

Power Elite Model, Factors of Political Dissonance, and Power Elites: Implication for Democratic Crisis in Pakistan (1990-1993)

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ABSTRACT

Democracy takes roots in a state in the presence of true democratic culture. And democracy without democrats is a thought that cannot be realized. The democratic culture of Pakistan is of conspiracy and counter conspiracy. This culture is elites ridden. The elites out of personal interests are engaged in perpetual political dissonance. This political dissonance revolves around factors of political and economic gains. This paper seeks to find out the pragmatics of the dismissals of Nawaz Sharif's term in office in 1993, and attempts to bring to the front the political crisis the political elites suffered from in the struggle for personal gains. It also attempts to point out how democratic and non-democratic elites as a group of power elites played their role in deepening the crisis among the main political elites. The period of Nawaz Sharif provides a sorrowful picture of the politics in the polity. He was mandated with majority in the elections of 1990 and became able to form government in the center. However, his relations with the President, and a group of power elites (the military and the oppositions) deteriorated with the passage of time. This gave birth to the power struggle among the power elites out of their personal interests. As a result, his government was dismissed apparently amid charges of corruption, mismanagement, worst law and order situation in the state. On the whole, the paper analyses that how political elites were engaged in the struggle for power in collaboration with democratic and nondemocratic elites. The crisis of democracy is analyzed in the light of power elite theory and descriptive-analytic method is used to analyze the data.

KEY WORDS: Political Dissonance, Democracy, Power Elites, Nawaz Sharif

1. INTRODUCTION

The President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the National Assembly on 6th August 1990, under the Article 58-2(b) of the Constitution on charges in the following lines. The Federal government was not running according to the provisions of the Constitution. It became, therefore, necessary to seek fresh trust of the public. Moreover, the culture of horse trading was rampant in the state and corruption was widespread in every institution of the government. The PPP broke all records of corruption. Its corruption was of such volume that the words corruption and politics became synonymous in Pakistan. On top of all these, the government failed to establish peace, law and order situation in the polity (Anjum, 2009, pp. 255-262). As a result, he had to dismiss the government of the PPP in 1990.

Nawaz Sharif assumed power as a result of elections in 1990. However, the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolved Nawaz Sharif's government on charges of corruption, mismanagement, and nepotism in April 1993. The charges were not different from those on which Benazir Bhutto's government had been dissolved in 1990 (Raza, 1997, p. 46).

The political scene in 1990s was not different from what we had experienced or heard in the past. The procedure adopted was well thought out even words used by the men on the helm to legalize their actions were the repetition of what we had heard before while leveling charges against the targeted government of the day (Wynbrandt, 2009).

The case of democracy in Nawaz Sharif's first term in office is analyzed in the light of the power elite model of C.W.Mills. He analyzed the politics of the USA and classified its politics into three categories in his book "the Power Elite". They are the politicians, the corporate sector and the military. He is of the view that so-called democratic power in the USA is enjoyed by these categories out of personal interests. Together they are known as the power elites. The case of democracy in Pakistan in the history and Nawaz Sharif's first term in office could be

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best seen in the light of power elite theory. The crisis of democracy was due to the power struggle among the president, Nawaz Sharif, army and the opposition in the centre and in the provinces. Together they could be clubbed as power elite. This power struggle was mainly due to the rivalries for political and economic gains. The transition to democracy once again was derailed out of inter-elite rivalries and a group of elites played a role that extended its support to the all powerful president in dismissing the democratic government in 1993. The political dissonance (Crisis) in Nawaz's 1st Term in Office had the following factors being given in the lines that had patterned rivalries among the power Elites.

The main rivalry was between Nawaz Sharif (PM.1990-1993) and Ghulam Ishaq Khan: (President: 1988-1993). They were the chief rivals and their rivalries were mainly out of personal interests. Nawaz Sharif wanted to repel 8th amendment. This antagonized Ghulam Ishaq Khan as he did want to lose grip on powers. Besides, Nawaz Sharif's attempt to investigate Veena Hayat Case, humiliation of Ghulam Ishaq Khan in the joint secession of the parliament, resentment over chief of the army staff appointment and over the appointment of the Governor of the Punjab, and resentment over 12th amendment. In this rivalry, a group of elites here known as integrated-group-of-elites played a decisive role to support the all powerful president. This was a constant feature of the political dissonance that thwarted democratic development in the period of democracy. The group comprised of the COAS, Benazir Bhutto, Bureaucracy, IJI, JI, MQM, Army (political-religious-civil-military elites) and had rivalries with Nawaz Sharif over Gulf Policy and IJI, Nawaz Sharif and MQM tussle and breaking of alliance, Nawaz Sharif, Gulf War, and army, and Benazir and him tussle and her rapprochement with Ghulam Ishaq and Nawaz Sharif's dismissal.

