theoretical developments in philosophical, historical, and social field, Sunni thinkers forced to use new research methods about social issues and revising the history (Enayat, 2001, 91-92).
- Caliphate abolishment: according to Enayat, after abolishment of Ottoman caliphate in order of the Turkey's great national council, the Sunni political thought reaches a key point (Enayat, 2001, 99).
- Forbidding the evil deeds and excommunication of oppressive ruler: Nasr Abo-Hamed Abo-Zeid refers to two groups of moderates and extremists among religious persons in Egypt in his book, The criticism of religious discourse, and states that there is disagreement between them about excommunication of ruling system, and also states that this disagreement is a secondary one, and in fact their quarrel isn't about elimination of oppressive system, rather it is about using or not using of violence and the proper time for this (Abo-Zeid, 2004, 65). For example, a speaker of moderate Islamic current in Egypt in an article under title of inescapable usage of coercive ways for elimination of evil acts wrote: "aiming to enforce meritorious affairs (enjoining the good and forbidding the evil) there is no need to ruler permit and his agreement, since when it is related to the ruler himself and his agents, how this permit can be a needed condition?" (Abo-Zeid, 2004, 65). Using the word excommunication about oppressive rulers, Abo-Zeid maintained that it is used firstly by Seied Ghotb about contemporary Islamic governments, then it remained as a basic element in contemporary religious discourse which depending on closeness or distance of its advocators to the power entity it sometimes acts publicly and sometimes underground (Abo-Zeid, 2004, 68).
- Islamic wakefulness: this concept, which became common quickly after recent Islamic movements, includes some aspects of anti-colonist struggles and consequently anti-tyrannical struggles in Muslim countries. For Abo-Zeid this concept is a lasting one, and insulation of wakefulness-related writings leads to this delusion that says Islamic wakefulness is a sapling that newly and artificially implanted in the soil of Islamic thought and this is precisely what security organizations and also governmental discourse wanted to propagate (Abo-Zeid, 2004, 74).

The Major Indicators in Examination of Political Fiqh's Effect on the Recent Egyptian Developments

What said above may help us to know that Sunni political thought is a deep-rooted thought and also to understand its effect in different historical periods. But throughout the examination of the influence of Sunni political fiqh on recent developments specifically in Egypt we need some indicators so that based them to assay its presence or absence in along with revolution and revolutionists or quality of its cooperation with it and them. These indicators are including:

- 1- The groups that are reprehensive of Sunni political fiqh's discourse and were active in Egyptian revolution.
- 2- The statements that invited people to subversion of Hosni Mubarak's government: the semantic signifiers that show clear tendency towards subversion in statements and interviews by leaders of groups and parties representatives of Sunni political fiqh that are provided through examination of Muslim Brotherhood's statements.
- 3- The signifiers that confirm the discourse of Sunni political fiqh is influential and dominant in the first constitution of Egyptian revolution and also linguistic analysis of key concepts of Sunni political fiqh cited in the constitution law.

Here we will examine three mentioned indicators as two discursive levels:

- 1- Linguistic and conceptual effectiveness level,
- 2- Political and social effectiveness level.

The Active Groups

In Egyptian revolution political Islam played its role within influential and universal parties such as Muslim Brotherhood and also in some official centers that were engaged in propagation of theoretical opinions about Islam and political Islam such as Al-Azhar. However, according to news and circulated information in various media and according to political analyses during formation of the revolution, in fact its initiation wasn't upon the executive arms or the groups officially affiliated with political Islam and Sunni political fiqh. During three weeks of the revolution, Islamists as Muslim Brotherhood (mainly its young groups) were active at last week. Young people maximum 25 years old who were member in Facebook page of "we all are Khaled Sa'id" were primary and main core of the revolution which named as 6th April movement. Khaled was an Egyptian young boy died because of torture by secret police months ago, but officials denied their responsibility. An invitation is issued for gathering on January 25th in that page. This gathering led to many extensive meetings at Al-Tahrir square afterwards (Poor Sa'id, 2011, 186). Main mottos were based upon human rights and democracy mainly. And even for them democracy was a new form of social life than an ideological narration. For them democracy was a kind of logic and language for a pluralist coexistence and a relatively proper way to solve disagreements (Farasatkah, 2011). Some researchers such as Asef Bayat (2011) and Olivier Roy (2011) Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions are post-Islamic ones. The meaning of post-Islamic term isn't that these revolutions are anti-Islamic or secular, in fact they are Muslims, but those movements beyond present Islamic ones are seeking citizenship rights. They wanted to establish democratic political processes in pious and Muslim societies (Poor Sa'id, 2011, 186).

