Extensiveness and Strength of United States' Paradoxical Policy and Guiding Principles as Regards North Africa: A Case Study of Arab Republic of Egypt

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ABSTRACT

This paper is based upon the records and statistics from the US-AID program in the North Africa with the case study of Egypt to analyze the impact of foreign aid on the democratization and decentralization process in the aid recipient nations. Previously, in several cases, it has been examined that aid can entrenched dictatorships, making a transition with least priority with a support to some narrow entities. However, the paper establishes the evidence that the relationship between aid and democratization depends on the nature and objectives of aid. Likewise, the paper also establishes the fact a large sum of aid that came from the democratic donors is often found to be found closely associated with the economic liberalization rather than democracy. In case of Egypt, around $5 billion have been spent by the US-AID with the agenda of democracy assistance and promotion was narrowed down with neo-liberalization economic reforms instead of democratic transition. In latter context, the paper suggests that the large portion of the American aid has been spent to introduce the neo-liberal economic reforms of the Washington consensus instead of strengthening democratic institution. The proposition that US-AID’s democratic promotion and assistance funding to the authoritarian regimes in Egypt had negatively related with democratization. Moreover, the research further elaborates, how the donors aid affects the domestic policies of the recipient nations especially in the context of the relationship between central authority and local bodies. Thus, the paper suggests that the source of funding matters, with donor priorities regarding democratic assistance and promotion to determine the link between aid and democratization.

KEY WORDS: Minimal state, Democratic assistance, Military intervention, World Bank, Washington Consensus, Neo-liberalism, Market reforms.

1- INTRODUCTION

The disjuncture between American rhetoric and American policies on democratization often leads to charges of hypocrisy in U.S. foreign policy. Such conclusions are too harsh. Policies such as MEPI do support democracy, and American policy makers do believe that the spread of democracy, in the long term, will make America more secure and more prosperous. Democracy, however, has never been America's sole interest in North Africa or any other region of the world, nor has it ever been the most important of America's interests. As a result, when democratization comes into conflict with what are seen as more pressing interests, democratization is often sacrificed. Having to balance competing interests does not make one a hypocrite, although America could do much more to bring its rhetoric closer in line with its behavior by discussing such tradeoffs and the reasons for them more explicitly. In North Africa, the United States is likely to continue its policy of rhetorically supporting democracy and offering limited assistance for democratization in the form of MEPI-like programs but reserving its most consequential support for actors that prove their moderation by supporting American policy goals in the war on terror. By maintaining close relations with Morocco and Tunisia and succeeding in improving relations with Algeria and Libya, the United States has moved beyond dividing the states of North Africa into those that are with us or against us. While some may discount this accomplishment because of the fact that all the regimes in North Africa have their own reasons to be with us in the war on terror, the rapprochements with Algeria and Libya were not inevitable and should be recognized as positive developments. In order to continue this momentum into the future, two additional difficult steps are required on the part of the United States. The first is to avoid trading an external "with us or against us" stance for an internal one by assuming that any domestic opposition to the regimes with which the United States currently has positive relationships necessarily has an agenda hostile to the United States. As the states of North Africa continue their own internal growth, the United States must remain willing to accept that the potential empowerment of groups or individuals that are not necessarily with us does not make those states our enemies. Second, if the United States wants to keep American allies with us, the Washington must also be...
willing to stand with them. While North Africa is likely to remain an area of secondary security interest to the United States, regional issues are certainly not secondary for Maghreb states themselves. If Washington is going to want to continue to have North African cooperation in solving issues outside of North Africa, the United States must also be willing to help the region solve the problems within the region. Now that American foreign policy has become more consistent across the Maghreb, the United States should take the next step and begin, at least in part, treating North Africa as a region in and of itself and not just as an adjunct to other more important regions. This study will come across the difference methods, ways and system of examining the causes and how to achieve the best democratization process, where the citizens will be able to receive their fundamental rights, liberty, protection, progress, peaceful society, respect for the humanity, the researcher found some solutions by emphasizing on these following factors, which are: wealth, social equality, cultural identity, foreign intervention, and standard educational institutions.

2- WEALTH

Numerous political scientists believe that wealth can be a very cause to victorious of democratization, the wealthy and the industrial countries hardly to fall in the hand of authoritarian regime, meanwhile the flourish of democracy will not allow them. i.e. United States, India, Ethiopia and Australia respectively as a perfect example (Lijphart, 1977).

1- Orders argues that wealth or be a comfortable State can’t determine the best system of democratization and painstaking it as out of question, while countless countries are actual rich with sound economy possessions still suffering from dictators or authoritarian regimes, for occurrence the middle –East kingdoms i.e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and UAE (McGuire, 2010).

2- The democratization phenomenon can likewise be deliberated in the sunny of European Circumstances, the catastrophe of Hitler and Nazis Germany can be stated as accomplished example as consequence of authoritarian administration, the industrial revolution be present beforehand the French revolution (Beaumont & Nicholls, 2008).

3- SOCIAL EQUALITY

Acemoglu and Robinson argued that it’s difficult to observe any affiliation amid democracy and social equality they are far too apiece order so it’s intellectual impossibility that they can exertion together. People have to accidental in any part of egalitarian society to go against authoritarian system, for instance Singapore (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001). Those who hail from less equally dispersal prosperity societies will unquestionably in favor of democratic government to alteration their fate and enhancement their economy, because elite class not in favor of equal distribution of wealth or resources, like South Africa (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005).

4- CULTURAL IDENTITY

The culture can likewise have donated to stability of self-governing scheme in many countries, but some States those who disallowed democracy to flourish customarily argues and claims that their culture demonstrate them erroneous not to comfortable the democratic as ideal classification in their countries (Almond & Verba, 2015). The western culture can be a perfect example in this phenomenon, while in order way order countries or States are perfectly managed to practice democracy in their land for instance: India, Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia, Namibia, Botswana, and South Korea (Kihl, 2015).

5- FOREIGN INTERVENTION

The foreign intervention can challenge democracy and recognized authoritarian supervisions i.e. military intervention for instance, Japan and Germany after World War-II (Calhoun, 1986). Decolonization can also be part of the package as it typically reputable democracy but frequently substitutes with authoritarian management, for example in the United States, in the south after civil war former slaves were marginalized by Jim crow law after restoration era of the United States after many periods. US democracy was re-conventional by civic association the African United States civil rights movements and an outside military the United States’ military (Moravcsik, 1995).

6- EDUCATION

This is communal theory amongst the scholars appealing that education effortlessly indorses democracy procedure in the world, the poor republics continuously motivation to enhance their education scheme so that it can support to endorse the equal of democracy in their mother land (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004).

7- VARIOUS SUGGESTIONS ON DEMOCRACY

Francis Fukuyama opines in his essay (Fukuyama, 1989) (the end of history & end of man), it was his address on liberal democracy as the concluding procedure of human management, nevertheless, it has been argued that the
growth of generous economic reorganizations has had varied effects on democratization in numerous customs, it is contended, democratic foundations have been embarrased and self-controlled in order to content intercontinental capital markets or to simplify the universal tide of trade (Fukuyama, 2006a). Strategy has many dimensional meaning which sometime means plan or cause of action where to perform certain things, to make perfect arrangement for any organization, institution or Government (Battistella, Biotto, & De Toni, 2012). Moreover, it denotes a master plan of action, like war strategy for wellbeing and protection of people, the accountable mediator must have solid and palpable strategy to make people contented (McCutchen, Francis, & Kerr, 1997).

8- ELECTION STRATEGIES

This includes elections process in selection of representatives, electoral commission, where people has to perform their rights in casting their votes to elect the best and suitable candidates for the post (Fetzer, 2008). The election process can be open ballot or secret one, but mostly secret ballot is more welcome by most developed and developing countries. Strategically people should avoid any incorporative action which can lead to violation of constitution i.e election rigging, killing, riot or other chaos leads to breaking the society peace (Jacobson & Kernell, 1983).

9- DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT

The spirit of democracy is to provide equal opportunities, chances for all genders in terms of equality in all aspects of life (Rhee, 1997). The appraisal of democracy in general as a field of development support and its impact support on the political architecture in Egypt, using the USAID funded Egyptian Decentralization Initiative (EDI), as a case study, in light of democracy promotion dynamisms led by the United States in Egyptian society (Aranson, Hinich, & Ordeshook, 1974). Through democracy theory we attempted to respond to the question of whether provider countries can convincingly have inspiration on national policies in addressee countries notwithstanding resistance from the recipient countries (Ahmed, 1982). In the case of Egypt is such assistance moved towards "democratizing" the political process again merely communicating an economic system receptive of United States’ monetary interests with a comprehensible assumption that democracy is to materialize, like a white bunny out of a magician's hat, as an unoriginal of such market reform (Makram-Ebeid, 1989).? The domineering presence of the market economy as a precondition for egalitarianism and political liberalization in the Arab world is a claim that has been made and rebound by the people of Egypt, The Arabs and Western audiences for moderately some time (Alexander, 2011). For instance, the Center for International Private Enterprise works under the dictum of “dispersion democracy complete market concerned with reform”, it’s all about promotion of real spirit of democracy in the World market, all is to combat the influences of communism and their agents (Bayat, 2007). The United State of United States’ as a sole power in the World politics, economy, culture and military has making all efforts to see that her authority and ideology remains unchallenged (Brownlee, 2002).