2. Nawaz Sharif's First Term in Office: An Analysis (1990-1993)

2.1. Pragmatics of Political Dissonance (Crisis): Nawaz Sharif, Ishaq Khan, and Rivalry

Elections were held in 1990. The IJI and its allied political parties the MQM and the ANP got 155 seats. However, the PPP got 45 seats. As a result of elections, Nawaz Sharif assumed the office and started rule with strong majority. However, once again, the prime minister embroiled in tussle with the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Despite the fact, Nawaz Sharif was known as the blue-eyed boy of Gen. Zia Ul Haq and also protégée in the light of his Islamization program. Besides, he had enjoyed the support of the military establishment. However, the struggle for power brought him in direct conflict with the president, and the military establishment (Haqqani, 2005, p. 143). Nawaz Sharif got majority under the banner of the IJI in the elections held in November 1990. His government was the first in the history of Pakistan that was enjoying two-third majority in the National Assembly. Besides, it had governments in all the provinces of the state. It was said that Nawaz Sharif had two advantages as compared to Benazir Bhutto when she was in the power. First and foremost, he had two-third majority in the Assembly, and had governments in all the four provinces. This sort of constitution Benazir Bhutto did not have during her first term in office (1988-90). This was the main hurdle to her government. Secondly, the IJI had controlled the situation in Karachi with the support of the MQM. On top of this, Nawaz Sharif had good relationship with the President and the Army (Kukreja, 1991, p. 665). Despite such favourable circumstances, the government of Nawaz Sharif suffered from deadlocks and distrust among the organs of the government (Hussain M. , 1990).

Nawaz Sharif pledged after assuming the office of the prime minister of Pakistan. He said, "We will change Pakistan to a prosperous, very strong and firm Islamic country. We will bring an industrial revolution in the country. It is my desire that I should not be remembered as those who wanted the government chair but rather as a PRIME MINISTER (Jang, 1990)." The President Ghulam Ishaq Khan always extended his help to Nawaz Sharif to maintain good relations with the army. It was he who patched the relations between the two whenever any rupture in their relations had occurred. In addition to that, the President Ishaq also succeeded in winnowing down the PPP-led-agitation in December 1992.

However, that bonhomie between the President Ishaq and him proved short-lived when he sought to take steps to curtail the President's powers. In such atmosphere, the opposition headed by the PPP demanded of the fresh elections in the state. The President dismissed Nawaz's government after securing support of the army and of the opposition (Rizvi, 1998, p. 105). This sort of affairs reflects that the elites go against one another for the sake of power so deep that they even do not hesitate to make undemocratic endeavours to prove their rivals a failure.

Differences began to emerge between the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Nawaz Sharif over the former's humiliation at the time of his speech to the joint secession of the Parliament at the hands of the opposition. However, he had to complete his speech amid slogan 'Go Baba Go'. Nawaz Sharif, although, reprimanded the behavior of the opposition as undemocratic and immoral but there was no active response from him and his party against the humiliation of the President.

Roedad Khan, the confidant of the President, said that the humiliation was the prime reason of the rapture in the relations between the President and Nawaz Sharif as the President Ishaq Khan had the opinion that Nawaz

Sharif and his party did not respond appropriately to the behavior of the opposition. As a result, there emerged serious differences between him and the President over the appointment of the COAS after the sudden death of General Asif Janjua as well as the repealing of the 8th amendment (Hasan, 2009, p. 201).

On the appointment of General Asif Janjua, Nawaz Sharif was not even consulted. He, therefore, wanted to revoke the 8th amendment and openly he used to talk in the meetings of the IJI that he did not want a lengthy constitution rather he wanted a constitution consisted of twelve pages only. However, the differences between the President and the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, for the first time, emerged on the appointment of the COAS in May 1991 when the President appointed General Asif Janjua.

As a matter of fact, Nawaz Sharif did not want General Asif Janjua as the COAS on account of his role in Sind operation, in floods, and in many other matters. However, the appointment of the COAS was the discretionary powers of the President under the Article 243 (2-C) of the Constitution which he had acquired as a result of the 8th amendment, whereas, according to the original Constitution of 1973, it was the right of the Prime Minister with the consultation of his cabinet if he likes.

The differences, once again, emerged on the appointment of new COAS when General Asif suddenly died on 8th January 1993. Nawaz Sharif called on the President in order to know his intention regarding the appointment of the new COAS. He got the impression that the President was going to appoint General Farakh as the COAS. On this, Nawaz Sharif protested that he was not going to acknowledge him as the COAS. He wanted either General Rahim Dil Bhati or General Javed Ashraf to be appointed as the COAS. To remove the deadlock between the President and Nawaz Sharif, Chaudhry Nasir Ali Khan, the political adviser of the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, met with Roedad Khan, a confidant of the President Ishaq Khan and a former bureaucrat, requesting him to help him in the matter.

As a result, Roedad Khan called on the President and requested him to change his mind about General Farakh's appointment. Furthermore, Roedad Khan stated that he told the President that General Farakh was not General Montgomery or General Rommel. If he had not appointed as the COAS, we would lose the 2nd World War. As a result, the President appointed General Wahid Kakar as the COAS on 12th January 1993 in order to defuse the situation. The crisis, although, was defused for the time being but preparation for the final show started.