The propagation of secularization processes among Egyptian society is an aspect of influential social and political role of Sunni political fiqh's reprehensive groups in Egyptian political and social developments. This is what we see, according to Bayat, on one hand its effects in absorption of Muslim Brotherhood to peaceful parliamentary, and social-educational nonprofit activities (for example in Al-Vasat and Al-Da'wah parties); and on the other hand shows itself especially among Egyptian new generations. Some researchers called this as the growth of post-Islamism in everyday life and different forms of Muslim Middle East, and theirs references are mainly towards steady increasing of human development indices in Middle Eastern societies (Bayat, 2009, 34-71).

This effectiveness indicated that groups like Muslim Brotherhood aiming to establishing its hegemony and finally to turn into an official discourse rivaling Hosni Mubarak's Neo-patrimonial government (Poor Sa'id, 2011, 167), spreads its ideology-originated concepts using some non-profit and educational activities. When discussing about the influence of active Islamic groups on the recent Egyptian developments it must be mentioned that the tendency of Egyptians towards Islam and revival of Islamic Shari'a dated back to first decade after First World War and historically originated in two concurrent internal and external trends: internally, Egyptian Muslims especially Hasan Al-Bana, who observed secularism is spreading among intellectuals after Ata Turk success in Turkey, found Islam as a way for releasing from oppression by colonialism (Enayat, 2001, 240). Externally, after caliphate abolishment and emergence of secular Turkish nationalism, Hasan Bana and his colleagues intended towards Islam propagation of Islam, absorption and organization and scientific activities. Therefore, at Ismai'liah city, in 2014 he founded the Muslim Brotherhood aiming return to genuine Islam, act on prophet's tradition, reform in government, resolving social problems, economic activities and wealth acquisition, and sport programs. Attempt according this political method by an obvious Islamist group in Egypt –as mentioned above- led to an influential effect on discursive orientation of political groups and affairs in the country.

Examining the political and social effect of groups on the recent Egyptian developments, it is possible to mention the establishment of new groups by new generations that have distinguishable political and social specifications and are conceptually and linguistically under influence of representative groups of Sunni political fiqh. Farasatkah refers to such Egyptian new generation in a paper. This new generation is forming in-between modern secular spaces with postmodern and post-secular prospects. The new social groups belong to this new generation, for example the young and women, especially from urban middle class, unlike former generations don't think within different ideologies such as nationalism, socialism, liberalism and Islamism. Even democracy and human rights are a new way of social life than an ideological narration. Farasatkah then added that for them democracy is a kind of logic and a language for a pluralistic coexistence and a relatively satisfactory method for dispute settlement. For Farasatkah, on one hand in Egyptian society, political Islam (whether about belief roots or about backgrounds of contemporary history and its organization and social networks) still is an important alternative and some researches find some real chances for Islamism in this society, and even analysts considered this matter that more likely democracy's formal arrangements (election and so on) will lead to Islamists' victory. But on the other hand, this society also is exposed (because of urbanism and young educated young people and emergence of new middle classes and also because of influence of competition rules in economy) highly to globalized processes of modernism, postmodernism, conventionalization, and pluralism so that even Islamism exists from its former frameworks and religious people also internalize some new outlooks and habits (Farasatkah, 2011).