Increasing progressively over the past two periods, democracy support is now a noteworthy essential of evolution schedules today as it shows in dissimilar fragment of the World meanwhile; there is no more competition between democracy and communism as ideology as it was before cold war (Kagan, 2004). ‘Allegedly, almanac outlay on democracy elevation is in additional of United States 5 billion dollars.’ ‘Originally led by the United States and Germany in the 1980s democracy upgrading has since then been followed by a conventional of trustworthy equivalences to numerous shades of participation’ (Ikenberry, 2002).

Currently classlessness promotion is being pursued by governments such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, the European Union, Denmark, Norway and Spain (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2004). Democracy promotion has been pursued by donors and aid agencies for a multiplicity of reasons, ranging from beliefs that democracies are less likely to go to war and thus strengthening global peace and security, supporting economic interests and trade, curbing the effect of terrorism, cold war containment strategies and extending local political ideologies and jutting them at the international level of world politics (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2004). Notwithstanding, Egypt has being considered a significant aid recipient of both military and economic aid, including democracy assistance (Petrov et al., 2007) The ‘Egypt’s political system leaves much to be desired in terms of democratic provisions, and in terms of sustenance to local government and regionalization, the United States’ Agency for International Development (USAID) has capitalized more than $800 million in local government and subsidiary missions over the past 20 years in Egypt, despite the fact that “Egypt has been administered under a centralized system that has led to limited democracy (Ahmed, 1982)”.

Why was this money allocated? Was it primarily for democratizing Egyptian politics through assisting its democratic transition? Is there a form of economic conditionality that remains implicit to what is primarily advocated as a political form of assistance? (Abed-Kotob, 1995). Beyond the bombast, Arab “exceptionalism” was animated andwell (Birks & Sinclair, 1978). The claim made here is not that United States’ in the form of democracy promotion is terrifyingly original or by any means unprecedented. Barry Gills and Joel Rocamora first criticized “low passion democracy” in 1992, noting that the documentation of entrepreneurship with democracy is not a very well hidden philosophical bias of sure western studies of Third World Democracy (Mackinder, 1919).

Today, the specific forms of democracy pushed by the West in the Third World are explicitly custom-made to serve the interests of global capital in these countries (Tessler, 2002). Here, a political economic convention of hegemonic
power holders is presented as being a matter of natural law, whether economic or developmental, rather than as a specific product of historical conditions, conflict over the pursuit of law, and class struggle" (Decalo, 1992). Or as Gills and Rocamora conclude in their analysis that low intensity democracy is ‘the political consequence of economic liberalization and internationalization (Nyang' Oro, 1994)’.

Liberalization, an economic construction will already be amalgamated and verbalizing the rules of governance, interpretation whatsoever democratization testing fairly ineffective and scruffy (Han, 1999). Such a state of activities would only differ in its effective facets lending no more bulk to the exhausted political institutions currently upholding the frontage of democracy while possession the rank quo intact finished a further alertness of monetary prosperity and political expert outside the clasp of the public scope (Pyatt & Round, 1985).

This is confirmed in the USAID reinforced Egyptian government’s approach to transference and local government, as it will be demonstrated below, whereby a lop-sided emphasis is on managerial and financial aspects to reinforce economic decentralization along with negligible concern for political decentralization and democratization of local government (Karshenas, 1997).

Neo-liberal market constructions maintained by the United States and Western Europe with all of therein eased through Intercontinental Financial Institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund are being erected (Abrahamsen, 2004), without any real efforts to create a political backdrop to anger or assimilate any form of partaking or representative government within the economic governance structures of such “reforms” (Chang, 2002).

The 2007 constitutional amendments of 34 articles, rubber embossed through parliament amidst a boycott by the weakened impression of an opposition, stood agreed off as Cairo’s center area stroked the strength of the refuge gadget predating a much earnt popular backlash against the barefaced authoritarian rule of Mubarak and his team (Palma, 2009). Unable or perhaps even reluctant to remonstrance and speech rebuff of the inequitable government of the organization, the Egyptian community at the time was once again relegated to observers choosing apathy over action (Crotty, 2005).

The advent of neo-liberal economic globalization and the mounting "subcontracting” of economic governance away from the political spheres coupled with growing apathy and disenchantment consequential from the almost non-existent forms of participatory politics and representative governments in the Arab world (Colelough, 1996), begs questions of the status of democracy, alleged democracy promotion, the type of democracy being promoted, the prospects of realizing self-rule in the Arab world at a juncture in time where notions of hegemony (Guthman, 2007), empire and imperialism and neo-colonialism are more present than ever.

Even though Safwat El Sheirf, Secretary General of the former National Democratic Party, assured Egyptians that they were living in the "brightest ages of democracy"; the researcher propose investigating the underlying theories behind democracy promotion, the impact, if any, of such efforts in Egypt, the current political economic context and whether democratization or economic liberalization are what the Egyptian regime was intending to bestow on its populace (Brenner & Theodore, 2002).

Throughout the sequence of this study, we will review the historical growth of democracy raise, criticisms of democracy assistance, measures of assessing and weighing the influence, or the lack thereof, of democracy assistance, local government in Egypt (Wissenbach, 2009), decentralization and strengthening local governance as a field of democracy assistance/ development sustenance and previous decentralization initiatives in Egypt (Snider & Faris, 2011).

The US continued to back the Mubarak regime preferring stability over uncertainty until the very end of his days in February 2011(Baloglu & Mangaloglu, 2001). The democratic façade reinforced by human rights abuses, and oppression of freedoms that defined the Modus operandi of the Egyptian despotism sustained persistent as Egypt was secret in transition and until popular protests and forays defied the authoritarianism of Mubarak’s management and exiled him out of power (Priesner & Wagner, 1961). However, Egypt’s change is equally economic and political; more ethno centric spectators will declare that it is one of absconding institution to the open hold of modernism (Saleh, 2005).

The course of transitions, helping hands usually be the western hands,they are always lengthy with suggestions of aid and assistance (Weinbaum, 1986). Democracy assistance, a comparatively new procedure of encouragement falls under this sort. Thus “democracy” mentioning to what is fundamentally a political concept depicting the abundant much-admired yet tremendously contestable superlative with rising and developing universal average is supposedly being aided and abetted to grow and embellishment by much more conversant and reputable democratic supremacies (Anderson, 2011).

However, we are involuntary to question why an essentially political concept is conditional on a very specific economic precondition that of the neo-liberal market economy (Gilsenan, 1974), at a time when economic governance is uphill in standing and progressively disentangled from the domain of political and partaking control (Wente & Melzter, 1990).

It seems to be rather self-defeating to sanction democracy based on neo-liberalism when it is argued that neo-liberalism subverts the political, i.e. democracy, to serve the economic and social (Ake, 1993).

This raises the question that whether there is frank curiosity in indorsing a neutral and ideologically free form of governance that appeals self- rule and autonomy while respecting the local discriminations of lots who have only knowledgeable the dominations of tyrannical rule (Ake, 1993).
The above opinions, also further explain selecting decentralization as a subject of review for this effort to discover the truth. Despite being used by technocrats the world over for addressing a crowd of glitches, devolution has been addressed by key benefactors and global officialdoms as a self-governance, chiefly by USAID and the case of the EDI. What the researcher will demonstrate is how the political procedures of decentralization and as demonstrated by the EDI were destabilized so that it will please the low-cost (Durac & Cavatorta, 2009).

We have selected to inspect local government performance as a subset of the wider political set and lack of democratization. Native governance existence the promptest form of administration and closest to the citizen and the focus of many democratic governance efforts in addition to decentralization being a major donor attraction and one of prescriptions (Ake, 1993) of the neo-liberal Washington Consensus. This will be done through a review of the history of local government in Egypt, decentralization in development studies in general and as applied to Egypt. This is conducted before reviewing samples of decentralization initiatives in Egypt and the case study of the USAID funded EDI (Dillman, 2002).

Egypt’s central construction of governance can be traced back to the Pharaohs. This emphasis on the centralized power of the pharaoh was also further enforced by the belief that “the demands for a centralized manipulation of the Nile’s irrigation system reinforced the tendency of the entire bureaucracy to see its interests and influence directly tied to the central government as the only legitimate seat of power (Entelis, 1997). The prosperity of Egypt was dependent on the efficiency of its governmentally highly centralized structure of governance continues to characterize Egypt’s form of governance until today (Entelis, 1997).

Various forms of governmental structures have been instilled in Egypt across Roman, Arab/Muslim, French, Ottoman, and British rule; all characterized by centralized top-down structures with the main seat of power located usually in Cairo and in Alexandria during Roman rule (Cavatorta, 2001). These local structures were tasked with duties such as tax collection, maintenance and sanitation, management of a wide range of farming activities, military drafts and at times cultural and religious ceremonies (Cavatorta, 2001). The limited decentralization, mainly involving the de-concentration of basic services such as sewage, sanitation, and local infrastructure has always been big with central government and their local arms (Cavatorta, 2001).