The relations between Nawaz Sharif and the President Ishaq Khan deteriorated when the Prime Minister Inspection Commission under Lt. General Muhammad Shafiq (Retired) prepared a report against the son-in-law of the President Irfanullah Marwat and his accomplice Samiullah Marwat in the infamous Veena Hayat Case in which their illicit activities were exposed. This created such a rift in the relationship that persisted to the last day.

Nawaz Sharif used to resent the 8th amendment in silent words. However, he had remained silent over it in his early days in the office because it was this amendment which provided him with an opportunity to come to power. He called it a miracle that time. In addition to this, he was the logical end of the plan hatched out by the President in collaboration with the civil and military bureaucracy in the light of that amendment. However, his potent desire to have complete grip on the business of the state became public when he prepared the draft of the 12th amendment in the guidance of his legal advisor Chaudhry Ihsanul-Haq.

The 12th amendment was even more dangerous than the 8th amendment. If it had been implemented in its real shape, the state would have gone in the grip of one-man rule. According to the amendment, the Prime Minister had the power to suspend any provision of the Constitution for an indefinite period. When the draft was tabled to the President, he called Nawaz Sharif and asked him if he had shown the draft to the members of the Parliament. He nodded in negative. He said if the President allowed it, the members would have no objection. In the meantime, the coalition parties the MQM, the JI, and the ANP of Nawaz Sharif's government called on the President and registered their reservations against the amendment. Despite the objection of the President, the amendment was passed on 2nd July 1991, and it was resented on all forums (Saleem A. , 1998, pp. 359-366).

The confrontation between Nawaz Sharif and the President Ishaq went from bad to worse after Nawaz Sharif's government was restored via the verdict of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The working relations between the two became extremely bad. In the meantime, Nawaz sought to replace the pro-president Governor and Chief Minister of the Punjab through resolution using his parliamentary majority. The resolution required the assent of the President. The resolution seemed to be a hope against the hope in the light of the relations between the Prime Minister and the President. As a result, Nawaz Sharif proclaimed an order to implement the resolution. However, the army failed to second his order being unlawful (Rizvi, 1998, p. 106).

In the initial days of his rule, Nawaz Sharif did not make any efforts to interfere in the day-to-day work of the state which was under the civil-military oligarchy. However, he started thinking how to increase his powers and influence. He made Brigadier Imtiaz Ahmed the head of the civilian intelligence bureau. It was the same chap who helped engineered the IJI while working as the head of the political wing of the ISI. He worked and made alliances

for him in order to isolate the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan (Sohail, 1993, pp. 73-75), (Hussain Haqqani's interview with Major.Amir. Islamabad, February 16.1999). (Aamir, 1999).

The operation cleanup in the province of Sindh had adverse effects on Nawaz Sharif's government. He was worried at the military operation in Sindh. This created resentment which affected his relationship with the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the COAS. Besides, issues like the Gulf War, differences over the controversial sharia bill, rising economic crisis and disenchantment within the IJI coalition draw the cracks in the relations among the troika. Moreover, Nawaz Sharif's efforts to extend the powers of the Prime Minister paved the way for parting the ways. Normalization of relations with Benazir Bhutto was also a point could be pondered upon.

However, Nawaz Sharif's struggle to review the 8th amendment and his silence over the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan reelection finally proved to be the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. Nawaz Sharif appeared on the state-run television on 17 August 1993 and charged the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan with conspiracy made against him. This address brought his dismissal by leaps and bounds. However, it made Nawaz Sharif a bold politician as otherwise he was not known for. The wily Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed his government and caretaker set up was made. Balkh Sher Mazari was appointed as the Prime Minister and politicians from the PPP were included in the cabinet. Among them Asif Zardari, Aitzaz Ehsan, Jahangir Bader were significant (Kamran, 2008, p. 152).

The situation went from bad to worse when the widow of the deceased COAS Asif Nawaz accused Nawaz Sharif of murdering her husband and proclaimed that her husband had been poisoned. This left Nawaz Sharif in bad situation. Benazir Bhutto made a strategic move and in order to take the advantage of the situation, she sought to have alliance with the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan. She demanded of Ghulam Ishaq Khan the dissolution of the IJI government and mid-term elections.

In return, Benazir pledged to extend her support to him in his quest for another term as the president if he dismissed her rival government (Jaffrelot, 2002, p. 317). Nawaz Sharif, however, realized his mistake and sought rapprochement with the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan. He even proclaimed to provide support for his candidature for the slot of the president. But he was too late to woo the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan (Cohene, 2005, p. 149).

Nawaz Sharif miscalculated the situation when he proclaimed that he would go to dispense with the 8th amendment. Without realization that he was alone politically, his, first and foremost, miscalculation was that he had of the opinion, despite history of enmity, mistrust and confrontation, that the PPP would extend its assistance in rolling back the 8th amendment. The second miscalculation was related with the matter that he thought the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan had been obsessed with his re-election as the president for the next term. So he would seek nothing except his re-election.

However, Nawaz Sharif self-created world fell like the house of cards when ministers from his own cabinet started gathering around the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Among them Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Tariq Chaudhry and a group of Jatoi loyalists merited as significant. As a result, the political position of Nawaz Sharif began to split and withered away. To save his skin, he nominated Ghulam Ishaq Khan as his presidential candidate, but his proclamation was too late to repair the gulf.