As expected, Al-Azhar at first forbade the uprising against Mubarak because of damage of public properties and that such peaceful demonstration is prohibited according to Islam: Sa'id Amer as general secretary of Al-Azhar Fatwa council in an interview with Al-Shorogh newspaper defended Mubarak regime against Egyptian people. Against Egyptian people he said: "Al-Azhar scholars according to this honorable verse that "those who cause corruption on earth are losers" (Holly Quran, 2:27) are at one that recent demonstrations on two past days which led to sabotages are forbidden, so Al-Azhar maintained that any other demonstration in the country is Haram. He didn't stop there and goes further and without no reference to the people's requests about peaceful demonstration said: "since peaceful demonstration is rejected in Islam, so it is unacceptable, and definitely according to the logic of Sunni political fiqh such uprising is an instance of rebellion against Islamic governor, therefore it is illegitimate (A'shori Moghadam, 2011).

Persistence of objections and controversial position of Al-Azhar led to some reactions and consequences. Some of these are resignation of Al-Azhar's speaker objecting to oppression of people and the university's position in this regard, establishment of free scholars of Al-Azhar aiming to provide political and economic independence from government, formation of legal committee for preparation of new regulations of Al-Azhar, joining some of Al-Azhar scholars to demonstrators. After these developments, Al-Azhar withdraws from its previous position and legitimated the uprising, invites the government to self-restraint and responsibility. Also some of Al-Azhar scholars met with some Brotherhood's leaders (A'shori Moghadam, 2011).

As mentioned before, among fifty new parties in Egypt, many of political parties are Islamist and advocated political Islam and reviving Islamic Shari'a. Parties such as Freedom and Justice, Al-Noor, Fazilah, Egyptian Socialism, Islah, Al-Vasah, and Al-Tyar are among those parties, and all of these demonstrated the obvious influence of Islamist political thought in Egyptian developments. Among these parties, Salafi ones (for example, Al-Noor, Al-Isalah, Fazilah and Islah) belong to the religious right and about their political position, they have much in common in regard with their political and ideological aspects with other parties including Al-Vafad, Al-'Adl, Freedom and Justice, and about ten others but influence of these parties which are representatives of traditional part of Sunni fiqh on Egyptian developments is visible. Islamist parties' victory in the parliament election 2011 (Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Noor, 70% of votes) and above all Freedom and Justice Party's victory in the second part of presidential election in the summer 2012 (Eftekhari, 2012, 199-217) are signs of political fiqh's discursive domination on the future developments of the country.

Examining Al-Noor's thought and program (Al-Noor's thoughts and programs in Egypt, 2011, 244) we can find the effect of Sunni political fiqh's discourse on their programs:

- 1- Underdevelopment compensation, establishment of modern government, revival of ethics and values.
- 2- Preservation of Islamic-Egyptian identity.
- 3- Shari'a as the main source of legislation
- 4- Financial independence of Al-Azhar.
- 5- Muslims' government instead of theocrat and secular government.
- 6- Democracy within Islamic framework.
- 7- Revival of dignity and subsistence of citizens (Al-Noor's Thoughts and Programs in Egypt, 2011, 244-345).

Domination of Sunni political fiqh and its discourse on the party's political language is detectable in each of above items.

Also about propagation of concepts and the level of linguistic and conceptual influence of active groups in the country's political realm, for example the concept of "Islamic wakefulness" as one of important items among them, Muslim Brotherhood –which is itself under influence of Seied Jamal and Abdoh- is one of most important groups in this regard that has a main role in the propagation of this concept. Islamic wakefulness as a freeing background has an important effect on the formation of public opinion amid Egyptian political developments.

Discursive Islamic wakefulness is differentiated from governmental discourse which led people to obeying government. This concept beside prevalence of the concept of conjoining the good and forbidding the evil, especially against an oppressive government, could prepare a proper background for propagation of an alternative discourse.

The Statements for Invitation of People to Participate in Overthrown of Mubarak

Aiming to clear discursive aspects of Sunni Political fiqh and its presence in Egyptian revolution, we will examine and analyze several statements and interviews of Brotherhood as one of most influential groups in the country. Analyzing these statements may demonstrate its political fiqh and organized branches linguistic and conceptual influence on the developments.