There is a pattern whereby only such limited functions have been entrusted to local government structures, in terms of the extent of devolution of powers, from the days of Khedive Ismail to Egypt’s former Minister of Local Development, Mohamed Abdel Salam El Mahgoub. The reasons behind the adoption of decentralization and its application by host governments have varied to and has ranged from increasing central control over peripheral areas, improving service delivery, strengthening national unity through increased participation, combating corruption, enhancing political legitimacy, tackling poverty reduction and reducing red tape amongst order reasons (Storm, 2009).

Over the last decade in Egypt alone various donors including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank, the Government of Netherlands, and the Government of Canada have put millions of dollars in supporting decentralization initiatives in Egypt such the National Program for Integrated Rural Development, also known as the Shorouk (sunrise) program, the Egyptian Decentralization Initiative, Municipal Initiatives for Strategic Recovery (MISR), and the UNDP supported Technical Support to the Ministry of Local Development (Storm, 2009).

Despite this international trend to adopt decentralized frameworks and the ongoing donor enthusiasm for such initiatives, decentralization in Egypt remains to be an “on-going” affair and political decentralization still pending (El Mansour, 1996). The economic system that of the neo-liberal market economy, and based on this economic prerequisite any “democratic” objectives must uphold the neo-liberal market economy. Since the topic currently involves both economic and political governance, we chose to examine USAID’s Egyptian (El Mansour, 1996), Decentralization Initiative to involve economic objectives, namely fiscal and administrative decentralization, that to be achieved under the objectives of strengthening democratic governance (El Mansour, 1996).

This effort will focus on examining “democracy assistance” as undertaken by USAID in Egypt through documentary analysis and the case study of the Egyptian Decentralization Initiative under the Democratic Governance portfolio conducted by USAID against a backdrop of the tangible developments on Egypt’s political and economic landscape (El Mansour, 1996) through decentralization. During the course of this effort, the researcher will examine democracy promotion and democracy assistance in general, and the theoretical underpinning of neo-liberalism at the heart of United States with democracy promotion, decentralization which is relates to neo-liberalism and democratic governance and an examination of Egypt’s history of local development and decentralization to set the stage for the case study (El Mansour, 1996).

In addition to the political economy approach utilized throughout this effort for the documentary analysis of relevant sources and the selected case studies, in addition to primary and secondary sources has been deployed throughout this work (Sreberny, 2005). Interviews have been conducted with Rudy Runko, Chief of Party, and Ernie Slingby, Senior Advisor, of the Egyptian Decentralization Initiative (EDI). Aladeen El Shawa, Local Development Expert, United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), Rania Hedeya, Program Analyst with the United Nations Development Program in Egypt responsible for decentralization Objectives (Sreberny, 2005). Achieve a better understanding of the new form of purported aid or development assistance supported by an increasing number of international development organizations particularly USAID (Sadiqi, 2016). The aid which is advocated under the guise of freedom and neutrality of a universal good when in actuality it entails hidden
conditionality and extreme ideological biases that may at times limit popular participation in the political process and encroach on and restrict the very freedoms and values allegedly being supported (Sadiki, 2016). Examining the status of democratic political development at the local level in Egypt, in the light of the aid regimes complacency with autocrats and the palpable stalemate of democratic governance in the country (Browers, 2015). The particular focus will be on the role of the United States’ aid apparatus in maintaining the status quo of a facade political democratic transition to further pursue the complete economic transition of Egypt’s economy to neo-liberal market model (Mabrour & Mgharfaoui, 2010).

10- MATERIALS

The proposed materials to be reviewed and analyzed include both qualitative and quantitative efforts on democracy assistance in general, democratic transitions, Egyptian political developments, neo-liberal expansion under the guise of political reform (e.g. the literature on low intensity democracy) and democratic alternatives to the narrowly defined capitalist United States’ model. Given the scope of this effort, quantitative efforts will only be resorted to in a selective manner throughout the course of the thesis (McGue, 1997). The research effort, in attempt to better understand democracy assistance both in Washington D.C. and its consequences in Cairo, will review both primary and secondary sources on the receiving and donor ends of the spectrum. Relevant project documents and reports commissioned by USAID (Wolk, 2004). In terms of quantitative studies, there are a number of important studies despite the difficulty in quantifying measures of democracy and therefore assessing changes in impact is a recurring theme (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009). The researcher will review the work of Scott and Steele will also review the work of Steven Hook who studied the correlations between aid allocations and democracy or human-rights issues and concerns in addition to Knack’s multivariate analysis of the impact of aid on democratization in a sample of recipient nations from 1975 to 2000 (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009). Moreover, Finkel et al.’s 2006 study of the impact of U.S. democracy assistance on democracy building worldwide used an exhaustive survey of the USAID democratic governance portfolio from 1990 to 2003 and Freedom House and Polity IV datasets.

11- UNITED STATES’ ROLE IN DEMOCRACY SPONSORSHIP AND ITS IMPACT ON DOMESTIC POLICIES OF NORTH AFRICA

Increasing steadily over the past two decades, democracy assistance is now a significant component of most major development organizations today (Chowdhury, 2004). Reportedly, annual expenditure on democracy promotion is in excess of USD 5 billion dollars. Initially led by the United States and Germany in the 1980s, democracy promotion has since then been pursued by a majority of established democracies to various degrees of involvement and engagement in the provision of democracy assistance. Currently democracy promotion is being pursued by governments such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, the European Union, Denmark, Norway and Spain (Chowdhury, 2004). Democracy promotion has been pursued by donors and aid agencies for a multiplicity of reasons, ranging from beliefs that democracies are less likely to go to war and thus strengthening global peace and security, supporting economic interests and trade, curbing the effect of terrorism, cold war containment strategies and extending local political ideologies and projecting them at the international level of world politics (Huber, 2008). Democracy promotion efforts have received mixed reviews from those who openly embrace these policies to support regime change and democratic consolidation to those who view them as a form of interventionist policies of cultural imperialism and an extension of United States’ hegemony. Indeed, democratizing Iraq and the consequent
toppling of the regime of Saddam Hussein was given as an excuse for occupation and invasion of Iraq. However, since the focus of this effort is on United States’ democracy (Huber, 2008).

Carorders promotions, it will attempt explain the rationales behind it. This chapter will focus on why democracy promotion takes place, its theoretical underpinnings, the various forms it may take and the general criticisms of this form of aid in both theory and application (Ross, 2004).

Before exploring the subject any further, we must first differentiate between democracy promotion and democracy assistance. Acute defines democracy promotion as “an umbrella term that covers various activities aimed at fostering, improving, and sustaining good governance at several political levels (Bunce & Wolchik, 2006). It comprises assistance, consolidation, dissemination, and advocacy”. While democracy assistance is described as: “the provision of support (financial, cultural, or material) to ‘democratic agents’ in the process of democratization, without entailing direct intervention (Bunce & Wolchik, 2006). It seeks to foster the conditions for the rise of a democratic regime, such as NGOs’ patronage or diplomatic pressure, and is thus as Thomas Carorders puts it, ‘a quiet support for democracy’ (Bunce & Wolchik, 2006). Burnell adds to this definition by noting that: “democracy assistance, such as practical support to the electoral process, strengthening civil society and horizontal mechanisms of accountability like the judiciary. But democracy assistance is only one of the instruments, tools or approaches that capitalist uses to promote democracy” (Benedict, Geisler, Trygg, Huner, & Hurry, 2006)

Therefore, democracy promotion is the much larger concept of supporting its governance, while democracy assistance refers to the targeted efforts pursued by development agencies to strengthen and support democratic processes (Benedict et al., 2006). An origin of Democracy Promotion before the 1980s, not much of US foreign aid was aimed at supporting or promoting democracy in the world. According to Carorders, in the 1950s, US aid was “heavily security-oriented” consisting primarily of economic and military assistance to friendly regimes (Benedict et al., 2006).

This shifted in the 1960s, with modernization theory as a driving force and the belief that economic development would lead to political development and democracy. Carorders explains this as: “economic development rose as a priority of US aid, both as a goal in and of itself and as an objective tied to US security interests – the idea being that promoting economic development in the Third World would deter countries from ‘going’ communist (Benedict et al., 2006).

Carorders notes one particular incident in 1966, with the passage of Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act, whereby USAID was to ensure the “maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of the developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic private and local government institutions” (Peart & Diaz, 2007). However, the understanding of USAID and the implementation of these programs which largely took place in dictatorships albeit in sectors such as legislatures, legal reform, labor unions and civic organizations was “more about increasing participation in economic development than about democratization (Peart & Diaz, 2007)”

However, it should also be noted that the inconsistencies of United States’ in democracy promotion were unabated by the trends in US foreignassistance (Peart & Diaz, 2007). However, what was originally a footnote in Cold War foreign policy has grown into a main aspect of development cooperation in the world today. USAID in Egypt alone has spent USD 1.13 billion in total assistance of democracy and governance during the period from 1975 to 2009 (Abrahamsen, 2000). Why the US Promotes Democracy but that promotion is not carrying perfect pictures in North Africa countries, because its unlike other part of the world.