Nawaz Sharif wanted to remove the Governor of the Punjab. However, the President was adamant to accept his demand. However, Nawaz Sharif passed a resolution from the Parliament on 29th June to take the administration of the province under article 234 of the constitution. He did not get the approval of the President regarding this resolution. As a result, he appointed Mian Azhar as Administrator-designate of the Punjab (Hasan, 2009, p. 204).

In disparate attempt, Nawaz Sharif addressed the nation on April 17, 1993 and publicly criticized the president. He even went so far to announce that the President House was involved to fragment the Pakistan founding political party PML. Moreover, he proclaimed that the Governor of the province was also involved in making conspiracies against the sitting government and residing in the President House for that purpose. This sort of affairs the public hardly bears. He further disclosed that the enemy of democracy even offered his cabinet minister prime ministership to rebel against him. He reiterated that he would not take the pressure from the president, rather he would face the dismal affair and he would not resign or dismiss the National Assembly on the wishes of the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Besides, he accused the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan of the conspiracies against the federation in general and against his government in particular. The prime minister challenged the sitting head of the state. No resignation, no dissolution, no dictation proclaimed Nawaz Sharif. In addition to, he announced that he was fully prepared to face any opponent both inside and outside (Khan Faqir, Fakhru Islam and Shahid Hassan Rizvi, 2015, p. 204).

Gohar Ayub Khan, the Speaker of NA, challenged the dismissal of the NA in Lahore High Court that declared the dismissal illegal and the result of personal grudges. Later on, Nawaz Sharif also filed a case challenging the dismissal in the Apex Court of Pakistan on May 25th, 1993. The court gave its verdict invalidating the dismissal and declared the presidential order illegal and restored the assemblies striking down Ghulam Ishaq Khan's orders (

the president of Pakistan 10:1 ratio of the verdict). As a result, national assemblies and the prime minister and his cabinet were restored (Waseem M. , 1994).

2.2. Nawaz Sharif, the Opposition and the Crisis:

The crisis of July 18th 1993 was not a bolt from the blue. Rather, diverse forces under the influence of both political and military leadership played their decisive role. There was not a single neutral agency which could solve the crisis. Rather, everybody was engaged in his own interests. Even the opposition asked the President to use his discretionary powers under the Article 58-2(b) of the Constitution. Besides, it threatened him with the Long March.

When Nawaz Sharif was engaged in confrontation with the President Ishaq Khan, Benazir Bhutto, initially, sought to have alliance with Nawaz Sharif against the President but she failed to achieve her objectives. Consequently, she sought to have the help of Roedad Khan, a confidant of the President and a former bureaucrat, to make rapprochement with the President. She told him that she would support the President against Nawaz Sharif so that he might not be able to repeal the 8th amendment and acquire dictatorial powers. This is the sorrowful aspect of political elites that how they compromise for their personal interests and work against democracy (Hasan, 2009, pp. 201-202).

Benazir persuaded the Chief Minister of the Punjab Manzoor Watto to dissolve the Assembly and he dissolved it on 28th June. However, the Lahore High Court restored the Assembly of the Punjab. It was again dissolved by the Governor of the Punjab on the advice of the Chief Minister within seven minutes of the Honorable Court decision.

The tussle between the President Ishaq and Nawaz Sharif became worst with the passage of time. In the meantime, the opposition led by the PPP gave a call for a Long March if their demand for fresh elections had not met. The COAS Waheed Kakar assured the opposition before he made agree the President Ishaq and Nawaz Sharif to resign (Abbas, 1993).

In order to appease the Islamists, Nawaz Sharif announced that woman lot should cover their heads while appearing on the screen. Moreover, he restricted the management of the Pakistan Television Corporation not to air Women Swimming Games of 1992 Olympic Games. This was the follow up of the appeasement policy as the Islamists had thoughts that their costumes were bad to Muslims' sensitivities.

However, the relations between Nawaz Sharif and Islamists suffered from deterioration on certain issues. For example, Nawaz Sharif extended his support to the USA and Allies during the Gulf War (1992). On the contrary, the Islamists supported Saddam Hussain. Similarly, the Islamists attacked the temple of the Hindus in Pakistan in reaction to the destruction of the mosque at Ayodhya (India) by Hindu religious fanatics. Consequently, Nawaz Sharif made large arrests in the temple attack. On the case of Afghanistan, opinions were divided. Nawaz Sharif sought to support the moderate groups of Mujahedeen. On the contrary, the Islamists and the military wanted to support fundamentalists (Haqqani, 2005 , p. 145).

In 1992, Nawaz Sharif suffered from ill fate as the IJI, which was a forced marriage solemnized by ISI, began to disintegrate. The NPP of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the JI of Qazi Hussain Ahmed, and the MQM of Altaf Hussain left the alliance on account of differences with Nawaz Sharif and his government. In addition to, the twelve members of the MQM also resigned from the National Assembly. Such changes in the configuration of the IJI although posed no major problem for the continuity of Nawaz Sharif's government in the centre but Nawaz Sharif did lose two-third majority in the National Assembly required for an amendment in the Constitution.