It is worthy to say that Egypt had a police state, so its threat and censor during the revolution must be noticed. Because of this threat parties didn't attempt to make official invitation to gatherings and political revolution before weakening of Mubarak's executive, military, and security branches.

There is no sign of invitation to initial demonstrations for overthrown of Mubarak's regime in Brotherhood's official statements and interviews which were appeared in its website, rather this group was organized amid general demonstrations and with attention to extensive presence of young people, it supported the revolution. Noticing past struggles of Brotherhood, this support demonstrated obviously that the group aims to be active during hard days of revolution.

Mohammad Badi' as leader of Brotherhood, on 23 January 2011, in an interview declared his support of public objections, especially attempts by youths against Egyptian dictatorship regime, in this way he tries to show a patriotic face of himself without reference to his organizational thought and only referred to the public demands for political, social, and economic reforms through peaceful ways.

On 26 January 2011, Brotherhood's statement (Brotherhood, 2011) only refers to support youths' movement, like in interview with its leader. The semantic signifiers used in this statement appeared from a modern position originated in democracy seeking.

Among Brotherhood's demands in this statement are political stability and reforms, democracy, justice, and free election. There the important point was that Brotherhood thereby demands equality and freedom for everybody, Muslims and non-Muslims, and declares that rights and nation's demands are beyond personal demands. This statement describes the movement as a peaceful one without damaging the public and private properties. With attention to Brotherhood's organized forma and its mobilization, this emphasize on "cooperation between opposition and non-organized forces with political groups" which is declared clearly in the statement shows the visible determination of Brotherhood towards political revolution and also its strong presence in revolutionary government after overthrown of Mubarak.

In the statement 6th February 2011 (Brotherhood, 2011) Brotherhood stated its obligation to public opinion and individuals' right for determination of their fate and to its previous positions about support the public objections, also regarded itself as a part of great Egyptian nation. Brotherhood in this statement invited others to collective dialogue among national and political forces especially youths that called them as the leader of Egyptian movement against Mubarak, also demanded a quick change in regime's behavior and accomplishing people's desired reforms.

Brotherhood thereby confesses has no agenda and specific plan, and don't pursuit power and certain position and don't consider anybody as president. In this statement it demands recognition of people's right to peaceful demonstration and also the right to express their opinions.

It is understood from this statement also that Brotherhood without any plan and strategy and has joined to the revolution maybe unbelief to its victory, but at this stage it tries to find an important role in the revolution through gathering various groups and introducing a representative in any other group so that in a systematic way according to its organizational background acquires the leadership of new system of power in the country.

It can be said that Brotherhood unlike traditional views of Sunni political fiqh about negation of revolution and overthrown of ruling government and power, obviously is cooperating with the revolution, and with attention to its vicissitudinous history in Egypt and other Islamic countries, it aims to be a part of revolution that itself isn't its initiator, but prepared its preparations during its vicissitudinous political life. For Sunni political fiqh, in its history,

the truth concept always was equal with concepts originated in religion, and such concept of truth was preferred to the people's vote and wishes. However, it can be seen clearly in Brotherhood's statements that now people's vote is preferred, of course here in the statements there is no reference to the religion-originated truth. So to speak, now the opposition to dictatorship is enough ideologically so that to avoid ideological debates to justify joining to the revolution.

In this regard, maybe it is useful to refer to Olivier Roy's analysis when Brotherhood he regards this group more conservative now in comparison with its political and social activities. For him, Brotherhood isn't a liberal movement, and now after decades suffering hardship and deprivation, it is fearful. Maybe it attempts to establish an authoritative government, but maybe this government will be a conservative one and will incline towards west. Roy maintained that this government is more similar to Mubarak's regime than Iranian Islamic Republic. Definitely this will be confronted with a strong organized opposition that wants democracy (Roy, 2013, V24, No. 1).

The Draft of Egyptian Constitution¹

In order to more clearance about influence of Sunni political fiqh on Egyptian revolution, we will consider the first Egyptian post-revolution constitution as a reliable criterion and we will measure discursive and verbal influence of political fiqh in this law.