The historical record showed a variety of reasons for the United States’ in promotion of democracy (Abrahamsen, 2000). Such as containment and the geopolitical security interests of the US during the cold war, basic human right’s needs, supporting economic expansion of US interests, reducing poverty and fighting terrorism. This section will focus primarily on the reasons given for United States’ support to democracy promotion with an emphasis on the economic reasoning inherent to what appears to be a political objective (Abrahamsen, 2000)

Democracy as we know it remains to be a universally contested concept and a relatively new one at that. According to Sen, “The idea of democracy as a universal commitment is quite new and it is quintessentially a product of the twentieth century (Abrahamsen, 2000). Democracy promotion as such is even more novel a concept and has been subject to various influences and continues to be so (Abrahamsen, 2000).

Observers have traced back the international and particularly United States’ commitment to liberal democracy and to “champion the promotion of democratic government abroad” to Woodrow Wilson’s presidency from 1913 to 1921 (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005).

This was built on Wilson’s “triad” of “liberal governance, peace and free markets”. Explained mainly in terms of what was described as a Wilsonian “internationalist liberal agenda” that sought to “shape the post-war order” and in the process (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005) “Wilson’s idealism had direct implications for his view about the goals of United States’ foreign policy such idealism has supported the Democratic Peace Thesis which simply states that “Liberal states, the argument runs, founded on such principles as equality before the law, free speech and other civil liberties, private property, and elected representation are fundamentally against war (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005).

When the citizens who bear the burden of war elect their governments, wars become impossible. Furthermore, citizens appreciate that the benefits of free trade can be enjoyed under conditions of peace”. Ikenberry sums up the liberal argument for democracy promotion aptly as “the United States is better able to pursue its interests, reduce security threats in its environment, and foster a stable political order when other states particularly the major great powers are democracies rather than non-democracies” (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005). Originating from Wilson’s triad and subsequently shaped by various economic arguments and the ensuing market fundamentalism, democracy
promotion has maintained its role to varying degrees within United States’ foreign policy (Griffin, 1991). Such economic biases have not only impacted the practice of democracy promotion but have also been a driving force in Western, mostly United States’ approaches to aid in general. According to one senior Western aid official the logic was simple: “economic growth would create a middle class with property interests which, however small would make its beneficiaries hostile to political instability in general and Communism in particular” (Griffin, 1991).

These views were put forward by Smith, Ralph, Robinson, Gills and Rocamora amongst others. This can be summed up by the fact that the US as it pursues its economic interests supports the creation and maintenance of regimes that are conducive to the neoliberal economic order, irrespective of what that entails for the local populations, which have primarily market economies and complementary democracies (Griffin, 1991).

This is further emphasized through the constant importance free markets play in the various strands of theory underpinning United States’ democracy promotion whether in the Wilsonian triad, the Democratic Peace Thesis, free market liberal democracy’s impact on economic development, neo-liberal Ergonomics and Clinton’s democratic enlargement (Smith, 2000). Throughout the course of United States’ democracy promotion, the role of free markets was always vital to any form of political or democratic organization (Smith, 2000).

12- THE RISE OF WASHINGTON CONSENSUS AND NEOLIBERALISM

The prescriptions of the Washington Consensus, advocate the following: “free trade, capital market liberalization, flexible exchange rates, market determined interest rates, the deregulation of markets, the transfer of assets from the public to private sector (Dowd & Dobbin, 2001) The tight focus of public expenditure on well directed social targets, balanced budgets, tax reform, secure property rights, and the protection of intellectual property rights” (Dowd & Dobbin, 2001). They have been critiqued by many observers and yet continue to set the standard for policy making in Egypt and many “reforming” economies today. It is beyond the scope of this effort to discuss the disadvantages of such an economic system, however, we must understand how devastating such an approach to governance, actually are to fully comprehend the result of a free market neo-liberal pre-requisite for democratic governance (Saeed et al.). Although the now infamous Washington Consensus was originally envisioned by John Williamson as an economic solution that would be appropriate for developing countries and accepted in policy making circles in Washington, it was later discovered that it in fact exacerbated the problems it set out to alleviate (Bonnie & Wallace, 2004). The main reason for this is that in the original formulation, Williamson did not endorse free capital mobility. However, as the term became associated with the right wing economic policies endorsed by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, also known as Reagonomics, certain attributes of the original form (Craig & Porter, 2006) Evaluation changed such as the emphasis on “free capital movements, monetarism, and a minimal state that accepts no responsibility for correcting income inequalities or managing serious externalities” (Hudson, 2010). The ensuing economic orthodoxy has had disastrous effects all over the globe in achieving fair, equitable and sustainable economic growth (Hudson, 2010).

13- DECENTRALIZATION AND NEOLIBERALISM

What Held refers to as “the minimal state” or what is dubbed by Kerlin and Kubal as “state shrinking” are vital aspects of the Washington Consensus. According to (Kaščák & Pupala, 2014)“state shrinking became the agenda of the day, as reformers worked under the assumptions that private markets were inherently more efficient than government bureaucracies and that where outright privatization was not possible, and is a recurring theme in this thesis, Slater further elaborates on this point noting that (Kaščák & Pupala, 2014) “The view that the term ‘decentralization’ can be deployed as a mask, to cover quite different objectives, has been recently reasserted since the 1970s ‘international technocracy’ has been sustaining ideas of decentralization through an interrelated series of schemes, such as the promotion of intermediate sized and small towns, integrated rural development, self-help housing and the championing of the ‘informal sector’ (Kaščák & Pupala, 2014). As far as the territorial organization of the state is concerned, the municipality is in the process of being resurrected, whilst central bureaucracy is being cast in the role of the key barrier to balanced development in the United States and Western Europe, the idea of decentralization becomes as a mask for dismantling the welfare state. Whereas some specific functions of the state maybe decentralized to the local level, there is no equivalent decentralization of resources; on the contrary there is more concentration of wealth (Brinkerhoff, 2009).The idea of decentralization is attractive; it can be seen as a way of breaking free the solidified blocks of a rigid central bureaucracy; it can be invoked as a crucial step towards a more sustainable pattern of social and economic development, and it can be linked to calls for more participation in the decision making process as a whole (Brinkerhoff, 2009). However, it can also be a less than overt step on the way to increased privatization, deregulation and a rolling-back of many of the economic and particularly social functions of the state (Brinkerhoff, 2009).

However, we must further investigate how USAID views decentralization and its application. The USAID Democratic Decentralization Programming Handbook elaborates on USAID’s approach to decentralization, of which economic development and consequentially economic reform are integral components, usually under the neoliberal economic orthodoxy. According to the USAID handbook (Kaščák & Pupala, 2014).

“Decentralization can help advance a number of distinct objectives. From the standpoint of promoting stability, strengthening the subnational offices of national government agencies can help accommodate diverse local demands
in a conflict-ridden environment (Kaščák & Pupala, 2014). With a view toward democracy, devolving power can invest larger numbers of citizens as active participants in the political system, giving political opportunities at the subnational level to actors who do not typically wield much influence in national politics (Kaščák & Pupala, 2014).

In terms of economic development, more empowered local administrations and governments can enhance responsiveness to the range of citizen demands (Kaščák & Pupala, 2014). Considering these numerous objectives, decentralization can usefully be conceptualized as a reform that advances the exercise of political freedom and individual economic choices in a context (Samoff, 1990). In Egypt USAID provided approximately $1 billion funding of projects supporting local government for the period which started from 1975 to 1995, it is approximately 90% of donor funding for local government projects in above mentioned time. The case study of the Egyptian Decentralization Initiative clearly shows the focus of the project on the financial and administrative aspects of decentralization at the expense of strengthening democratic and participatory processes (Samoff, 1990). We can also agree with Gills and Rocamora including in their analysis that low intensity democracy is ‘the political corollary of economic liberalization and internationalization’ (Samoff, 1990).

This is quite an alarming observation, particularly when juxtaposed with the previously mentioned fact that during the period from 1975 to 1995, USAID has been the dominant source of funding of projects supporting local government in Egypt with a total amounting to $1 billion (Souza, 1996). Despite the contributions of various donors concluding Japan, the UK and Canada, USAID has provided approximately 90% of funding for local government projects in that period. The Mubarak regime understood that it could afford to restrict the Egyptian political landscape, but would have to concede economically (Souza, 1996) Although some trace economic liberalization to the Sadat sponsored open door policy, which was intended to make Egypt more attractive to foreign investment yet, resulted in “principally an opportunistic tactic intended to facilitate the inflow of Arab funds” (Soederberg, 2001). Interestingly enough that despite the open door policy and the association of the early days of economic liberalization with Sadat, public sector employment rose from 780,000 in 1970 to 1.1 million in 1980, total subsidies rose from less than 2% of GDP in 1971 to 13% in 1980 and the number of employees rose from 1.2 million in 1970 to 1.9 million in 1978 (Craig & Porter, 2006).

However, the bulk of liberalization of Egypt’s economy under the dictates of neoliberalism and the structural adjustment program came under Mubarak. Rutherford attributed the beginning of Egypt’s economic restructuring to the agreement with the International Monetary Fund in March 1991 with the objective to “transform Egypt into a competitive market economy that was fully integrated into the global economic system” (Craig & Porter, 2006). Prior to this Egypt owed $40 billion or 112% of GDP, using the official exchange rate, or 184% of GDP, using a free market exchange rate, making Egypt “the most heavily indebted. Due to Egypt’s role in the Gulf War in 1990, the United States, the Gulf countries and the Paris Club wrote off $6.7 billion in military debt, $6.6 billion in loans and $10 billion in debt (restructured the remaining $10 billion), respectively (Craig & Porter, 2006).