Furthermore, the formation of a group in the name of the Conscience Group in the Senate of Pakistan made Nawaz Sharif's grip in the upper house weak. Consequently, after such metamorphosis, the IJI coalition comprised of the PML and ANP- two strange partners keeping in view their rivalry and hate in the past (Khan, 1993, p. 130).

Political Parties and the government of Nawaz Sharif were locked in bitter rivalries while each attempting to play zero-sum game. Their bitterness had no parallel. The Prime Minister and the President did not meet the opposition leader even for a single time during the two years of the government of the IJI under Nawaz Sharif (Khan, 1993, p. 130).

Organizations like NICFC and SCCC had taken large loans from the banks. These organizations belonged to the members of the provincial assembly of the ruling IJI. This created a lot of problems for Nawaz Sharif and put his government credibility at stake. Besides, this also provided an opportunity to the opposition to take mileage of the situation and used the opportunity for destabilization in such circumstances. Benazir Bhutto sent a telegram to the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan demanding him of Nawaz Sharif's dismissal (Dawn, 1991).

It was a matter of an immense surprise that Benazir Bhutto was engaged in bonhomie with the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan who had dismissed her government. Besides, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan represented the establishment. This type of behaviour reflects the features of the politics in the state of Pakistan. In such type of

politics, there is more space to confrontation than to accommodation. This shows the political intolerance of the opposition (Talbot I., 2005, p. 321).

The low politics touched the pinnacle in the polity when on 27 November 1991 five masked persons entered into Veena Hayat's House. She was the close-associate of Benazir Bhutto and the daughter of Muslim League leader Sardar Shaukat Hayat. She was gang raped. She accused Irfan Ullah Marwat of the incident and said that the men were sent by him. It is worth mentioning that Irfan Ullah Marwat was the son-in-law of the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Advisor on Home Affairs to the CM Sindh Jam Sadiq Ali (Talbot I., 2005, p. 321). The incident became a rallying point for the political parties and groups. However, the establishment including the President took no interest in the incident. Moreover, Jam Sadiq Ali at the behest of the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan launched crackdown on the workers of the PPP (Kamran, 2008, p. 151).

Judiciary handed down decision in Nawaz Sharif's favour, however, his sufferings had not yet ended. His political friends now had become staunch enemies. His trusted Lieutenant Mian Manzoor Ahmed in understanding with Altaf Hussain, the Governor of the Punjab, did not let Nawaz Sharif take advantage of the court decision. Both had in secret understanding with the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. This patch up did not permit Nawaz Sharif to take support in the Punjab which was his political base. Thus, the political crisis took the shape of the constitutional crisis. The President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed Nawaz Sharif's move when he sought to bring the Punjab's government under the control of the central government.

The President was of the opinion that Constitution has no such provision that support that move of the central government. The situation demanded the intervention of the COAS. As a result, Gen. Waheed Kakar made both resign after a deal between the two. This gave an opportunity to Moin Qureshi, a World Bank /IMF financial wizard, to take the office as the caretaker prime minister. Mr. Wasim Sajjad became the president who was the favorite of the establishment and was right-winged (Kamran, 2008, p. 153). The process gave way to other groups of elites as a change occurs in the paradigm. They favour one another if there is any deadlock. They exchange powers to their respective elites and this is how the power ball rolls among them.

2.3. Nawaz Sharif, the Army, and the Crisis:

Nawaz Sharif had the blessings of General Zia in going up in the political career. Being a progeny of General Zia, he enjoyed the support of the army even after his death in air crash in 1988 near Bahawalpur (Pakistan). The men in the uniform were happy with him and had good relations with him. He had earned that status on account of his enmity toward the PPP. He did not exhibit even an iota of reservation over the COAS Aslam Baig's open criticism on the government policy toward the Gulf Crisis of 1991 (Rizvi, 1998) p.104.

The differences between the army and Nawaz Sharif emerged over the operation of Sindh. The army was called upon to start operation against the miscreants in the province. The operation was started in the rural area-the stronghold of the PPP. The army became apprehensive being used as an instrument by the government to target the PPP activists. On top of that, the operation when extended to the urban area came into clash with the MQM-the ally of the PML (N). That sort of situation put the Nawaz Sharif's government into trouble.

Some of the cabinet ministers condemned the army publically. However, Nawaz Sharif refused to own the statements. But the damage had been done. In rebuttal, the military came openly maligning the government of Nawaz Sharif and said that his government attempted to buy some of the top commanders with material rewards. The COAS Asif Janjua called that behavior of the government low and said an attempt to corrupt the army (Rashid, 1993).

The army was not happy with Nawaz Sharif's foreign policy. The US imposed sanctions on Pakistan invoking the Pressler Amendment of 1985 on account of Pakistan nuclear programme. As a result, the economic and military assistance was suspended. In such a situation, the army had hopes that the government of Nawaz Sharif would devise some diplomatic solution to the impasse between the two states and the military assistance would be restarted.

However, the government failed to achieve any and hopes failed to materialize. In addition to that, the US put Pakistan on the watch list of states that sponsored terrorism. In such state of affairs, the army was conscious about the image of the state abroad and had thoughts that Nawaz's government was doing nothing important on diplomatic front (Rizvi, 1998, p. 105).