About its first article it can be said that this is based on new theories of Sunni fiqh, for example Tofiq Al-Shavi' opinions who maintained council is participation of all and freely cooperation of all individuals in decision-makings (Noori, 1997, 179), and it is appeared in the law aiming to adapt it to the domination of democracy idea. This article reads as follows: "sovereignty belongs to the people and the people is the only rightful source for establishment of forces that rule over the country, and these forces take their legitimacy from Egyptian people and must obey people's will. The limitation of their powers and responsibilities will determine by people's decision and they are responsible about preservation and fair distribution of general properties and the country's incomes, and these governmental duties and posts aren't rights or privileges for their owners, rather these posts are responsibilities for those who it is supposed to serve the people" (post-revolution constitution draft's first article).

Some principles in democratic systems are emphasized ones including freedom, social justice, equality, and respect to individual, so emphasize on them in the Egyptian constitution without reference to divine source of them signifies that there is a secular aspect in the constitution's theoretical source. Emphasize on equality between men and women, even about governmental posts, also is an important point that signifies to paler role of Islamic fiqh during the constitution composition:

"Women as a half of the society are like men and partner in all national affairs and responsibilities." (The article six of constitution's draft)

But in first chapter, in first section, article two, Islam is regarded as the official religion of the country and Islamic Shari'a is introduced as the source for legislation. In addition, according to the fourth article, Al-Azhar's council of scholars is regarded as expert in Islamic Shari'a.


Also in article 219 it is stated that Islamic shari'a includes general arguments and Osooli and fiqh rules, and its authentic literature are Sunni's factions.

This article, in fact, is one of most important achievements of Sunni political fiqh during constitution composition and formation of Egyptian revolutionary government. It must be mentioned that this article was also on of controversial articles after overthrow of Morsi government and during establishment of transient government by interference of army (CRI Online, 2013).

But considerable point in all 234 articles of new Egyptian constitution is the number of words in the constitution that have direct connection with Islam and are semantic signs of Sunni political fiqh, as appeared in following table:

¹ The source for this is <http://www.farsnews.com>, 15 December 2012, news code: 13910924000705.

Table 2
The Number of Sunni Political fiqh's Semantic signs in the
Constiotion Passed during Morsi's Government



Although Islam is the official religion of the country and its principles and foundations are the main source of legislation, but there is the neglect about reference to it Islam's principles at the rest of the constitution.

This shows that the weight of Sunni political fiqh is less than expected amount in the constitution, which obtained 63.8% of Egyptian people's votes in December 2012.

But what is worthy to notice about Egyptian constitution law which was confirmed during Morsi, is that these minimums and also the reference to four Sunni factions were revised during later demonstrations and in the next government which is established after coup by army and is attributed to liberal and leftist parties (Fars News Agency, 3rd September 2013), also some attempts were done aiming to revise the religious principles which were foundations of such articles.

According to Fars news agency (3rd September 2013) a committee including 50 persons was formed to revise Egyptian constitution law. These are: "Representatives from Al-Azhar, Churches, Revolutionary youths, Unions, Women, Police, Army, Islamic movements, Liberal Movements, Leftists, Nationalists, and some well-known characters including Amro Mossa, a former presidential candidates, and Jaber Ansar, chief of Cairo University (Fars News Agency, September 2013). This combination which its main role is revision of the constitution law, which as mentioned above is on the way of independence from Sunni fiqh discourse, has in itself some components of a modern discourse, a non-fiqh discourse. The presence of churches' representatives shows a positive approach towards religious tolerance. The role and presence of women, youths, workers, and leftists also shows a tendency of new government about using rival discourses that evidently have non-religious claims and modern aspects in the field of Egyptian politic scene.

Conclusion

With attention to ups and downs of Sunni political fiqh in its long political life and its considerable background in Egyptian political thought of Egypt as motherland of Islamic countries, and through examination of events and also the constitution's articles and the statements of Brotherhood as one of modern survivals of Sunni thought in Egypt, the results obtained by the present paper and the amount of reaching its goals, and also test of considered hypothesis can be summarized as follows.