Despite forgiving roughly 50% of Egypt’s debt, various donors and IFIs including the United States, the Gulf, Europe, Japan, South Korea, the IMF, the World Bank increased significantly their economic assistance to Egypt including $7 billion in emergency economic assistance during Gulf War and $8 billion after the war (Harrigan, Wang, & El-Said, 2006). The IMF sponsored Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Plan (ERSAP) involved cutting government investment, slashing subsidies and an extensive privatization program. As Ikram notes (N. Alexander, 2002): “privatization on the scale proposed was not simply a financial exercise, but rather the abandonment of a model of development that had shaped Egyptian society for a generation” (N. Alexander, 2002). The Egyptian government began privatization of 314 public sector enterprises in 1991, by 2000 it had sold off a controlling interest in 118 enterprises for LE 12.3 billion and a minority interest in 16 companies for LE 1.8 billion and drawing IMF praise that Egypt had the fourth successful privatization program in 1998. Egypt continued the neoliberal economic trajectory outlined in the 1990s, privatizing 9 companies with a total value of $17.5 million in 2003, and then 59 firms with a total value of $2.6 billion in the period from 2005 to 2006. The World Bank continued to praise Mubarak’s regime and, the rise of market liberalism that began in 1991 continued and manifested itself in the NDP’s new guard led by Gamal, Mubarak and the government of Egypt’s economic policy until the ousting of Mubarak in February 2011 (Shearer & Studies, 1998).

As Egypt transitions into a market economy, supported by US democracy assistance, it has yet to experience an equally democratic transition. Labeled by some as a “semi-authoritarian” regime, it is still not yet a democratic country, despite market reforms (Harrigan et al., 2006). Should this transition occur, the impact of marketization on democratic and participatory politics will likely be disastrous similar to the cases of Chile and Mexico, discussed in more detail in the case study chapter (Dorman, 2006). Some of these trends are already visible such as economic differentiation and regional disparities and extremely weak political participation and the occupation of the political space by a dominant neo-liberal party, in Egypt’s case the former National Democratic Party (NDP) (Dorman, 2006).

As Heydemann notes in his analysis of the use of selective economic reforms to further authoritarianism in Arab regimes: selective liberalization reflects the broader dynamics of authoritarian upgrading: Arab regimes appropriate and exploit economic policies that are often seen as inimical to authoritarianism because they are able to use these instruments to reinforce their hold on power (Dorman, 2006). For governments, the political benefits of selective liberalization are particularly important. Regime elites and their allies use their political privileges to capture the resources generated by economic openings. Incumbents manage access to economic opportunities as a political resource, rewarding friends and penalizing adversaries, Selective economic reforms generate the essential economic resources upon which processes of authoritarian upgrading depend (James, 1998). They also provide the basis for
expanding the social coalitions that help to stabilize the regimes politically, providing incentives that bind private sector actors to elite counterparts in government and bureaucracy” (James, 1998). USAID support to the 105 Heydemann, decentralization efforts of the Mubarak regime and the NDP continued despite the acknowledgement of both USAID as an organization of their limited impact on strengthening democracy and as the interviewed staff members managing the project noted in terms of implementation of specific objectives related to the strengthening of participatory mechanisms in decentralization. However, the inherent neo-liberalism and focus on free markets at the heart of democracy assistance is not the only criticism, this growing form of aid assistance has managed to receive (James, 1998).

Democracy promotion has taken several forms within the multilayered systems of geopolitics, international affairs and development. It can range from tacit diplomatic pressure, support for election monitoring and local government to full out military occupation through complete regime removal and regime change as experienced in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan (Harrigan et al., 2006). As explained earlier, this work will focus on democracy assistance which is: “the provision of support (financial, cultural, or material) to ‘democratic agents’ in the process of democratization, without entailing direct intervention. It seeks to foster the conditions for the rise of a democratic regime, such as NGOs patronage or diplomatic pressure, and is thus, ‘a quiet support for democracy’ (Harrigan et al., 2006). Burnell adds to this definition by noting that: democracy assistance, such as practical support to the electoral process, strengthening civil society and horizontal mechanisms of accountability like the judiciary. But democracy assistance is only one of the instruments, tools or approaches that democracy promotion uses to stimulate democracy”. Carorders uses another term which is the third level, is that democracy promotion has “become an integral part of an interventionist US foreign policy in the Arab Middle East, epitomized in the invasion and occupation of Iraq” (Bond, 2011). It is clear that the case of Egypt falls within the first and second levels, the policy level and traditional public diplomacy as identified by Dalacoura (Bond, 2011). However, this level can be further clarified as Carorders provides a broad definition and categorization of what he terms “democracy aid”. Carorders defines democracy aid as a phenomenon which is falling within three general categories defined as follows. In terms of Egypt’s development and the attempts of “building a well-functioning state”, Rutherford demonstrates the rise of market liberalism and the neo-liberal economic order at the heart of the Egyptian state formation since 1990 (Bond, 2011). Rutherford notes that “the conception of market liberalism that emerged within the private sector in the 1990s was integrated into the ideology of the ruling party and the policies of the government by 2006”. This model of the “well-functioning state” although severely lacking in terms of democratic governance was acceptable to the United States and the West as it adhered to the dictates of neo-liberalism and the slow and hampered integration of Egypt within the global economy (Bond, 2011). Given the scope of this thesis, we will focus on the use and capturing of selective economic reform to further authoritarianism and counter balance democracy promotion, his “End of History” argument: “he [Fukuyama] sees no contradiction between the terms ‘liberal’ and ‘democracy’ despite the fact that the clash between the rights of the liberal individual, and the duty of the democratic governments to limit the freedom of individuals has been the central dispute in democratic theory throughout its history (Held, 2006). Held further adds to this debate and critiques the limited United States’ centric view of liberal democracy in an excellent overview and analysis of democratic models in the world today, held identifies eight different models of democracy (Held, 2006). Moreover, held further emphasizes the schisms and debate within liberal democracy, as he notes: “liberalism cannot be treated simply as a unity (Held, 2006). There are, as we have seen, distinctive liberal traditions set down by figures such as John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill, which embody quite different conceptions from each other of the individual agent, of autonomy, of the rights and duties of subjects, and of the proper nature and form of political community (Held, 2006). This is a striking lacuna, since liberalism itself is an ideologically contested terrain. A key element of this debate, on liberties within a market economic model of democracy pertains to notions of socio economic justice and participation (Held, 2006). Hook points out: “the tension between political liberty and socioeconomic equality as components of a democratic polity has always been a central dilemma of social organization given their inherent contradictions (Held, 2006).The U.S. democratic model, however, has traditionally emphasized political liberty while de-emphasizing socioeconomic equality. Indeed, the latter has been consistently viewed (Held, 2006). However, Carorders believes that this changing albeit gradually on a “steep, often punishing, learning curve”. He claims that “American aid providers are moving away from the simplistic application of made-in-America templates, resorting less often to the sending abroad of inexperienced, heavy-handed United States’ consultants, and coming to the recognition that technical fixes will not solve deeply entrenched political problems” (Held, 2006) . This may be happening as claimed by Carorders gradually. However, “less often” does not mean that it seizes to exist. The closure of the International Republican Institute’s office in Cairo in 2006, prior to the commencement of its operations, because of what can be termed the “inexperienced and heavy-handed” director’s comments regarding the “speed up of political reform in the country” is a case in point and even if some examples of United States’ democracy assistance in practice show some elements of change, it is difficult to neglect the wider theoretical underpinning and overall strategic objectives and US economic interests at the heart of democracy assistance, described in the earlier section with particular reference to the case of Egypt. Al Sayyid notes in his analysis of US assistance to civil society in Egypt and some segments who are suspicious of the objectives of this assistance “They do not see the aid as a sign of Washington’s commitment to promote democracy (Weiner, Huntington, & Almond, 1987). Rather, they look at it as effect that might have on the achievement of its interests, primarily economic and
geo-strategic. For example, when Hamas is democratically elected, the US was quick to distance and indirectly punish Palestinians for this democratic misjudgment on their part. However, electoral fraud in Egypt is tolerated and US military and economic support continues unabated after limited concern is expressed (Weiner et al., 1987).