On 1st July 1993, Nawaz Sharif called on the COAS and proposed to have forced the President of his office and hold elections under the Prime Minister. In his opinion, free and fair elections were not possible in the presence of the President. He himself knew that how he was made the Prime Minister in 1990. However, the COAS responded in negative and said that he had no constitutional right to dismiss the President. However, he assured Nawaz Sharif that the President would remain neutral in the elections. In addition to this, he proposed that the new elections were the solution of the current crisis.

There was an agreement on the proposal of holding new elections between the COAS and the President. However, Nawaz Sharif took time to think over the proposal and went to Lahore. In the newspapers, it was reported that the army had been putting pressure on Nawaz Sharif to resign. It was a ploy only as the proposal for holding new elections was given by Nawaz Sharif himself. He was of the opinion if his government had been dismissed, a doubt would have emerged in the mind of the public against the neutrality of the military. In this way, he would be able to have the sympathy of the masses.

Even in certain newspapers, General Wahid Kakar had been tagged as the traitor of the nation. As a result, the COAS called on Nawaz Sharif and complained of the statements in newspapers. He denied flatly of having any relations with the statements, but he promised to issue an explanatory statement against those statements via the Ministry of Defense. However, the statement was issued by the Ministry of Information after some delay (Saleem A., 1998, pp. 348-349).


On the Gulf War (1991), the stance of the government and the COAS was divided. The COAS Aslam Baig wanted to extend support to Iraq and spoke against the hegemony of the USA. In addition to, the Islamists also rose in protest and staged demonstrations in the capital city Islamabad and demanded of the government to support Iraq against the USA and allied forces. The scenario gave birth to apprehensions that the COAS might probably stage a coup in the state. Nawaz Sharif and his close associates had such apprehensions.

Consequently, Nawaz Sharif announced Baig's successor prior to his retirement after consulting Generals on the matter. This move weakened Baig's influence in the army and provided Nawaz Sharif with the time of solace and non-interference from the army. However, he failed to materialize many of the modifications he had wanted to do in the presence of strong president like Ghulam Ishaq Khan on his side (Haqqani, 2005 , p. 143).

2.4. Role of Judiciary, and Nawaz Sharif:

On April 17th, 1993, the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif publically acknowledged in his address to the nation on TV and Radio that he had been pressurized from all quarters and he was not allowed to serve the nation. He said categorically, that he would not resign and would not dissolve the Assembly as well as would not take any dictation. When circumstances went to a point of no return, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolved the National Assembly on 19th April 1993, while using his discretionary powers under Article 58-2 (b) of the Constitution. The dissolution of the Assemblies was challenged in the Supreme Court which declared the dissolution invalid and restored the government of Nawaz Sharif on 26th May 1993. However, in the absence of the working relationship between the two, both the Prime Minister and the President had to resign on the intervention of the COAS on 18th July, 1993 (Hasan, 2009, pp. 201-203).

The Political Dissonance and Nawaz's 1st Term in Office: Pattern of Rivalries and Elites (1990-1993)



3. Analysis of Discussion: Power Elite Theory in Perspective

The case of democracy in Nawaz Sharif's first term in office is analyzed in the light of the power elite model of C.W.Mills. He analyzed the politics of the USA and classified its politics into three categories in his book "the Power Elite". They are the politicians, the corporate sector and the military. He is of the view that so-called democratic power in the USA is enjoyed by these categories out of personal interests. Together they are known as the power elites. The case of democracy in Pakistan in the history and Nawaz Sharif's first term in office could be best seen in the light of power elite theory. The crisis of democracy was due to the power struggle among the president, Nawaz Sharif, army and the opposition in the centre and in the provinces. Together they could be clubbed as power elite. This power struggle was mainly due to the rivalries for political and economic gains. The transition to democracy once again was derailed out of inter-elite rivalries and a group of elites played a role that extended its support to the all powerful president in dismissing the democratic government in 1993.

In the elections held in 1990, the ISI played an active role in bringing together political parties opposed to the PPP and made a gigantic anti-PPP alliance. As a result, in every constituency, there was at least one candidate available against the PPP's. In addition to, the ISI also distributed a large sum of the money among the politicians. The money was made available by a Karachi-based banker who, later on, acknowledged that distribution. Similarly, the then ISI Chief Lt. General Asad Durani also acknowledged that he distributed "a total of 60 million to 20 anti-Bhutto politicians" (Bray, 1997, p. 324) for the 1990 elections. General Hamid Gul supervised the campaign of the IJI in the elections held in 1990 through his associates in the ISI. Nawaz Sharif and JI propagated against Benazir Bhutto as a security risk if came again in power. Moreover, they both alleged her that she had shared intelligence information with India regarding the Sikh Resistance Movement which had links with Pakistani intelligence agency (Sohail, 1993).