Discursive aspects of Sunni political fiqh and discursive relation of Sunni political fiqh with the revolution and recent developments of Egypt were studied here. According to what mentioned in the second part of this study, and according to Fairclough's theory, domination, power, and ideology are among most crucial concepts of critical analysis of discourse. So using this methodological outlook we can classify the periods of Sunni political fiqh by a new and different method based on domination of one or several dominant currents and resistances against inequality of social positions and thought position:

- 1- Ideological/discursive primary formulation: first period or period of Sahabah (companions) and Tabe'in (followers).
- 2- Emergence of rival micro-discourses: second period or the age of emergence of fiqh factions.
- 3- Domination and usage of power enforcement tools in discursive formulation of four fiqh factions: the third period is the blockage period of Ijtihad, and the fourth period is depression period and domination of four factions.

4- Resistance against domination within the discourse of Sunni fiqh: its starting point is in fifth period, and its public appearance and blossoming is occurred in sixth period.

This intra-discursive resistance of modern discourse of Sunni political fiqh that is moving towards separation of social-political realm from spiritual realm and conveys also secularist claims, meanwhile that has conflicting groups in itself which belong to both extreme sides of integration and separation of religion and politics, as a marginalized discourse during Egyptian revolution plays its role within political parties and groups. Muslim Brotherhood, for example, at first stepped on the scene through a free election and reaches the political power using its ideological capacity and historical conceptualizing around itself and its anti-imperialistic and also less anti-dictatorship background.

About future position of political fiqh in Egypt we can say that simultaneous presence of several rival and parallel ideologies in a discursive order can lead people towards a doubtful state, and at the same time change in domination of a discourse/ideology and replacement of one with another can make people aware about ideological effects. Side by side presence of religious and nonreligious parties in these developments and their attempts about possession of revolution's achievements, although they weren't as its initiator, but had influence and roles for providing its preparations and its emergence because of many years their struggle, and also marginalization of youths' social demands included providing a free atmosphere without any religious intolerance and even ideological attitudes about concepts such as democracy, human rights, socialistic and Marxist and liberalist demands, these all caused that people and especially the initiator generation to be aware of new discourse and to act more precise about its domination and instruments than before.

Using critiques of typical domination of modern Islamism which is manifested in Brotherhood and Mohammad Morsi's government and based on support of some foreigner states, very existence of rival discourses ultimately through a way that may be called a "coup" or a "revolution in revolution" could provide a chance for political change and consequently seizing a tool for conceptualization and expansion of ideology for its discourse/ideology.

In other words, we can distinguish the escape from traditional and modern meta-narrations and attempt to find a life style with welfare and social freedom among primary demands of young Egyptian revolutionaries. This has a far distance from concepts of Egyptian Sunni political fiqh and traditional fiqh's discourse. Almost we can't in a distinguished way find fundamental concepts of Sunni political fiqh's discourse including "the inference of rules out of Shari'a", "Fatwa", "fiqh factions", "Islamic legislation", "imitation", "adaption of fatwas to time conditions", "legitimacy and illegitimacy", "return to Islamic teachings", and other concepts of fiqh thought among primary demands of Egyptian revolutionaries.

A look at the statements of Brotherhood as one of influential actors of modern Sunni political fiqh in Egypt and also in the constitution of Morsi's revolutionary government, it can be found that although demands and debates during formation and success of Egyptian popular revolution have much distance with Sunni political fiqh's concepts in the country, but mentioned visible signs about adaptation to new fiqh theories of legitimacy and sovereignty and adaptation to modern political theories signify a progressive horizon on the way of Sunni political fiqh.

At the end, according to what stated in the present paper we can conclude that: Sunni political fiqh as an effective ideological/discursive force within active political and social parties and groups and through networking and organizational activities in the country could produce a challenge for the organization of Egyptian ruling power, brought invulnerability of ruling political system under question, and by developing a rival discourse against dominant political discourse, introduced a new alternative to Egyptian public opinion.

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