The historical record of United States’ democracy promotion shows that the US has resisted democracy as much as it has claimed to support it (Weiner et al., 1987). Building on the work of Steve Smith and his analysis of US resistance to democracy in Latin America and the Middle East, according to Smith: “these two regions of the world seem to support the view that the US has been involved in undermining democratic regimes rather than fostering them. And crucially, the driver for such a policy in both regions has been US economic interests” (Weiner et al., 1987). As Hook notes: “the promotion of democracy has long served as a key vehicle of the projection of US ideals as well as for the pursuit of the country’s material self-interests…Liberal governments pursuing market-oriented economic policies have always served the ‘national interests’ of the United States (Phillips, 1980)”

The US has not shied away from supporting repressive regimes the world over and particularly in the Arab world, where democracy assistance has not amounted to much (Rustow, 1970). US support for appalling regimes ranging from apartheid South Africa, Israel, Mubarak’s Egypt, Pinochet’s Chile, Marcos of the Philippines, Sukarno and Suharto in Indonesia, the Shah’s Iran to name but a few is clear case of the importance of overriding strategic interests. A point that is echoed by Steve Smith in his critical analysis of democracy promotion: “the entire debate about democracy promotion is set up in such a way as to make criticism particularly difficult. Like apple pie, how can anyone be against the expansion of democratic rights to parts of the globe that are currently ruled by despots? (Rustow, 1970)” Additionally, it is noted that evaluating democracy assistance has replicated some of the very criticisms democracy assistance has received, Crawford aptly notes that: “conventional evaluation reproduces a negative feature of democracy assistance itself it is externally led and controlled, with limited input from local actors” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999). Such inquiries have no doubt had an effect on assessing the impact of democracy promotion and assistance, if the end goal is uncontestable or above criticism, how can the process of achieving it be placed under scrutiny or questioned as he notes: “We are seeing this both in the pushback from a number of nondemocratic governments that are actively resisting democracy assistance in new and creative ways, and also in a heightened questioning by people in many parts of the world of the value and legitimacy of democracy promotion itself” (Held et al.). But, on the other hand, it should be noted that the theoretical underpinning of this very approach regarding the prerequisite of economic development for democratic transformation was proven faulty by the cases of China and Russia, where neoliberal market reforms have not led to substantive democratic gains. Although never explicitly stated by the Egyptian government the same approach has been adopted through controversial economic reforms and liberalization without the equivalent in terms of political reform (Fukuyama, 2006b). What was dubbed by Jadish Bhagwat as the “cruel dilemma”, one between either economic development or political development, was “subsequently revised as social scientific understanding of the type of political regime and development underwent a double paradigm shift. It moved away from economic determinism and the suspicion that if regimes do influence development then authoritarian polities have certain advantages, towards a conviction that political institutions make a difference and in the long run democracies possibly do it better” (Fukuyama, 2006b). According to UNDP, governance or lack thereof is vital as “an improved understanding of the quality of governance in a country is critical to deliver on poverty reduction and human development goals” before any claims, can be made about whether both economic and political development are both feasible and possible to achieve simultaneously, we must first consider the effectiveness of political development efforts in terms democracy assistance and assistance efforts in achieving what they claim to do (Fukuyama, 2006b).

### 14- POSSIBILITIES OF EVALUATING AND ASSESSING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE

Evaluation is now integral aspect of development assistance. Reasons have varied from the growing need to deliver “results” amidst decreasing donor funding increased pressure for accountability to improved management and planning processes that feed into better development programming and discussions of aid effectiveness as manifested in the 2005 Paris Declaration “to increase the effectiveness of development assistance with concrete indicators and targets” (Orum, 1983) However, evaluation procedures are by no mean novel. Evaluation was first introduced to development assistance in the 1950s, despite not being put into systematic use until the 1970s and early 1980. According to UNDP, evaluation is essential in establishing linkages between past, ongoing and future initiatives and development results, supporting accountability and building knowledge because: “Monitoring and evaluation can help an organization extract relevant information from past and ongoing activities that can be used as the basis for programmatic fine-tuning, reorientation and future planning (Orum, 1983). Without effective planning, monitoring and evaluation, it would be impossible to judge if work is going in the right direction, whether progress and success can be claimed, and how future efforts might be improved. When evaluations are used effect (Gastil, 1993) However, the ambitious and multifaceted objectives have come under scrutiny and valid concerns are raised by Jacquet in report by the Center for Global Development as part of the Evaluation Gap Working Group: “Part of the difficulty in debating the evaluation function in donor institutions is that a number of different tasks are implicitly simultaneously assigned to evaluation: building knowledge on processes and situations in receiving countries, promoting and monitoring quality, informing judgment on performance, and, increasingly, measuring actual impacts (Gastil, 1993) Other agencies still need their own evaluation teams, as important knowledge
providers from their own perspective and as contributors to quality management. But these teams provide little insight into our actual impacts and, although crucial, their contribution to knowledge essentially focuses on a better understanding of operational constraints and local institutional and social contexts (Gastil, 1993). All these dimensions of evaluations are complementary. For effectiveness and efficiency reasons, they should be carefully identified and organized separately: some need to be conducted in house, some outside in a cooperative, peer review, or independent (Gastil, 1993). Development practitioners and observers alike need to be overly astute to notice that the above methodologies are applied rigorously by donor agencies such as USAID, UNDP, the World Bank, German Technical Assistance Agency (GTZ), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the European Commission, Department for International Development (DFID) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) amongst others. What UNDP and CIDA refer to as Results-Based Management (RBM) is known in USAID as Managing for Results (MFR) but is essentially the same approach (Ghany, 2012). This was later modified in the mid-1990s, with the introduction of what is known as RBM and MFR by CIDA and USAID respectively. CIDA defines the result as “a describable or measurable change in state that is derived from a cause and effect relationship”. Usually these changes are the results of the project inputs. According to Crawford: “RBM entails a typical log-frame approach with the construction (Ghany, 2012) That particular construction provides framework” (PF) and ‘performance measurement framework’ (PMF) The PF provides the anticipated cause and effect relationships from the level of activities (inputs) upwards to strategic goals, including assumptions and risk assessments, while the PMF provides a systematic plan for measurement and verification through (mainly quantitative) performance indicators and data collection requirements”. USAID on the order hand, and the main focus of this effort, uses a slightly different wording although similar methodology. Within USAID’s MFR the Strategic Objective (SO) is defined as: “the most ambitious result (intended measurable change) in a particular program area that a USAID operational unit, along with its partners” can materially affect and for which it is willing to be held responsible (Bowman, 1996).” The second level, known in other agencies as the output is called, Crawford adds to this explanation noting that: “The three levels of objectives are linked in causal hypotheses’ that is, each is perceived as an essential step leading to the next level (Bowman, 1996). Within the DG sector, a strategic objective could simply reflect the agency goal (sustainable democracy built), or one of the four agency objectives (for example rule of law strengthened), while an “intermediate result” is more specific” (for instance, effective justice sector institutions). Performance indicators ‘answer the question of how much (or whether) progress is being made towards a certain objective’, with appropriate indicators requiring the ready availability of data sources” (Przeworski & Limongi, 1993). In the case of the chosen case study for this effort, the researcher will be reviewing the Egyptian Decentralization Initiative (EDI) supporting the Intermediate Result: Good Governance promotes a more accountable and responsive local government under USAID’s Strategic Objective: “Initiative in Governance Strengthened”. The EDI has the following objectives (sub-intermediate results): Increased Egyptian financial resources available to local governments for responding to community priorities; enhanced participatory mechanisms to plan, allocate, and monitor the use of resources; and strengthened administrative capacity and legal framework for local governments to effectively and transparently manage resources (Przeworski & Limongi, 1993).