When the first term of Benazir Bhutto was dismissed, the PDA made public white papers alleging rigging in the elections. The interim setup both at the center and provincial level used state machinery to realize the rigging. It was alleged that there was a cell in the President House to ensure the defect of the candidate of the PDA. The officials on elections day was pressurized to facilitate and favor the IJI candidate even help to stuff the boxes with illegal votes. The rigging was also validated by foreign agencies that were observing the election process. It was against the principles of democracy and proclaimed that without fair and independent Elections Commission election were not possible (Anthony, 1989, p. 105) (Nation, 1990) (Muslim, 1990).

The elections held in 1990 were not without discrepancies and rigging. Pre-poll rigging was significantly high and random in the elections of 1990. The President Ishaq Khan and the caretaker Prime Minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi along with the armed forces and intelligence agencies were engaged in the making of the elite group in order to break the PPP vote. It was made in the shape of the IJI. In the President's House, a cell under General Rafaqat was made responsible to watch all the process of tasked pre-poll rigging. Besides, the state controlled media was used for this aim. Similarly, polling-day rigging was also practiced in the elections. As a result, the PPP failed to get many seats in the Punjab. These seats were won by the PPP in the elections of 1988. Consequently, it lost 39 seats out of 53 although these seats were won by it in the elections of 1988.

The IJI ballot boxes had been filled with false votes on the polling-day. Consequently, it got many seats. Similarly, the post-poll rigging created differences between the President of the IJI and the troika i.e. the President, the COAS, and the caretaker Prime Minister. The President Ishaq Khan and the COAS wanted Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi to be the Prime Minister. However, Nawaz Sharif was adamant to accept him. Nawaz Sharif was the President of the IJI. Therefore, he did not want to surrender. Although he was allowed to make government in the centre but this used to remark that the post-poll rigging later on prepared a ground for his removal in his first term in office in April 1993.

There was conflict over who would take the office of the Prime Minister. The COAS Aslam Baig sought Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi to be the Prime Minister. However, Nawaz Sharif had the support of General Hamid Gul and several other Generals who threw their weight behind him on the basis of ethnicity. The Punjabi Generals wanted Nawaz Sharif to be the Prime Minister. In the elections held in 1990, the IJI had landslide victory in the Punjab. To make this victory a basis for his claim, Nawaz Sharif proclaimed that the Punjab gave its verdict in favour of him and wanted him to be the next Prime Minister. Besides, he acknowledged in public that he had the support of the Punjabi Generals. The house of the IJI was divided on who should be the Prime Minister. However, in the end Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister in November 1990 (Haqqani, 2005 , p. 141). This symbolizes that how elites struggle for power without any care for group loyalties.

Sharp differences emerged between Nawaz Sharif and the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan over naming the successor of the COAS Asif Nawaz. In the meantime, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan nominated General Waheed Kakar-a Pashtun general- as the COAS. After setting-aside the issue of the COAS, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan sought to settle a score with Nawaz Sharif. The relations between them went on deteriorating with passage of

time. General Waheed Kakar like his predecessor Asif Nawaz tried his best to minimize the role of the military in the political affairs. However, he failed to translate his wish. He played his role to bring the two to resign from their respective positions (Haqqani, 2005 , p. 144). The military is thought in the state of Pakistan as the king-maker and behind-the-scene manipulator. The political scenario of the state is famous for behind-the-scene manipulation. Such shady games are played with too much decorum and decency.

Nawaz Sharif proclaimed himself to be the flag-bearer of the Quaid-e-Azam's principles on the Independence Day (14th Of August). On Zia's death anniversary, he also proclaimed himself to be the guardian of the legacy of General Zia ul-Haq. He failed to pay any heed to this matter that the Quaid-e-Azam was a democratic and General Zia ul-Haq was a dictator (Khan, 1993, p. 131). Nawaz Sharif was so mesmerized in his authority that he even failed to differentiate between a democrat and a dictator. For him both were respectable without considering their thinking about democracy. How can a democratically elected prime minister praise a dictator who had no regard for democracy? Such thoughts exhibit his belief in democracy. Besides, he openly promised to protect the legacy of Zia.

In the first term, Nawaz Sharif gave a lot of attention to the private sector. Private Air lines were setup. He also founded the Privatization Commission headed by Gen.Saeed Qadir. Its mandate was to put on the sale the sick units in the public sphere to the private ownership. As a result of this privatization drive, the Muslim Commercial Bank was sold to the private firm, the Chinioti-Punjabi Mansha, Saphire group (Talbot I. , 2005, p. 320).

In the name of Privatization, the political elites entertain the interests of their groups and involve the other groups of elites giving them opportunities to take advantage of the situation like power elites in the USA. The elites in Pakistan also entertain the interests of one another. Making Gen.Saeed Qadir as the Head of the Privatization Commission and the selling of the Muslim Commercial Bank to his own nominee of the corporate sector are the significant instances of the power elite theory with reference to Pakistan.

The Eight amendment levied effects on the powers and relations between the president and the prime minister. The president had resolved to keep play dominating role. Making various appointments increased the space between the two. As a result, the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif sought to dispense it once for all. However, the PPP struck a deal with the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan to support him as the president for next term. In return, the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the provincial and national assemblies and proclaimed elections on 14 July 1993 using his constitutional power under 8th amendment on charges of corruption and misgovernance. However, the Apex Court contrary to the traditions restored the government of Nawaz Sharif on 26th May 1993. In retaliation, Benazir Bhutto, the leader of the opposition, proclaimed long march to Islamabad against the government and demanded new elections. All this was not short of the musical game being played for power. Each stakeholder wanted to have power and did not matter which way it was possible to grip. Each was oblivious to the democratic norms, and values. (Musarrat, 2013, pp. 264-265).

In addition to, it was the political parties that started clan based (biradari based) politics for their own purpose. Before independence, the PML was a group of some wealthy family, and it even remained under their influences after independence. Thus, biradari based politics provided not only strength to the political parties but it also provided leadership to the political parties. Bhuttos, Paghares, Lagharis, Mangales, Khan and Sherpoas are worth mentioning (Ahmed, 2009, pp. 111-113).

Nawaz Sharif used to say that the IJI government sought to have long lasting, most positive, and well thought out democratic tradition both within and without the parliament. However, all such claims were only wishful thinking and never were materialized. The government worked via ordinances from 1990 to April 1993. The worst of the matter was that total 78 ordinances were promulgated out of which 28 were not even sent to the cabinet violating the constitutional obligation. Such dismal sort of situation made the parliament rubber-stamp instead a body whose sole authority was to make and remake laws. The rule of the IJI was also of worst type and there was no rule of law.

Favoritism was the order of the day. This was used arbitrarily for personal purpose and flounder the law. The MNAs and MPAs were hardly arrested if found guilty. The corruption was rampant. The affluent people got monetary benefit in land scam as well as in banks or financial scams without any check from the government to patch the rent. The government made Commission to probe Cooperative Financial Companies scams. But however, no fruitful results were met. Moreover, to show case the public favor, the government representatives used to distribute cheques among the effectees on TV to show that government constituted commission were doing enough. However, both the government and the opposition accused each other of these scams and held responsible for them one another. Such blame game did nothing fulfilling the loss been incurred on the masses (Khan Faqir,Fakhrul Islam and Shahid Hassan Rizvi, 2015, p. 204).

In October 1990, the IJI led by Nawaz Sharif claimed majority in the elections and made government in the centre. Nawaz Sharif during his 1st term in office, failed to bridge up the divide between the socio-economic forces

and political system. He broke alliances with the MQM as well as lost the confidence of the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Besides, law and order situation took most of the part of the state. Corruption by bureaucracy and politicians pervaded the state. The conflicts between Nawaz Sharif and the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan were revolved around the 8th amendment, and the forth coming presidential elections. As a result, political and constitutional crisis precipitated between them and both were made resign in 1993 (Haroon, 2004, pp. 383-86).

Despite frequent elections in the state, the political leadership, however, failed to promote democracy in the polity and an environment that could promote democratic values and principles. As a result of this, there was a strong inclination towards ill use of democratic norms and principles that threatened democratic consolidation. Such demeanor, on the part of leaders, threatened political trends in Pakistan. The government of Nawaz Sharif attempted to enforce the decision in the light of majoritarian view of democracy without giving any heed to the view of the minority. This is manifested in his decision in the proclamation regarding the imposition of Governor's rule in the province of Sindh. His, this posture, roused undemocratic feelings, and damaged the feelings of the smaller provinces resulting in the formation of PONAM (Shafqat, 1999, p. 282).

Such kind of behaviors on the part of political leaders has produced distrust about democracy. This disappointment does not mean that democracy is the bad form of government. But it is related with the undemocratic behavior of the power elites who had been hoped to make democracy work in the polity. Like a number of democracies, where aspiration for democracy is strong, however, pro-democratic groups are less. The same is the case of Pakistan (Shafqat, 1999, pp. 283-284).

4. CONCLUSION

In short, factors of political dissonance gave way to mutual rivalries between the power elites and put the democratic transition in the state on stake. In consequence, democracy was derailed for personal gains. In this struggle for power, they even do not hesitate to join hands with the army in order to bring down their rival. It was this rivalry for power that none of the governments was able to complete its span of time according to the constitution. Each government had to leave the office ungracefully. For this state of affairs, power elites are held responsible keeping in view their role that provided an opportunity to the group of elites both democratic and undemocratic to take advantage of the situation between the main power elites. Mama's Sharif's first term in office had been of conspiracy and counter conspiracy. He and the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan were engaged in power politics. All the power elites consisting of the ruling party, the president, the opposition, the army, and the judicial elites promoted their personal interests at the cost of democracy. In addition to this, the role of the opposition was not according to democratic norms and principles. It made alliances against the ruling party in order to bring it down, and welcomed frequently the undemocratic decisions of the President. The role of the opposition in the period speaks volume about its political behavior and its belief in democracy. Moreover, the factors of dissonance as discussed earlier paved the way for the crisis of democracy during Nawaz Sharif's first term in office. If the coalition partners failed to compromise on mutual interests, the dissident threatened the government to go out of the coalition. As a result, the ruling party had to suffer from crisis. In the light of the discussion, it could be acknowledged that the inter-power elite's rivalries gave way to political dissonance that in turn paved the way for crisis of democracy in the period (1990-1993).

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