15- THE LIMITATIONS OF LFA AND RBM IN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE PROGRAMMING

The application of the Logical Framework Approach (LFA) and the closely related Results Based Management (RBM) approach to evaluate democratic governance, have been highly criticized and their effectiveness questioned. According to the report on International Development Research Center (IDRC) “Evaluating Governance Programs” “the notion of causality in governance programming was rejected: there are too many variables at play Evaluation of governance work is not scientific per se or as Wong notes: “the practice of democracy assistance is very different from the “clinical” approach assumed in experiments. In addition, the characteristics of democratic phenomena are inherent complex, multi-dimensional and highly context-specific (Mattes & Bratton, 2003). These are conditions more appropriate for qualitative evaluation methodologies that can support causal conclusions. Specifically, methods for generating and assessing evidence on causal mechanisms have been developed in the general evaluation literature but little applied in the evaluation of democracy assistance.” The IDRC report also noted a more striking and damming aspect of applying limited methodologies to democratic governance evaluations: “traditional evaluation approaches which demand the application of the same tool and logic model to all initiatives were rejected as irrelevant and possibly destructive. It was noted that some of the evaluation tools in use today (such as Logical Framework Analysis – LFA, Results Based Management – RBM, and Indicators-based studies) were developed with different purposes, primarily the evaluation of discrete blueprint-type (Macpherson, 1977) Crawford further elaborates on the limited nature of LFA and RBM approaches: “the logical framework approach is narrowly geared towards project evaluation, most appropriately where clear outputs can be achieved within a specific time-span and where ‘hard’ quantitative data is more readily available, that is, ‘blueprint-type projects’ such as infrastructural projects. It is less appropriate for evaluation of wider program goals (Macpherson, 1975). This is especially true in an area like democracy and governance, a ‘soft’ area of programming in which institutional relationships and culture are the subject of reform, where time frames are hard to predict, and change is difficult to measure. “One of the strongest criticisms of this approach comes from one of most sited commentators of United States’ democracy assistance” Thomas carorders criticizes the limited approach of US aid’s managing for results (MFR).
The effort to assess the impact of democracy programs by using highly reductionist indicators is a deeply flawed undertaking that is consuming vast resources, producing little useful insight or knowledge, and introducing serious distortions into the designing and implementing of such aid democratization in any country cannot be broken down neatly and precisely into a set of quantitative bits the false dream of science, the belief that all those messy particularities of people and politics can be reduced to charts and statistics” Crawford adds evidence to this that “LFA is inward oriented, inverting evaluation towards pre-determined project objectives. In contrast, political interventions require an outward orientation, able to capture the political context in which such interventions are implanted (Macpherson, 1975). This is particularly important given that the overall context is itself a significant factor in influencing the success or otherwise of external donor interventions, for instance, the relative strength or weakness of domestic pro-democratic actors. Thus, the nature of democratization, and of programs intended to assist such processes, are not appropriate to log frame-type analysis: LFA cannot anticipate and capture political dynamics in which local actors make their decisions” (Macpherson, 1975). However, quantitative analysis of NED grants paints a different picture. Scott and Steele conducted a study of 1,754 NED assistance grants from 1990 to 1997 and democratization data from the developing world, using control variables such as wealth, progress in education and the impact of culture to test two main hypotheses: Democracy Promotion Hypothesis: Democracy assistance by the NED contributes to progress in democratization of recipient countries; Democracy Consolidation Hypothesis: The democratization of recipient countries results in NED grants designed to reinforce that progress (Macpherson, 1975). Their analysis found that the democracy promotion hypothesis, whereby NED grants resulted in greater democratization was “firmly rejected” and so was the hypothesis on democracy consolidation. According to the study: “NED aid neither produces democracy nor follows democratization (Macpherson, 1975). The rejection of these hypotheses, made even more emphatic by the negative relationship between grants and democracy scores shown in the data, serves as important counter to the optimistic assessments of the NED’s impact this conclusion is in line with previous studies on the relationship, if any, between aid and democratization (Macpherson, 1975). Steven Hook found that aid allocations are not driven by democracy or human-rights issues or concerns. Knack’s multivariate analysis of the impact of aid on democratization in a sample of recipient nations between 1975 and 2000 could not find. However, Finkel et al found in their 2006 study of the impact of U.S. democracy assistance on democracy building worldwide, using an exhaustive survey of the USAID democratic governance portfolio from 1990 to 2003 and Freedom House and Polity IV datasets, that: “USAID Democracy and Governance obligations have a significant positive impact on democracy, while all other U.S. and non U.S. assistance variables are statistically insignificant (Macpherson, 1975). It should be noted though that Despite arguing that democracy assistance had positive impacts in general, when analyzing the Middle East, despite some 606 million dollars in democracy assistance, the study notes that the “Middle East as the exception to the general pattern” (Crawford Brough Macpherson, 1975). Given the origins of Freedom House, it is understandable if their indexes are not necessarily the most objective (Macpherson, 1975). As Smith aptly notes in his reservations and criticisms of United States’ democracy promotion: the form of democracy being promoted, and specifically the on the relationship between this geopolitical policy and United States’ geo-economics policy the latter drives the former, to such an extent that it results in the form of democracy promoted being particularly narrow and thereby suitable for supporting US economic interests” (Macpherson, 1975). Within the general support to democracy assistance is the issue of World Bank and USAID support to the neoliberal Washington consensus in decentralization reforms is a case in point and is discussed in more detail throughout this work (Crawford, 2003). The historical argument and examples of subordination of democracy assistance to US economic interests and the promotion of a specific type of democracy are numerous and well documented. Egypt, second only to Israel as a recipient of United States’ aid, is by no means a democratic country (Crawford, 1998). Yet it receives a significant share of total United States’ aid and is considered a friendly moderate ally of the United States in the region (Crawford, 2000). However, Egypt is not a democratic country; this is offset by its economic liberalization in line with the market economic prescriptions of neo-liberalism, which is applauded by Washington and conducive to United States’ economic interests (Crawford, 2000) Egypt is but one of many cases where stability and security concerns in addition to economic interests have overshadowed the concerns raised by democracy promotion (Crawford, 2000). However, it should be noted that the neo-liberal inspired democracy assistance efforts supported by the United States could be in part responsible for the absence of democratic and participatory politics or eventually responsible for the weakening of the very aspects these policies claim to support (Crawford, 2000). As demonstrated by the previous United States’ support to low intensity democracy and impact of neo-liberal reforms on democratization and meaningful participation in a wide range of countries, this is not a farfetched claim (Crawford, 2000). As Hook notes: “The U.S. democratic model, however, has traditionally emphasized. This has also brought the US’s commitment to democracy under suspicion in recipient countries as democracy assistance in particular and US aid are seen as a means to create an United States’ model of a free market democracy (Crawford, 2000) . Democracy assistance is also further complicated by the overarching US concerns for security and stability in the Arab world. Moreover, to economic interests, US geostrategic and security interests have shaped US foreign policy and consequentially democracy assistance to ensure US interests through favoring stability and security of its allies, lest democracy bring about governments that are not hospitable to US interests (MacPherson, 1973). The historical record is abundant with cases where the US has supported regimes that do not espouse United States’ ideals of liberties and freedoms, primarily because they are allies of the US. Mubarak’s Egypt is one of many of these regimes and could be categorized as such best friend (MacPherson, 1973). The criticisms of United States’ democracy promotion
efforts have varied from the theoretical and political levels to the actual implementation of democracy assistance. Alleged democracy promotion has taken the form of military intervention, political diplomatic pressure and development assistance programs (MacPherson, 1973). The main theoretical or political criticisms include being eclipsed by geo strategic considerations, lacking credibility due to their inconsistent application, Given the context for democracy assistance today and the widening gap between academic criticisms and implementation of democracy assistance programs, the field has a long way to go before funding matches the achievement of results and programming is improved to strengthen democratic (MacPherson, 1973). Alternative approaches to democracy promotion at the policy level such as supporting more comprehensive and systematic policies for reform in the Arab world that would democratize economic opportunities and strengthen the link between social and political reform are also growing (Skocpol & Fiorina, 2004). Yet for these significant and much required shifts to take place both donor and recipient countries will be required to induce changes that would make democracy assistance more effective. However, the critical review of democracy assistance outlined above, only covers the supply side of the equation, namely the approach of the US as the donor country to democracy promotion and assistance (Skocpol & Fiorina, 2004). The analysis thus far has not included the reactions within recipient countries particularly when there is resistance to some of the elements supported by such aid as is the case of United States’ democracy assistance in Egypt (Skocpol & Fiorina, 2004)

16- HISTORY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND DECENTRALIZATION IN EGYPT: DONORS’ STRUGGLE WITH GOVERNMENT

Egypt’s centralized structure of governance can be traced back to the Pharaohs. As it was believed that the Pharaoh was the son of the sun god Ra, which did not leave much room for provincial or regional autonomy (Mayfield, 1996). This emphasis on the centralized power of the pharaoh was also further enforced by the belief that “the demands for a centralized manipulation of the Nile’s irrigation system reinforced the tendency of the entire bureaucracy to see its interests and influence directly tied to the central government as the only legitimate seat of power. The prosperity of Egypt was dependent on the efficiency of its governmental organization (Mayfield, 1996) to a degree hardly equaled anywhere in the world”. Even though some observers claim that such a centralized structure of Paranoiac Egypt only pertained to affairs of the Nile. Various forms of governmental structures have been instilled in Egypt across Roman, Arab/Muslim, French, Ottoman, and British rule; all characterized by centralized top-down structures with the main seat of power located usually in Cairo and in Alexandria during Roman rule (Mayfield, 1996). These local structures were tasked with duties such as tax collection, maintenance and sanitation, management of a wide range of farming activities, military drafts and at times cultural and religious ceremonies. Throughout history, local government in Egypt has continued to be weak in favor of a centralized state and charged with only limited functions at the expense of realizing functioning local governance structures. Despite various donor interventions to support decentralizations and strengthen democratic participatory politics at the local level, political decentralization through increased local participation in the decision making process and the transfer of political power have not taken place in Egypt primarily due to the resistance of the Government to political liberalization and its acceptance of economic liberalization (Darwish, 2008).

17- HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN EGYPT FROM THE PHARAOHS TO BRITISH RULE

During Pharaonic times, Egypt was divided in 24 provinces (names) which were each headed by a governor appointed by the Pharaoh (Mayfield, 1996). The number of provinces changed across historical periods with varying forms of regional structures, but the general overall structure remained significantly unchanged. During Ottoman and Mamluk rule, the Nile valley was divided in 24 provinces which were headed by bays. Local councils were first introduced in Egypt by the French colonialists, whereby the largest 14 provinces (Mudiriya) had bureaus usually in charge of administration and security (Finer, 1997). French influence on local government in Egypt has been significant from Napoleon to Mohamed Ali, a point which has prompted one observer to note that the current 4-tier Egyptian administration system comprised of (Muhafza, Markaz, Qism, and Qarya) is curiously like France’s system of (department, Arrondissement, canton, and commune) During the reign of Mohamed Ali, Egypt’s 14 largest rural provinces each had a provincial council that lacked representative and autonomous administrative and, an interesting example of initiative in local governance dates back to the mid-1860s when concerned citizens, mostly foreign merchants, established the Comité du Commerce d’ Exportation or the Export Commerce Committee to improve local infrastructure in the absence of central support from Cairo (Finer, 1997). The Export Commerce Committee was allowed by the Central government to raise some funds to improve the infrastructure, provided that the process is under the supervision of the governor (Finer, 1997). This ushered in an early experience in municipal politics in the 1870s with the formation of the “mixed municipal council” (Ma’lul Baladiya Mukhatalat) comprised of Egyptians and foreigners. Although the council lacked municipal powers and authorities it was allowed to raise some funds for local infrastructure, sewage systems and public works (Finer, 1997). However, even with these limited roles, the representative councils were required to receive final approval from the center. By 1910, the British established local councils in many villages that had police stations, with the chief of police in the village acting as the chairman of the local council. By 1944, 152 councils were
present in cities, towns and villages divided as follows 13 mixed councils, 55 local councils, and 84 village councils (Nidumolu, Goodman, Vogel, & Danowitz, 1996). However, these highly bureaucratic councils had significantly weak financial and decision-making authorities and were not well received by the local villages; this as such led to protest and dismay from the local villagers. By 1952, only 70 out of the 4000 villages had such councils. However, it should be noted that several of these councils were disbanded due to opposition and unrest (Nidumolu et al., 1996). However, dissent was not the only game in town, as conformity and acquiescence to the occupation did exist. It should be noted that due to British occupation, most upper echelons (undersecretaries and director generals), were British citizens, especially in the areas of finance, justice, transportation, and irrigation and thus were dominated by the British Civil Service (Nidumolu et al., 1996). This further strengthened the perceived need of the Egyptian personnel at the local levels to conform and answer to the center on all matters (Nidumolu et al., 1996).

18- LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDER NASSER

Nasser and the Revolutionary Command Council came to power in 1952, which prompted the drafting of a new constitution to usher in a new era in Egypt’s history. According to some observers the new constitution was to be more “democratic” and “local government institutions would be emphasized (Aruri, 1970). The 1953 draft of the constitution witnessed 15 articles dedicated to the functioning of local government such as the following:

1- The central government was specifically prohibited from nominating or controlling the election of the local council chairmen (Aruri, 1970).
2- Non-elected members, including the ex official members selected by the Central Government would be restricted to no more than one fourth of the total council membership.
3- Specific powers were identified to ensure the collection and mobilization of adequate local resources to fund local public works projects (Abdulkadir, 2016).
4- The principle of local decision-making autonomy was outlined restricting central government interference and ensuring that all disputes between local and central authorities could be presented to the Supreme Constitutional Court for resolution (Abdulkadir, 2016).

However, despite a real effort towards drafting a “democratic” constitution and the establishment of a truly decentralized system, as outlined in the 1953 draft of the constitution, the Nasser regime did not hesitate to ignore these articles in their entirety (Abdulkadir, 2016) The final version of the constitution of 1956 placed “all reference to local government under the presidential and central executive authorities”. The 1956 constitution actually reversed some of the political and institutional gains for local government as experienced in the 1923 constitution as it limited the discussion of local government to: “The Egyptian republic shall be divided into administrative units, and all or some of them may enjoy corporate status” (Quigley, 1994). It should be noted that Law 124 of 1960 drew heavily on the territorial and organizational structure of Egypt’s single party, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), with ASU presence corresponding to the government’s administrative divisions at the levels of the governorate, town and village (Quigley, 1994). The ASU also had executive bureau comprised of key party leaders at both the district and governorate level. The following observations have been made regarding the relationship between the ASU structure and its implications on the system of local administration in Egypt (Quigley, 1994).

Despite the clear requirement for the councils at all three levels to be comprised of elected, selected and ex officio members, the process of election is worth reviewing more closely. Under Law 124 of 1960, all the elected local administration officials had to be members of the ASU (Quigley, 1994). At the village level the twelve elected members would be directly selected from the ASU’s lajnat al-ishrin (Quigley, 1994). The two selected members of the village local council were chosen based on loyalty to the party and efficiency based on a decree from the Ministry of Local Administration and the governor (Quigley, 1994). While ex officio members were selected from government administrators representing the main sector ministries present in the village usually the following six: The Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Interior (Rubinstein, 1979).

19- LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDER SADAT

Under Sadat’s regime came Law 52 of 1975 as a culmination of discussions and recommendations to allegedly strengthen local administration in Egypt. Although initially the new law did have various characteristics of a decentralized system of local government, it was relatively short lived and eventually revisited in 1979 (Rubinstein, 1979). Below are some of the recommendations that were adopted and thus changing some of the 93 aspects of the system of local administration as previously outlined by Law 124 of 1960:

1- The local council would be comprised of elected officials only instead of the previous System of selected and elected officials within the same council. An executive committee comprised of the various administrative officials would be established at the levels of the governorate, district and village (Rubinstein, 1979).
2- The local people’s councils were granted the right to Istigwab (question, challenge and require a response) the local officials on the executive committees on issues pertaining to administration, policy, and service delivery (Rubinstein, 1979).
3. The establishment of the Services and Development Fund which allowed for the collection and retention of funds at the local level without having these funds returned to the central government at the end of the fiscal year. This was considered to be a breakthrough in terms of increased revenues and resources with the possibility of greater autonomy and decentralized processes (Baker, 1978).

4. The establishment of the council of beneficiaries (majalis al mustafidin) which included beneficiaries of the services being provided at the local level such as health and education (Baker, 1978). The purpose of these councils was to create a platform for interaction with the service providers to voice concerns, handle complaints, improve service delivery, and ensure equitable distribution and accountability (Baker, 1978)

However, not all the recommendations were accepted by the National Assembly. These rejected recommendations included: the central government’s provision of an independent budget allocation to the local councils, the creation of a local government career system in the governorates for greater authority over the technical and administrative personnel to be hired, the allocation of a “lump sum” grant to be utilized at the discretion of the governorate, the establishment of integrated. It is interesting how the government of Egypt is still grappling with whether or not to implement similar recommendations today (Nidumolu et al., 1996).

A problem that is further exacerbated by the rising poverty and inequality levels across the country, diminishing and inadequate service delivery and the strikingly weak capacities within the current system of local administration (Nidumolu et al., 1996).

1. Both the executive councils and the local people’s councils were to be part of one administrative structure (Nidumolu et al., 1996).

2. All budgetary and policy-implementation powers were delegated to the executive councils (Anderson, 1987).

3. Local people’s councils’ roles were redefined from decision making bodies to advice and review giving councils. The previously granted right of Istigwab, which was granted to the elected local councils earlier was severely restricted. And as such the local people’s councils became hollowed out platforms of participation with review and consultative responsibilities only (Bhatia, 2005).

4. Councils of beneficiaries were cancelled as they were perceived to serve redundant functions as those of the local people’s council (Bhatia, 2005).

However, Sadat’s reform of the local administrative system does not end their law 50 of 1981, which was a minor amendment to Law 43 of 1979, granted increased financial responsibilities to local councils in terms of revenue generation at the local level law 50 of 1981 also created the Higher Council for Local Administration which was to be chaired by the Prime Minister and was comprised of all governors, and elected governorate level local council chairmen. Although intended as a direct platform between local government officials and national leaders and despite potentially beneficial impacts on local administration in Egypt, the council never met and was later eliminated in an amendment to Law 43214 (Bhatia, 2005). It is worthy to note that the return of the Higher Council for Decentralization is being proposed in the draft law (Bhatia, 2005) prepared by law 145 would also require the governorates to work closely with the Ministry of Local Administration instead of the Ministry of Finance on “matters related to planning, capital investments, and annual budgets” (Bhatia, 2005). However, as is demonstrated in the case study, there have been steps taken to position the Ministry of Finance as a main partner in the establishment of fiscal decentralization. Another interesting article is that pertaining to the required approval of the governorates’ draft budget by the People’s Assembly and the right to resort to the Ministry of Local Administration or the prime minister in case of disapproval. Mayfield claims that this could be “a ‘sleeper clause’ with important implications for strengthening the local people’s councils in the long run” (Bhatia, 2005)

Local government has given autonomy to various local bodies to enable them to run their affairs freely but need the consent of central authority (Makram-Ebeid, 1989). The central government should fulfill their responsibility in providing facilities to every local government. Egypt has historical informal local government since years back, when pharaoh was the king as well as the president and the head of the government (Makram-Ebeid, 1989).

The benefit of local government can be discussed in terms of creation of wealth. Facility and many more. Meanwhile, the importance of local government is to have full attentiveness and focus on all provinces, states and people, to provide wellbeing of its citizens. Local government provides equality of opportunity, justice and perfect administration to have appropriate capital and wealth (Makram-Ebeid, 1989).

**20- CONCLUSION**

Accommodations are hardly unusual in societies emerging from a long period of authoritarian rule. The challenge of pluralism in Egyptian society wasn’t allow this Arab nation to adopt perfect democratic system in the country, but deepening its economic and political crisis. United States of America only pursuing her agenda in Egypt by applying different types of containments, such as, political, economic and military containments respectively to gain her own political schedule without establishing an excellence atmosphere for democratic system. Sadat local government was aimed to serve social ambitions but was fruitfulness because of these containments. The utilization
of wealth, education, cultural identity and social equality in perfect directions can bring solid democratic system to the Egyptian society.

REFERENCES


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